Iryna Topolyan

Rent-seeking for a public good with additive contributions

We analyze rent-seeking for a public good with two groups, where the provision of a public good is decided in the all-pay contest where “the winner takes all”. We assume that the valuation of the public good varies across groups, but is the same for all members within a group. Free-riding in such situation was predicted by Baik et al. (J Public Econ 82(3):415–429, 2001). We describe a continuum of equilibria where all players make contributions. There is room for substantial payoff asymmetry, which ranges from equal payoffs to all group members to a zero payoff for the player who makes a contribution and positive payoffs for free-riders. The results generalize for the case where the prize has both a private and a public component.

Best-shot versus weakest-link in political lobbying: an application of group all-pay auction

We analyze a group political lobbying all-pay auction with a group specific public good prize, in which one group follows a weakest-link and the other group follows a best-shot impact function. We completely characterize all semi-symmetric equilibria. There are two types of equilibria: (1) each player in the best-shot group puts mass at the upper bound of the support, whereas each player in the other group puts mass at the lower bound of the support; (2) players in the best-shot group put masses at both the lower and the upper bounds, while the other group randomizes without a mass point.

Differential effects of mother’s and child’s postnatal WIC participation on breastfeeding

ABSTRACT We evaluate the effect of postnatal participation in the Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) programme on breastfeeding decisions using the data from the IFPS II. We find that the infant’s WIC participation positively affects the hazard of discontinuing breastfeeding, both partial and exclusive (and is thus associated with abbreviated breastfeeding duration). No significant association is found between the mother’s participation and the hazards of stopping exclusive or partial breastfeeding. Such differential effects might be a result of the programme’s policy, according to which the infant, but not the mother needs to be enrolled to receive free formula.