Irène Couzigou

International organisations and states within an agency relationship: the distribution of responsibility

This article first examines the entire range of agency relationships between an international organisation, acting as a principal, and one or more states, acting as its agent(s). It is here argued that an agency relationship between an international organisation and one or more state(s) can be established by the constitutive treaty of the organisation, or ad hoc. In particular, an ad hoc agency relationship results from a state placing one of its organs at the disposal of an international organisation and under its effective control, with the purpose of carrying out functions of that organisation.The article then examines the consequences for the responsibility of the organisation andthe relevant state(s) of an agency relationship between an international organisation acting as a principal and one or more states acting as its agent(s). It is demonstrated that an international organisation may be responsible for damage caused by the conduct of the state. Furthermore, it is argued that the state itself may bear responsibility for having established or for not having terminated the agency relationship if it commits wrongful conduct on behalf of the international organisation.

Securing cyber space: the obligation of States to prevent harmful international cyber operations

ABSTRACT The paper argues that the obligation of States to prevent harmful international activities perpetrated within their territory, or any other area under their exclusive control, applies to activities conducted in cyber space. Thus, a State is bound by an obligation to prevent detrimental cyber conduct committed from its territory or transiting through its territory, or any other area under its exclusive control, when it knows or should have known of the conduct, when the conduct contradicts the rights of another State, and when it may cause or is causing serious harm. Where a State is aware or should have been aware of the misuse of its territorial cyber infrastructure, the State must attempt to prevent or to react to the harmful transboundary operation, applying all reasonable measures. The content of the obligation of due diligence to prevent damaging cross-border cyber activities depends on the economic, financial and human resources of the State. The paper concludes that the obligation to preclude harmful international cyber operations constitutes only a first step in securing information and communication technology and should be sustained and improved by the introduction of a treaty on cyber security.

The Fight Against the “Islamic State” in Syria : Towards the modification of the right to self-defence?

This article analyses whether the military operation against the “Islamic State” in Syria led to a modification of the right to self-defence in customary international law. It outlines the arguments presented by some States in favour of a right to self-defence against the IS as a non-State actor. It also explains that, in contradiction with the traditional temporal understanding of the right to self-defence, some of the States intervening in Syria assert a right to react to imminent armed attacks or even to a simple threat of armed attacks committed by the IS. This article shows that there is limited international acceptance of a broad right to self-defence as a justification for the military involvement in Syria. It concludes that neither a right to self-defence against a non-State actor, nor a right to self-defence in reaction to potential future attacks, has crystallised in customary international law. However it acknowledges that the fight directed against the IS in Syria constitutes another step towards the emergence of a customary right to self-defence against non-State actors in response to current or future armed attacks.

The Challenges Posed by Cyber Attacks to the Law on Self-Defence

States have become increasingly dependent on computers and the networks that connect them. The development of cyber space enables States and non-State actors to increase their offensive capabilities significantly. Cyber attacks can now be carried out more easily and with a lower risk of detection than attacks with conventional weapons. These attacks may produce effects that are not only internal to a computer or network but also external, by causing harm to connected facilities which could in turn lead to serious physical harm to property or individuals. Such would be the case for example when a computer network attack disables an air traffic control system and causes an airliner to crash. This paper addresses a number of challenges posed by cyber attacks to the law of self-defence. Section II outlines the international criteria for the attribution of a cyber operation to a State. Section III argues that only cyber attacks reaching the level of an armed attack give the right to the victim State to use self-defence. Section IV explains that the law on self-defence does not offer an effective response to cyber attacks because, as international law stands, only cyber attacks attributed to States trigger the right to self-defence. Section V concludes that current international law on self-defence needs to be adapted to meet the challenges posed by cyber attacks.