Irwin M. Wall

France in the Cold War

During the Cold War France fashioned its foreign policy first in con-junction with, and then in opposition to, the United States. In the immediate post-war era the French diverted American monies intended for economic growth and military defence against the USSR to colonial struggles in Indochina and Algeria. In the 1960s, France dissented from American policy in Vietnam, withdrew from NATOs integrated com-mand, and pursued its own agenda in the hope of achieving détente. This policy foundered due to the May 1968 upheaval, but it was picked up by Willie Brandts Ostpolitik and contributed to bringing about the end of the Cold War.

Mitterrand's France

Outlines the policy intentions and achievements of the French socialists in the key sectors of the economy, social welfare, industry, education, culture, defence, decentralisation and foreign policy.

A Desert Named Peace: The Violence of France’s Empire in the Colonial Sahara, 1844–1902

Antichrist’s Jewish representatives and their Masonic henchmen [who] also control the Vatican” (93). And on and on. Filiu nicely sums up this entire genre as “notable not least for the disturbing evidence it produces of intellectual degradation and the power of systematic obscurantism” (139). If there is a shortcoming in this book, it lies, I believe, in the author’s failure to fully grapple with the question of exactly how important or influential these views actually are to the political and social dynamics of the Muslim world. While providing extraordinary detail about contemporary Islamic apocalyptic theories, Filiu never quite comes to a full assessment of how widespread these views actually are, how influential they are among political elites, and whether, in the end, they actually matter. It is one thing if a mass audience reads about America, UFOs, Jews, Masons and the Antichrist for “fun,” as problematic as that itself might be. It is quite another if these theories actually lie behind political movements and real-world politics. Filiu fails to fully address this fundamental question. He honestly stipulates in various places that such apocalyptic views have not been terribly important in motivating major political actors to date, discounting their role, for instance, in the Iranian Revolution or in al-Qaida’s activities. As he puts it, “the producers, distributors, and manipulators of this very widely read literature serve as trustees of an immense fund of symbolic capital that in recent times has nonetheless only sparingly been put to use. ... For the moment, only the Iraqi militia known as the Supporters of the Imam Mahdi has actively sought to translate the rise of eschatological anxiety into action” (198). Thus, he implies, the real danger from these views is, for now, more potential than actual—but it remains a potentiality about which those interested in practical political implications would want to hear more. Despite this shortcoming, this book is very useful and valuable. Well-written, exhaustively researched and colorfully illustrated (with reproductions of the garish covers of many apocalyptic books), it is one that will prove of great interest to those interested in the fascinating development of this new, syncretistic Muslim eschatology.

Commentary on Globalizing de Gaulle

Four distinguished analysts of French foreign policy under Charles de Gaulle provide in-depth assessments of the new book edited by Christian Nuenlist, Anna Locher, and Garret Martin, Globalizing de Gaulle: International Perspectives on French Foreign Policies, 1958–1969, published by Lexington Books. The commentators praise the books wide scope and many of its essays and broad themes, but they raise questions about Garret Martins contention (shared by a few, though not all, of the other contributors to the volume) that de Gaulle had a coherent if ultimately unsuccessful strategy to overcome the Cold War and move toward the unification of Germany and Europe. In article-length commentaries, both Andrew Moravcsik and Marc Trachtenberg take issue with Martins view, arguing that de Gaulles foreign policy involved more bluff and bluster than any genuine attempt to bring about the reunification of Germany or to end the Cold War. Moravcsik also provides a spirited defense of the “revisionist” conception of de Gaulles policy toward Europe, which sees the general as having been guided mostly by his domestic economic and political interests—a conception that Trachtenberg has also come to accept. The forum ends with a reply by Nuenlist, Locher, and Martin to the four commentaries.