Isil Erel

Does Governance Travel Around the World? Evidence from Institutional Investors

We examine whether institutional investors affect corporate governance by analyzing portfolio holdings of institutions in companies from 23 countries during the period 2003-2008. We find that firm-level governance is positively associated with international institutional investment. Changes in institutional ownership over time positively affect subsequent changes in firm-level governance, but the opposite is not true. Foreign institutions and institutions from countries with strong shareholder protection play a crucial role in promoting governance improvements outside of the U.S. Institutional investors affect not only which corporate governance mechanisms are in place, but also outcomes. Firms with higher institutional ownership are more likely to terminate poorly performing CEOs and exhibit improvements in valuation over time. Our results suggest that international portfolio investment by institutional investors promote good corporate governance practices around the world.

Differences in Governance Practices between U.S. and Foreign Firms: Measurement, Causes, and Consequences

We construct a firm-level governance index that increases with minority shareholder protection. Compared to U.S. matching firms, only 12.68% of foreign firms have a higher index. The value of foreign firms falls as their index decreases relative to the index of matching U.S. firms. Our results suggest that lower country-level investor protection and other country characteristics make it suboptimal for foreign firms to invest as much in governance as U.S. firms do. Overall, we find that minority shareholders benefit from governance improvements and do so partly at the expense of controlling shareholders.

Do U.S. Firms Have the Best Corporate Governance? A Cross-Country Examination of the Relation Between Corporate Governance and Shareholder Wealth

We compare the governance of foreign firms to the governance of similar U.S. firms. Using an index of firm governance attributes, we find that, on average, foreign firms have worse governance than matching U.S. firms. Roughly 8% of foreign firms have better governance than comparable U.S. firms. The majority of these firms are either in the U.K. or in Canada. When we define a firms governance gap as the difference between the quality of its governance and the governance of a comparable U.S. firm, we find that the value of foreign firms increases with the governance gap. This result suggests that firms are rewarded by the markets for having better governance than their U.S. peers. It is therefore not the case that foreign firms are better off simply mimicking the governance of comparable U.S. firms. Among the individual governance attributes considered, we find that firms with board and audit committee independence are valued more. In contrast, other attributes, such as the separation of the chairman of the board and of the CEO functions, do not appear to be associated with higher shareholder wealth.

Corporate Liquidity, Acquisitions, and Macroeconomic Conditions

Firms hold liquid assets to enhance their ability to invest efficiently when external financing costs are high, especially during poor macroeconomic conditions. Using a sample of 47,378 acquisitions from 36 countries between 1997 and 2014, we study how the relation between firms’ cash holdings and their acquisition decisions changes over macroeconomic cycles. We find that higher cash holdings increase the likelihood a firm will make an acquisition. Better macroeconomic conditions, which lower the cost of external finance, also increase the likelihood of an acquisition. However, larger cash holdings decrease the sensitivity of acquisitions to macroeconomic factors, suggesting that cash holdings lower financing constraints during times when the cost of external finance is high. Announcement day abnormal returns for acquirers follow a consistent pattern: they decrease with acquirer cash holdings and with better macroeconomic conditions. The results are consistent with the view that firms choose liquidity levels to insure against poor macroeconomic conditions.

Selecting Directors Using Machine Learning

Can algorithms assist firms in their decisions on nominating corporate directors? We construct algorithms to make out-of-sample predictions of director performance. Tests of the quality of these predictions show that directors predicted to do poorly indeed do poorly compared to a realistic pool of candidates. Predictably poor performing directors are more likely to be male, have more past and current directorships, fewer qualifications, and larger networks than the directors the algorithm would recommend in their place. Machine learning holds promise for understanding the process by which governance structures are chosen, and has potential to help real-world firms improve their governance.

Multinational Firms and the International Transmission of Crises: The Real Economy Channel

We study how non-financial multinational companies transmit negative shocks from their subsidiaries located in countries experiencing a negative shock to subsidiaries in countries not experiencing one. We find that investment is 18% lower in subsidiaries of these parents relative to the same-industry, same-country subsidiaries of parents that are headquartered in the same parent country but do not have a subsidiary in a country experiencing a negative shock. Employment growth rate in the affected subsidiaries is zero or negative while it is 1.4% in the subsidiaries of unaffected parents. The aggregate industry-level sales and employment are also negatively impacted in the countries of the affected subsidiaries.