Ishtiyaque Haji

Indeterminism and Frankfurt‐type examples

Abstract I assess Robert Kanes view that global Frankfurt‐type cases dont show that freedom to do otherwise is never required for moral responsibility. I first adumbrate Kanes indeterminist account of free will.This will help us grasp Kanes notion of ultimate responsibility, and his claim that in a global Frankfurt‐type case, the counterfactual intervener could not control all of the relevant agents actions in the Frankfurt manner, and some of those actions would be such that the agent could have done otherwise. Appealing to considerations of responsibility and luck, I then show that the global cases survive Kanes objections

Moral Anchors and Control

Soulignant lincompatibilite du determinisme et de la liberte avec ce que lA. appelle les ancrages moraux concernant le bien, le mal et lobligation, lA. examine deux versions (stricte et moderee) du principe deontique selon lequel devoir, cest pouvoir (principe K), dune part, et analyse le processus de controle que les agents doivent appliquer dans leurs actions, dautre part. A partir de la critique de la conception indeterministe du controle et de la causation de lagent chez R. Kane et R. Clarke, lA. montre que la version faible du principe K est compatible avec les ancrages moraux dans des mondes indeterministes

Control Conundrums: Modest Libertarianism, Responsibility, and Explanation

Modest libertarianism aims to specify the sort of control that suffices for moral responsibility without appealing to metaphysically exotic agents or forms of causation. I critically discuss two versions of modest libertarianism, one more robust than the other, with the primary aim of developing and defending the following sort of requirement for moral responsibility: an agent is responsible for performing an action only if there is an explanation (that need not be deterministic) in terms of prior reasons of why the agent performs the action that she does rather than some alternative.

THE EMOTIONAL DEPRAVITY OF PSYCHOPATHS AND CULPABILITY

In this paper, I restrict discussion to cases of psychopathy in which it is assumed that psychopaths who satisfy epistemic requirements of responsibility, including the requirement that one is culpable for an action only if one performs it in light of the belief that one is doing wrong, can and do perform actions they take to be immoral or illegal. I argue that in such cases, the well-documented emotional impairment of psychopaths fails to subvert moral culpability. In particular, it does not undermine the sort of control required for moral blameworthiness and, hence, assuming all other conditions of responsibility have been met, the psychopaths of concern are indeed culpable for their behavior. Drawing, however, from certain lessons regarding the effects of coercion on responsibility, I propose that emotional impairment is a factor that should abate, perhaps even significantly, negative reaction to or treatment of such agents.

Alternative Possibilities, Luck, and Moral Responsibility

I first question whether genuinealternatives are necessary for moralresponsibility by assessing the assumption thataccessibility to such alternatives is vital tohaving the kind of control required forresponsibility. I next suggest that theavailability of genuine alternatives courtsproblems of responsibility-subverting luck foran important class of libertarian theories. Isummarize one such problem and respond torecent replies it has elicited. I then proposethat if this ``luck objection against theidentified class of libertarian theories ispersuasive, a similar objection appears toafflict compatibilist theories as well.Finally, I show that reflections on luck maywell take some bite out of variousFrankfurt-type examples. These are examplesdesigned to establish that an agent can bemorally responsible for an action despiteacting with libertarian free will in theabsence of genuine or pertinent alternatives.

Indeterminism, Explanation, and Luck

I first adumbrate pertinent aspectsof Robert Kanes libertarian theory of free choice oraction and an objection of luck that has been levelledagainst the theory. I then consider Kanes recentresponses to this objection. To meet these responses,I argue that the view that undetermined choices (ofthe sort implied by Kanes theory) are a matter ofluck is associated with a view about actionexplanation, to wit: when Jones does A and hisdoing of A is undetermined, and when hiscounterpart, Jones*, in the nearest possibleworld in which the past and the laws are held constantuntil the moment of choice does B instead, thereis no explanation (deterministic or indeterministic)of the difference in outcome – Joness A-ing butJones*s B-ing – in terms of prior reasonsor motives of either agent. Absence of such anexplanation is one crucial factor that underliesthe charge that Joness A-ing and Jones*sB-ing are matters of luck. I argue that thissort of luck is incompatible with responsibility.

Moral Responsibility and the Problem of Induced Pro-Attitudes

The problem of induced pro-attitudes is simply this: why is action which ultimately issues from pro-attitudes such as desires, volitions, and goals, induced by techniques such as direct manipulation of the brain, hypnosis, or “value engineering,” frequently regarded as action for which its agent cannot be held morally responsible? The problem is of interest for several reasons. Ferdinand Schoeman, for instance, believes that the problem poses a resolvable but challenging predicament for compatibilists: if agents can be held morally responsible for actions that are causally determined, then why should actions that result from induced pro-attitudes be regarded as paradigmatically unfree actions for which agents cannot be held morally accountable? Robert Kane exploits the problem to launch a libertarian attack on compatibilists. He says that a covert non-constraining controller controls the will of another agent by arranging “circumstances beforehand so that the agent wants and desires, and hence chooses and tries, only what the controller intends.” Kane claims that compatibilist accounts of freedom cannot distinguish between cases in which an agent behaves freely and those in which an agent falls prey to the covert non-constraining control of some other party.

Alternate possibilities and responsibility

Examinant la critique recente des exemples de Frankfurt developpee par C. Ginet, lA. refute le principe des possibilites alternatives comme condition de la responsabilite morale, a partir de deux arguments fondes sur la motivation inconsciente et sur les troubles multiples de la personnalite.

Frankfurt-Pairs and Varieties of Blameworthiness: Epistemic Morals

I start by using “Frankfurt-type” examples to cast preliminary doubt on the “Objective View” - that one is blameworthy for an action only if that action is objectively wrong, and follow by providing further arguments against this view. Then I sketch a replacement for the Objective View whose core is that one is to blame for performing an action, A, only if one has the belief that it is morally wrong for one to do A, and this belief plays an appropriate role in the etiology of ones A-ing. I next defend this core against recently advanced objections and then show how it helps with defusing a skeptical challenge from the direction of causal determinism against blameworthiness. Finally, I exploit the core to isolate an analogous epistemic core for nonmoral but “normative” varieties of blameworthiness.

Skepticism about Autonomy and Responsibility as Educational Aims — What Next?

In liberal democracies it is widely assumed that educating for autonomy and moral responsibility, arguably both significant in educating for citizenship, are educational tasks educators should set themselves. However, starting from straightforward principles of intentional action, we advance an argument for the skeptical conclusion that educating for autonomy — endowing youngsters with the skills and dispositions needed to live autonomous lives — and educating for responsibility — nurturing children into agents disposed, minimally, to perform actions for which they are not morally blameworthy, and, desirably, to perform actions for which they are morally praiseworthy — is misguided, because education should not aim to attain what is largely beyond reach.