Iris Blandón-Gitlin

Imagination and memory : Does imagining implausible events lead to false autobiographical memories?

Previous studies have reported that imagination can induce false autobiographical memories. This finding has been used to suggest that psychotherapists who have clients imagine suspected repressed memories of childhood sexual abuse may, in fact, be inducing false memories for the imagined events. In this study, at Time 1 and then, 2 weeks later, at Time 2, 145 subjects rated each of 20 events on the Life Events Inventory as to whether each had occurred to them in childhood. One week after Time 1, the subjects were told that 2 target events were plausible and 2 were implausible. They were then asked to imagine 1 plausible and 1 implausible target event. Plausibility and imagining interacted to affect occurrence ratings; whereas imagining plausible events increased the change in occurrence ratings, imagining implausible events had no effect on occurrence ratings.

Are Computers Effective Lie Detectors? A Meta-Analysis of Linguistic Cues to Deception

This meta-analysis investigates linguistic cues to deception and whether these cues can be detected with computer programs. We integrated operational definitions for 79 cues from 44 studies where software had been used to identify linguistic deception cues. These cues were allocated to six research questions. As expected, the meta-analyses demonstrated that, relative to truth-tellers, liars experienced greater cognitive load, expressed more negative emotions, distanced themselves more from events, expressed fewer sensory–perceptual words, and referred less often to cognitive processes. However, liars were not more uncertain than truth-tellers. These effects were moderated by event type, involvement, emotional valence, intensity of interaction, motivation, and other moderators. Although the overall effect size was small, theory-driven predictions for certain cues received support. These findings not only further our knowledge about the usefulness of linguistic cues to detect deception with computers in applied settings but also elucidate the relationship between language and deception.

Is knowing believing? The role of event plausibility and background knowledge in planting false beliefs about the personal past

False memories are more likely to be planted for plausible than for implausible events, but does just knowing about an implausible event make individuals more likely to think that the event happened to them? Two experiments assessed the independent contributions of plausibility and background knowledge to planting false beliefs. In Experiment 1, subjects rated 20 childhood events as to the likelihood of each event having happened to them. The list included the implausible target event “received an enema,” a critical target event of Pezdek, Finger, and Hodge (1997). Two weeks later, subjects were presented with (1) information regarding the high prevalence rate of enemas; (2) background information on how to administer an enema; (3) neither type of information; or (4) both. Immediately or 2 weeks later, they rated the 20 childhood events again. Only plausibility significantly increased occurrence ratings. In Experiment 2, the target event was changed from “barium enema administered in a hospital” to “home enema for constipation”; significant effects of both plausibility and background knowledge resulted. The results suggest that providing background knowledge can increase beliefs about personal events, but that its impact is limited by the extent of the individual’s familiarity with the context of the suggested target event.

When is an intervening line-up most likely to affect eyewitness identification accuracy?

Method. In each of the 3 experiments, a forensically relevant factor known to affect the accuracy of face recognition memory was manipulated to assess how the factor impacted the suggestive influence of an intervening line-up on eyewitness identification accuracy in a subsequent test line-up. These factors were (a) in Experiment 1, samerace versus cross race target faces, (b) in Experiment 2, whether the intervening line-up occurred on the day of the presentation phase (close to presentation) or 1 month later on the day of the subsequent test line-up (far from presentation), and (c) in Experiment 3, whether the target face was presented for 10 seconds or 60 seconds. Results. In each experiment, factors associated with poorer memory for the target face led to a greater suggestive influence of the intervening line-up on identification accuracy in the subsequent line-up, evidenced by lower hit rates and higher false-alarm rates. Conclusions. These findings suggest that the problem of decreased identification accuracy following the viewing of an intervening photograph is especially of concern when memory for the perpetrator is likely to be poor. Implications of these findings for interpreting line-up results in the courtroom are discussed.

Oxytocin eliminates the own-race bias in face recognition memory.

The neuropeptide Oxytocin influences a number of social behaviors, including processing of faces. We examined whether Oxytocin facilitates the processing of out-group faces and reduce the own-race bias (ORB). The ORB is a robust phenomenon characterized by poor recognition memory of other-race faces compared to the same-race faces. In Experiment 1, participants received intranasal solutions of Oxytocin or placebo prior to viewing White and Black faces. On a subsequent recognition test, whereas in the placebo condition the same-race faces were better recognized than other-race faces, in the Oxytocin condition Black and White faces were equally well recognized, effectively eliminating the ORB. In Experiment 2, Oxytocin was administered after the study phase. The ORB resulted, but Oxytocin did not significantly reduce the effect. This study is the first to show that Oxytocin can enhance face memory of out-group members and underscore the importance of social encoding mechanisms underlying the own-race bias. This article is part of a Special Issue entitled Oxytocin and Social Behav.

