Ina C. Uzgiris

Two Functions of Imitation During Infancy

A review of recent studies on imitation, particularly during infancy, suggests that imitation may serve two functions: gaining understanding of puzzling observations and communicating mutuality and shared understanding with another person. Although changes in cognitive understanding influence development in imitation, the occurrence of imitation in specific situations may be governed by the interplay of the two functions that imitation can serve. This analysis implies that research needs to consider not only the kinds of acts that are imitated at different developmental levels, but also the childs understanding of the interpersonal interaction during which imitation is obtained in order to elucidate the age-related trends in imitation.

Imitation of Actions with Objects: The Role of Social Meaning

Abstract The effect of meaningfulness of modeled acts on imitation by infants was investigated by comparing imitation of four acts, each carried out with a socially appropriate and an inappropriate object. A total of 40 infants, equally divided between 7 1/2-, 10-, 16-, and 22-month-old groups, were videotaped in play with a set of toys and while imitating actions carried out with objects. Imitation was found to increase with age. The two middle groups imitated acts with socially appropriate objects more frequently, while the 22-month-olds imitated acts with both types of objects about equally. Simple familiar acts were imitated most by the youngest group, but were imitated much like acts with inappropriate objects by the older children. It was suggested that meaningfulness rather than familiarity is probably the important dimension affecting occurrence of imitation during middle infancy.

Organization of Sensorimotor Intelligence

Infancy is traditionally recognized as a distinct period in the course of human life; with regard to intellectual activity it is frequently considered to be not only distinct but different. Even those who do not view ontogenesis in terms of qualitative transformations seem to recognize a gap between functioning in infancy and in subsequent age periods. The apparent limitations on self-initiated activity, on physical mobility, and on communication with others during infancy have impressed numerous observers and have led to the conjecture that the infant’s world may be quite unlike the world as known by the adult. Thus studies of infant intelligence have been concerned largely with charting those infant behaviors that seem to indicate progressive approximation to adult patterns of action, or those that seem to document acquisition of concrete information about the world. Since the importance of advance to adult and thereby uniquely human forms of intellectual activity is so clear, the relative neglect of forms of functioning characteristic of infancy itself need not be surprising.

Some Observations on Early Cognitive Development

The issue that I should like to take as my central concern pertains most broadly to organization of achievements in development. If the notion of organization is taken to imply a differentiation of parts in a system and an interdependence of the parts through specifiable relations within the system, the issue of organization may be addressed at the level of actions or at the level of structurations of cognitive processes manifested in actions. One of the attractions of studying development during infancy stems from the relative lack of differentiation between the level of actions and of thought during this period. In the course of this presentation, I should like to share with you some observations on the interrelationships between various achievements stemming from a longitudinal study of a small group of infants as well as some speculations on the implications these observations have for the question of organization in early cognitive development.