Ilya Somin

Voter Ignorance and the Democratic Ideal

Abstract If voters do not understand the programs of rival candidates or their likely consequences, they cannot rationally exercise control over government. An ignorant electorate cannot achieve true democratic control over public policy. The immense size and scope of modern government makes it virtually impossible for voters to acquire sufficient knowledge to exercise such control. The problem is exacerbated by voters’ strong incentive to be “rationally ignorant” of politics. This danger to democracy cannot readily be circumvented through “shortcut” methods of economizing on voter knowledge costs. A truly democratic government must, therefore, be strictly limited in scope.

Knowledge About Ignorance: New Directions in the Study of Political Information

Abstract For decades, scholars have recognized that most citizens have little or no political knowledge, and that it is in fact rational for the average voter to make little or no effort to acquire political information. Rational ignorance is fully compatible with the so‐called “paradox of voting” because it will often be rational for citizens to vote, but irrational for them to become well informed. Furthermore, rational ignorance leads not only to inadequate acquisition of political information, but also to ineffective use of the information that citizens do possess. The combination of these two problems has fundamental implications for a variety of issues in public policy and international affairs.

Richard Posner's democratic pragmatism and the problem of ignorance

Abstract Richard Posners Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy urges that political and legal decision makers should be guided by what he calls “everyday pragmatism,” rather than by “abstract” moral theory. He links his conception of pragmatic government to Sclmmpeters unromantic view of democracy. Posner argues that judicial review should be based on a combination of pragmatism and adherence to this limited conception of democracy, rather than sticking closely to “formalist” theories of adjudication, which demand strict adherence to traditional legal norms. However, Posners consequentialist pragmatism fails to provide an adequate guide to judicial decision making, because it does not give us any criterion for deciding which consequences are desirable. His Schumpeterian theory of democracy, too, is problematic because it does not sufficiently consider the shortcomings exposed in recent scholarship in political science and economics.

Controlling the Grasping Hand: Economic Development Takings After Kelo

The Supreme Court’s controversial decision in Kelo v. City of New London upheld the condemnation of private property for purposes of economic development. This Article argues that Kelo was wrongly decided and that courts should forbid economic development takings. Part I analyzes the flaws of economic development takings generally. Such condemnations allow politically powerful interest groups to capture the condemnation process for the purpose of enriching themselves at the expense of the poor and politically weak. This Part also shows that the need to eliminate holdout problems that could block desirable assembly projects cannot justify permitting economic development takings. In most cases, private developers can prevent holdouts by such noncoercive methods as assembling property in secret and adopting precommitment strategies that prevent holdouts from using their bargaining power. Part II considers the major alternatives to a categorical ban. While these proposals are not without merit, none can prevent eminent domain abuse as effectively as forbidding the economic development rationale altogether. In Part III, I consider the Kelo case itself. In advocating broad deference to local governments on public use issues, the Kelo majority unfortunately ignored the serious defects in the political processes that control economic development takings. The Court’s analysis of history and precedent also has significant weaknesses. Nonetheless, Kelo actually represents a modest improvement on the Court’s previous public use decisions, by holding out the possibility of at least slightly greater judicial scrutiny. Part III also provides a very preliminary assessment of the political backlash against Kelo, showing that much of the proposed anti-Kelo legislation provides little or no real protection for property owners. Part IV strikes an additional note of caution, showing that even a categorical ban on economic development takings is not a comprehensive solution to the underlying problem of eminent domain abuse. A ban on economic development takings can potentially be circumvented in several ways, most notably because such bans still permit condemnations to alleviate blight. Courts in many states have already defined blight so broadly that the definition could encompass virtually any property.

Foot Voting, Political Ignorance, and Constitutional Design

The strengths and weaknesses of federalism have been debated for centuries. But one major possible advantage of building decentralization and limited government into a constitution has been largely ignored in the debate so far: its potential for reducing the costs of widespread political ignorance. The argument of this paper is simple, but has potentially important implications: Constitutional federalism enables citizens to “vote with their feet,” and foot voters have much stronger incentives to make well-informed decisions than more conventional ballot box voters. The informational advantage of foot voting over ballot box voting suggests that decentralized federalism can increase citizen welfare and democratic accountability relative to policymaking in a centralized unitary state.Ballot box voters have strong incentives to be “rationally ignorant” about the candidates and policies they vote on because the chance that any one vote will have a decisive impact on an electoral outcome is vanishingly small. For the same reason, they also have little or no incentive to logically evaluate the information they do know. By contrast, “foot voters” choosing a jurisdiction in which to reside have much stronger incentives to acquire information and use it rationally; the decisions they make are individually decisive.Political ignorance is far from the only factor that needs to be considered in determining the degree of centralization in political systems. But it deserves greater attention than it has received so far.

Why Political Ignorance Undermines the Wisdom of the Many

ABSTRACT Hélène Landemores Democratic Reason effectively demonstrates how cognitive diversity may potentially improve the quality of democratic decisions. But in setting out the preconditions that democracy must meet in order for the many to make collectively well-informed decisions, Landemore undermines the case for voter competence more than she strengthens it. The conditions she specifies are highly unlikely to be achieved by any real-world democracy. Widespread voter ignorance and the size and complexity of modern government are severe obstacles to any effort to implement Landemores vision. Better-informed decision making is more likely to be achieved by allowing a wider range of issues to be decided by “voting with your feet” instead of at the ballot box.

Democracy and voter ignorance revisited: Rejoinder to Ciepley

Abstract Democratic control of public policy is nearly impossible in the presence of extreme voter ignorance, and this ignorance is in part caused by the vast size and scope of modern government. Only a government limited in its scope can be meaningfully democratic. David Ciepleys response to my article does not seriously challenge this conclusion, and his attempts to show that limited government is inherently undemocratic fail. Ciepleys alternative vision of a “democracy” that does not require informed voters turns out to be not a defense of democracy at all, but a rationalization for any form of government that achieves a high level of leadership skill and bureaucratic efficiency.

Eminent Domain: A Comparative Perspective

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The Ongoing Debate Over Political Ignorance: Reply to My Critics

ABSTRACT The participants in this symposium raise many insightful criticisms and reservations about my book Democracy and Political Ignorance: Why Smaller Government Is Smarter. But none substantially undermine its main thesis: that rational political ignorance and rational irrationality are major problems for democracy that are best addressed by limiting and decentralizing government power. Part I of this reply addresses criticisms of my analysis of the problem of political ignorance and its causes. Part II assesses challenges to my proposed solution.

The Constitutionality of the Individual Mandate

Since the Affordable Care Act was passed, numerous lawsuits have been filed arguing that the federal mandate that individuals obtain health insurance is unconstitutional. Three appeals courts have issued mixed rulings, and the matter will probably ultimately be decided by the Supreme Court. In this video roundtable, Wendy Mariner moderates a discussion between legal scholars Jack Balkin and Ilya Somin focusing on the relevant constitutional issues.