A reverse order interview does not aid deception detection regarding intentions

Promising recent research suggests that more cognitively demanding interviews improve deception detection accuracy. Would these cognitively demanding techniques work in the same way when discriminating between true and false future intentions? In Experiment 1 participants planned to complete a task, but instead were intercepted and interviewed about their intentions. Participants lied or told the truth, and were subjected to high (reverse order) or low (sequential order) cognitive load interviews. Third-party observers watched these interviews and indicated whether they thought the person was lying or telling the truth. Subjecting participants to a reverse compared to sequential interview increased the misidentification rate and the appearance of cognitive load in truth tellers. People lying about false intentions were not better identified. In Experiment 2, a second set of third-party observers rated behavioral cues. Consistent with Experiment 1, truth tellers, but not liars, exhibited more behaviors associated with lying and fewer behaviors associated with truth telling in the reverse than sequential interview. Together these results suggest that certain cognitively demanding interviews may be less useful when interviewing to detect false intentions. Explaining a true intention while under higher cognitive demand places truth tellers at risk of being misclassified. There may be such a thing as too much cognitive load induced by certain techniques

Strategic Interviewing to Detect Deception: Cues to Deception across Repeated Interviews

Previous deception research on repeated interviews found that liars are not less consistent than truth tellers, presumably because liars use a “repeat strategy” to be consistent across interviews. The goal of this study was to design an interview procedure to overcome this strategy. Innocent participants (truth tellers) and guilty participants (liars) had to convince an interviewer that they had performed several innocent activities rather than committing a mock crime. The interview focused on the innocent activities (alibi), contained specific central and peripheral questions, and was repeated after 1 week without forewarning. Cognitive load was increased by asking participants to reply quickly. The liars’ answers in replying to both central and peripheral questions were significantly less accurate, less consistent, and more evasive than the truth tellers’ answers. Logistic regression analyses yielded classification rates ranging from around 70% (with consistency as the predictor variable), 85% (with evasive answers as the predictor variable), to over 90% (with an improved measure of consistency that incorporated evasive answers as the predictor variable, as well as with response accuracy as the predictor variable). These classification rates were higher than the interviewers’ accuracy rate (54%).

The inhibitory spillover effect: Controlling the bladder makes better liars.

The Inhibitory-Spillover-Effect (ISE) on a deception task was investigated. The ISE occurs when performance in one self-control task facilitates performance in another (simultaneously conducted) self-control task. Deceiving requires increased access to inhibitory control. We hypothesized that inducing liars to control urination urgency (physical inhibition) would facilitate control during deceptive interviews (cognitive inhibition). Participants drank small (low-control) or large (high-control) amounts of water. Next, they lied or told the truth to an interviewer. Third-party observers assessed the presence of behavioral cues and made true/lie judgments. In the high-control, but not the low-control condition, liars displayed significantly fewer behavioral cues to deception, more behavioral cues signaling truth, and provided longer and more complex accounts than truth-tellers. Accuracy detecting liars in the high-control condition was significantly impaired; observers revealed bias toward perceiving liars as truth-tellers. The ISE can operate in complex behaviors. Acts of deception can be facilitated by covert manipulations of self-control.

The effects of photographs and event plausibility in creating false beliefs.

Recent studies have shown that using photographs as memory retrieval aids can significantly increase the likelihood of false memories. The current study further investigated this effect by examining the interactive effects of photographs and event plausibility in developing false beliefs. At Time 1 and two weeks later at Time 2, participants rated 20 events on the Life Events Inventory (LEI) as to whether each occurred to them in childhood. One week after Time 1, participants were told that two target events were plausible and two were implausible. They then used event-related photographs to visualize one plausible and one implausible event. Occurrence ratings significantly increased from Time 1 to Time 2 for plausible events in the photo condition. These results suggest that the use of photographs as a memory enhancing technique is unlikely to cause false memories for events that are not perceived personally plausible.

Can credibility criteria be assessed reliably? A meta-analysis of criteria-based content analysis.

This meta-analysis synthesizes research on interrater reliability of Criteria-Based Content Analysis (CBCA). CBCA is an important component of Statement Validity Assessment (SVA), a forensic procedure used in many countries to evaluate whether statements (e.g., of sexual abuse) are based on experienced or fabricated events. CBCA contains 19 verbal content criteria, which are frequently adapted for research on detecting deception. A total of k = 82 hypothesis tests revealed acceptable interrater reliabilities for most CBCA criteria, as measured with various indices (except Cohen’s kappa). However, results were largely heterogeneous, necessitating moderator analyses. Blocking analyses and meta-regression analyses on Pearson’s r resulted in significant moderators for research paradigm, intensity of rater training, type of rating scale used, and the frequency of occurrence (base rates) for some CBCA criteria. The use of CBCA summary scores is discouraged. Implications for research vs. field settings, for future research and for forensic practice in the United States and Europe are discussed.