Incheol Shin

An Efficient Message Authentication for Non-repudiation of the Smart Metering Service

This paper proposes an efficient message authentication scheme providing non-repudiation of the smart metering service in Smart Grid. One of the main challenges in securing Advanced Meter Infrastructure is to accomplish message authentication and non-repudiation services in the metering service. Low power consumption of cryptographic operations in smart meter devices is another critical issue. The proposed scheme utilizes authentication values generated using linked two keys to reduce the number of signature operations. Our scheme provides the assurance of the integrity and origin of metering data. These features prevent either consumers or utilities from denying their authenticated metering data. Furthermore, the proposed scheme achieves low power consumption in the viewpoint of significant cryptographic operations.

The Not-So-Smart Grid: Preliminary work on identifying vulnerabilities in ANSI C12.22

Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) is envisioned to have the potential to revolutionize the power grid making it the “Smart Grid”. AMI, through the use of “smart meters” and high-speed networks, promises to strengthen both the stability and sustainability of the grid. The vision of AMI is to enhance and improve the grid by providing fine grained control over pricing and usage to both the utility and the customers. The promise is so convincing that there have been rapid large scale deployments all over the world in a very short time. In this frenzy of excitement, security of AMI, an issue of utmost importance may have been overlooked. In this paper, we present preliminary work of an in-depth study of vulnerabilities in AMI against cyber attacks. We point out vulnerabilities in ANSI C12.22, the protocol specification for interfacing smart meters with data networks. We also show how these vulnerabilities can be used to launch denial of service (DoS) attacks on the AMI and then propose potential solutions.

DLMS/COSEM security level enhancement to construct secure advanced metering infrastructure

This paper proposes an authentication and key management framework to strengthen the security level of the advanced metering infrastructure based on the DLMS/COSEM standard. The current DLMS/COSEM standard does not specify detailed secret key generation and distribution procedures, which induce a critical issues regarding interoperability in secure communication among AMI devices. Moreover, the protocol suffers from a key distribution problem, which can expose a session secret key supposed to be shared only by two devices to a third party node. The basic ideas are that smart meters and data collection systems perform the authentication and key exchange with AMI server using existing Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) standard, and DLMS/COSEM secret keys are created and shared securely using pre-formed secure channels. We show how the proposed framework can be realized in advanced metering infrastructure using existing standard protocols and provide preliminary security and performance comparisons with the existing related proposals.

Replacing Cryptographic Keys in AMI Mesh Networks with Small Latency

Advanced Metering Infrastructures (AMI) facilitate efficient and reliable exchange of electricity information between the homes and utilities. Their unique characteristics (e.g., connecting millions of smart meters; accessing customers’ private information), however, make them a lucrative target for adversaries. For example, an attacker might try to compromise the head-end of an AMI and send “remote disconnect commands” to the smart meters, disconnecting a large number of customers. To implement message authentication and protect message integrity and confidentiality, a number of cryptographic keys are being utilized. A “command key”, for example, signs messages that are sent from the head-end to the meters. Such keys, however, introduce their own set of problems if they ever get compromised. A stolen command key would allow an adversary to continuously send malicious commands to the meters. Hence, the compromised keys must be revoked and replaced as quickly as possible. This paper proposes an efficient and reliable key distribution framework for the AMI mesh networks based on the connected dominating set approach. The keys are replaced with minimal latency through our “hexagon-tile coloring scheme”, which allows the maximum number of keys to be transmitted in parallel, free of collision.

On Trigger Detection against Reactive Jamming Attacks: A Localized Solution

Reactive jamming attacks have been considered as the most critical and fatally adversarial threats to subvert or disrupt the networks since they attack the broadcast nature of transmission mediums by injecting interfering signals. Existing countermeasures against reactive jamming attacks, i.e. frequency hopping or channel surfing, requires excessive computational capabilities, which are infeasible for low cost resource constraint Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs). To overcome the problems for normal lower power sensors, we propose an efficient localized jamming-resistant approach against reactive jamming attacks by identifying trigger nodes whose transmissions invoke the jammer. By constraining the trigger nodes to be receivers only, we can avoid invoking the jammers and completely nullify the reactive jamming attack. The triggers identification approach utilizes a hexagon tiling coloring and sequential Group Testing (GT), which does not demand any sophisticated hardware. Theoretical analyses and simulation results endorse the suitability of our localized algorithm in terms of time and message complexity.