Isabel Lindner

Observation Inflation Your Actions Become Mine

Imagining performing an action can induce false memories of having actually performed it—this is referred to as the imagination-inflation effect. Drawing on research suggesting that action observation—like imagination—involves action simulation, and thus creates matching motor representations in observers, we examined whether false memories of self-performance can also result from merely observing another person’s actions. In three experiments, participants observed actions, some of which they had not performed earlier, and took a source-memory test. Action observation robustly produced false memories of self-performance relative to control conditions. The demonstration of this effect, which we refer to as observation inflation, reveals a previously unknown source of false memories that is ubiquitous in everyday life. The effect persisted despite warnings or instructions to focus on self-performance cues given immediately before the test, and despite elimination of sensory overlap between performance and observation. The findings are not easily reconciled with a source-monitoring account but appear to fit an account invoking interpersonal motor simulation.

When Do We Confuse Self and Other in Action Memory? Reduced False Memories of Self-Performance after Observing Actions by an Out-Group vs. In-Group Actor

Observing another person performing an action can lead to a false memory of having performed the action oneself – the observation-inflation effect. In the experimental paradigm, participants first perform or do not perform simple actions, and then observe another person perform some of these actions. The observation-inflation effect is found when participants later remember performing actions that they have merely observed. In this case, self and other are confused in action memory. We examined social conditions of this self-other confusion when remembering actions, specifically whether the effect depends on the observed actor’s group membership. In our experiment, we manipulated group membership based on physical appearance, specifically complexion of the hands. Fair-skinned participants observed either an in-group (i.e., fair-skinned) or an out-group (i.e., dark-skinned) actor. Our results revealed that the observed actor’s group membership moderated the observation-inflation effect: False memories were significantly reduced when the actor was from the out-group (vs. in-group). We found no difference to a control condition in which the actor wore black gloves, suggesting that distinctiveness of perceptual or sensory features alone (due to the out-group member’s dark skin) is not critical. We discuss these findings in light of social-neuroscience studies demonstrating the impact of an observed person’s group membership on motor simulation. Overall, our findings suggest that action memory can be affected by a ubiquitous feature of people’s social perception, that is, group-based social categorization of others.

Source and destination memory: Two sides of the same coin?

Whereas source memory involves remembering from whom you have heard something, destination memory involves remembering to whom you have told something. Despite its practical relevance, destination memory has been studied little. Recently, two reports suggested that generally destination memory should be poorer than source memory, and that it should be particularly difficult for older people. We tested these predictions by having young and older participants read sentences to two examiners (destination encoding) and listen to sentences read by two examiners (source encoding), under intentional (Experiment 1) or incidental encoding (Experiments 2 and 3). Only in Experiment 3 (in which cognitive demands during destination encoding were increased) was destination memory significantly poorer than source memory. In none of the experiments were older adults inferior to the young on destination or source memory. Destination- and source-memory scores were significantly correlated. Item memory was consistently superior for sentences that had been read out loud (during destination encoding) versus those that had been heard (during source encoding). Destination memory needs not always be poorer than source memory, appears not to be particularly impaired by normal ageing and may depend on similar processes to those supporting source memory.

Confusing what you heard with what you did: False action-memories from auditory cues

Creating a mental image of one’s own performance, observing someone else performing an action, and viewing a photograph of a completed action all can lead to the illusory recollection that one has performed this action. While there are fundamental differences in the nature of these three processes, they are aligned by the fact that they involve primarily or solely the visual modality. According to the source-monitoring framework, the corresponding visual memory traces later can be mistakenly attributed to self-performance. However, when people perform actions, they do not only engage vision, but also other modalities, such as auditory and tactile systems. The present study focused on the role of audition in the creation of false beliefs about performing an action and explored whether auditory cues alone—in the absence of any visual cues—can induce false beliefs and memories for actions. After performing a series of simple actions, participants listened to the sound of someone performing various actions, watched someone perform the actions, or simultaneously both heard and saw someone perform them. Some of these actions had been performed earlier by the participants and others were new. A later source-memory test revealed that all three types of processing (hearing, seeing, or hearing plus seeing someone perform the actions) led to comparable increases in false claims of having performed actions oneself. The potential mechanisms underlying false action-memories from sound and vision are discussed.

Unannounced memory tests are not necessarily unexpected by participants: test expectation and its consequences in the repeated test paradigm

Abstract In memory research, many paradigms take advantage of repeated testing. One phenomenon that is revealed through this procedure is hypermnesia, a net increase in memory performance over repeated tests. While this effect is robustly found, a consensus about the underlying mechanism is still pending. This paper investigates whether test expectancy may have contributed to this circumstance. The present research demonstrates that it may not be assumed that unannounced memory tests come as a surprise to participants. Based on the violation of fundamental conversational norms as well as the informative function of experimental procedures, systematic discrepancies between participants’ expectations and experimenters’ announcements may occur. Following identical instructions, test expectancy was shown to be a function of the experimental procedure (Exp. 1). Anticipation of an additional memory test did not affect hypermnesia; however, it did affect item fluctuation: Those participants who expected (vs. did not expect) another test showed reduced forgetting and—at the same time—reduced reminiscence (Exp. 2a and b). Consequently, our results show that test expectation does affect memory performance. It remains open, however, why this effect occurs and whether this generalizes to other research paradigms that apply “surprise” recall tests, which may not truly be surprises.

False action memories in older adults: Relationship with executive functions?

ABSTRACT Merely observing another person performing an action can make young people later misremember having performed this action themselves (the observation-inflation effect). We examined this type of memory error in healthy older adults. Overall, both young and older adult groups showed robust observation inflation. Although the number of people committing observation-inflation errors did not differ between age groups, those older adults who were prone to this illusion showed a greater observation-inflation effect compared to the corresponding young. At the same time, observation also had beneficial effects on subsequent action memory, especially in older adults. Surprisingly, executive functioning was not correlated with the degree to which older adults made observation-inflation errors, but it was related to the degree to which older adults benefited from observation. We consider accounts of observation inflation based on source monitoring, familiarity misattribution, and motor simulation.