Israel Scheffler

In praise of the cognitive emotions and other essays in the philosophy of education

Part I: Human Nature 1. In Praise of the Cognitive Emotions (1977) 2. Human Nature and Potential (1983) 3. Making and Understanding (1987) Part II: Symbolism 4. Educational Metaphors (1960) 5. Ten Myths of Metaphor (1988) 6. Symbol, Ritual, and Cognition (1989) Part III: Curriculum 7. Basic Mathematical Skills (1976) 8. Computers at School? (1986) 9. Moral Education Beyond Moral Reasoning (1990) Part IV: Education 10. The Education of Policy-Makers (1984) 11. Four Languages of Education (1987) 12. Vice into Virtue, or Seven Deadly Sins of Education Redeemed (1989) 13. John Deweys Social and Educational Theory (1974) 14. Pragmatism as a Philosophy (1984)

The anatomy of inquiry : philosophical studies in the theory of science

Introduction: Philosophy and the Theory of Science 1. Approaches to the Philosophy of Science 2. Arguments of a Theory of Science 3. Approach to the Problems Part I: Explanation 1. The Humean Background 2. The Deductive Pattern of Explanation 3. Statistical and Confirmational Generalization 4, The Structural Divergence of Explanation and Prediction 5. The Centrality of Explanation and Prediction 6. The Problem of Ontological Interpretation 7. Explanation of Psychological and Historical Events 8. Teleological Explanation: Beliefs and Desires 9. Teleological Explanation: Self-regulating Behavior Part II: Significance 1. Explanation and Criteria of Significance 2. Conditions of Adequacy for Defining and Criterion 3. Criteria Based on Complete Verifiability or Falsifiability 4. Falsifiability as Criterion of Significance and as Criterion of Demarcation 5. Criteria of Incomplete Verifiability 6. Criteria of Translatability 7. Inclusion in an Empiricist Language 8. Disposition Terms, Observational Predicates, and Observable Elements 9. The Interpretation of Disposition Terms 10. The Method of Reduction Sentences 11. The Problem of Theoretical Terms 12. The Problem of Function and the Problem of Interpretation 13. Approaches to the problem of Interpretation: Pragmatism and Fictionalism 14. Pragmatism 15. Fictionalism and Its Varieties 16. Instrumentalistic Fictionalism 17. Empiricism, Pragmatism, and Instrumentalism 18. Eliminative Fictionalism 19. Eliminative Fictionalism: Syntactical Form 20. Eliminative Fictionalism: Craigian Form 21. Eliminative Fictionalism: Ramseyan Form Part III: Confirmation 1. Explanation, Significance, and Confirmation 2. Humes Challenge and the Generalization Formula 3. Hempels Study of Qualitative Confirmation 4. Critical Discussion of the Satisfaction Criterion 5. The Paradoxes of Confirmation: Hempels Treatment 6. Further Discussions of the Paradoxes of Confirmation 7. Positive Instances and the Generalization Formula 8. Induction and Projectibility 9. Goodmans Proposal on Induction 10. Reflections on the Justification of Induction Bibliography Index

A Plea For Plurealism

In contrast to monistic realism (as represented by Peirce) and pluralistic irrealism (as represented by Goodman) I argue for what I call plurealism, a view which is both pluralistic and realist, recognizing different worlds that are not only independent of one another, but also independent of us.

Rejoinder to Levi’s Reply

To give up the categorical or absolute idiom of certainty in favor of the relative idiom is just to give up talking of sentences (or beliefs) as certain, i. e. immune to error, and to speak instead of the conviction that persons may have in them.

Fallible is as Fallible Does

After a wild philosophical decade which has seen the resuscitation of innate ideas, essences, necessities, and possible worlds, Professor Isaac Levi now dreams the impossible dream of reviving infallibility. With admirable daring, he invokes pragmatism, not only to legitimate the quest for certainty, but to declare it always and everywhere successful. Not, to be sure, in the soul of man, but at any rate in his corpus, at every moment, glows the flame of certain and infallible truth.