Irina Stefanescu

Cost Shifting and the Freezing of Corporate Pension Plans

Many U.S. corporations have frozen defined benefit (DB) pension plans, replacing new DB promises with contributions to defined contribution (DC) plans. We estimate expected DB accruals from the age-service and salary distributions of a large sample of U.S. corporate pension plans with more than 1,000 employees. Comparing the counterfactual DB accruals to the actual increase in 401(k) and other DC contributions for firms that freeze, we find only partial compensation to employees for the lost DB accruals. Net of the increase in total DC contributions, firms save 2.7-3.6% of payroll per year, and over a 10-year horizon they save 3.1% of total firm assets. Workers would have to value the structure, choice, flexibility, or portability of DC plans by at least this much more to experience welfare gains from freezes. The forgone accruals and net cost effects are initially largest for older employees but over time become largest for middle-aged employees who plan to stay with the firms until retirement. Furthermore, the probability that a firm freezes a pension plan is positively related to the value of new accruals as a share of firm assets. While there are differences in the age-service distributions of firms that freeze versus those that do not, we find that the differential accrual effect is largely driven by differences in benefit factors and the relative importance of labor in the freeze firms production function. The results overall support the hypothesis that pension freezes affect overall compensation and therefore that they change compensation costs relative to a workers marginal product.

Pay Me Now (and Later): Pension Benefit Manipulation before Plan Freezes and Executive Retirement

Large US firms modify top executives’ compensation before pension-related events. Top executives receive one-time increases in pensionable earnings through higher annual bonuses one year before a plan freeze and one year before retirement. Firms also boost pension payouts by lowering plan discount rates when top executives are eligible to retire with lump-sum benefit distributions. Increases in executive pensions do not appear to be an attempt to improve managerial effort or retention and are more likely to occur at firms with poor corporate governance. These findings suggest that in some circumstances managers are able to extract rents through their pension plans.

Pay Me Now (and Later): Bonus Boosts Before Pension Freezes and Executive Departures

We show that large public companies in the United States change the assumptions of the benefit formulas of the defined benefits pension plans for their top executives in anticipation of plan freezes and executive retirements. In particular, on average top executives receive a boost in annual bonuses (an input of the pension benefit formula) by 15–50% one year before pension freezes and executive departures. Such boosts are not driven by firm performance or other known determinants of annual bonuses. Our findings are also robust to alternative research designs that address potential endogeneity problems. Interestingly, we do not find significant increases in equity awards, which do not affect the value of pension benefits, before pension freezes or executive departures.