Itai Sened

Rational Voting and Candidate Entry Under Plurality Rule

We analyze a formal model of electoral competition under plurality rule that is characterized by two novel features. First, rather than assuming a fixed field of candidates, we allow candidates to make decisions regarding entry, as well as location. Second, voters in our model are strategically rational, that is, they maximize utility over expected policy outcomes, rather than simply voting for the ideologically closest candidate. Given these assumptions, all equilibria in this model are such that the set of entrants locates at the median voters ideal point. This result stands in sharp contrast to earlier models of multicandidate competition in which entry is not allowed and voters vote sincerely.

Multiparty Competition in Israel, 1988 96

Formal models of voting usually assume that political agents, whether parties or candidates, attempt to maximize expected vote shares. ‘Stochastic’ models typically derive the ‘mean voter theorem’ that each agent will adopt a ‘convergent’ policy strategy at the mean of the electoral distribution. In this article, it is argued that this conclusion is contradicted by empirical evidence. Estimates of vote intentions require ‘valence’ terms. The valence of each party derives from the average weight, given by members of the electorate, in judging the overall competence or ‘quality’ of the particular party leader. In empirical models, a partys valence is independent of current policy declarations and can be shown to be statistically significant in the estimation. It is shown here that the addition of valence gives a very strong Bayes factor over an electoral model without valence. The formal model is analysed and shown to be classified by a ‘convergence’ coefficient, defined in terms of the parameters of the empirical model. This coefficient gives necessary and sufficient conditions for convergence. When the necessary condition fails, as it does in these empirical studies with valence, then the convergent equilibrium fails to exist. The empirical evidence is consistent with a formal stochastic model of voting in which there are multiple local Nash equilibria to the vote-maximizing electoral game. Simulation techniques based on the parameters of the empirical model have been used to obtain these local equilibria, which are determined by the principal component of the electoral distribution. Low valence parties, in equilibrium, will tend to adopt positions at the electoral periphery. High valence parties will contest the electoral centre, but will not, in fact, position themselves at the electoral mean. Survey data from Israel for the elections of 1988, 1992 and 1996 are used to compute the parameters of the empirical model and to illustrate the dependence of equilibria on the electoral principal components. The vote maximizing equilibria do not perfectly coincide with the actual party positions. This divergence may be accounted for by more refined models that either (i) include activism or (ii) consider strategic party considerations over post-election coalition bargaining.

“A Theory Waiting to Be Discovered and Used”: A Reanalysis of Canonical Experiments on Majority-Rule Decision Making

The paper offers a reassessment of canonical attempts to address a fundamental question about majority rule: what is the relationship between the preferences held by the participants and the outcomes that emerge from their interactions? Previous work, based on the analysis of abstract spatial models or relying on data from real-world spatial experiments, has yielded a mass of contradictory findings. Our work applies a new technique for estimating the uncovered set, a concept that describes a fundamental constraint on majority rule: given the preferences of decision makers, which outcomes can emerge from majority-rule decision making? By applying the uncovered set to a series of previous experiments on majority rule, we show that their seemingly bizarre and incompatible findings are in fact consistent with a clearly specified theory of how sophisticated individuals make decisions in majority-rule settings.

Governance and public policy

(2001). Governance and public policy. Israel Affairs: Vol. 7, Public Policy in Israel, pp. 3-20.

Political Bargaining: Theory, Practice and Process

Introduction A Conceptual Framework for the Study of Political Bargaining The Social Problem A Bargained Social Contract Special Interests and Political Entrepreneurs Electoral and Post-Electoral Bargaining in Parliamentary Systems Post-Electoral Bargaining in Presidential Systems Bargaining at the International Arena Conclusions

Local Nash Equilibrium in Multiparty Politics

AbstractWe present a model of multi-party, “spatial” competition under proportional rule with both electoral and coalitional risk. Each party consists of a set of delegates with heterogeneous policy preferences. These delegates choose one delegate as leader or agent. This agent announces the policy declaration (or manifesto) to the electorate prior to the election. The choice of the agent by each party elite is assumed to be a local Nash equilibrium to a game form

Closing the Deal: Negotiating Civil Rights Legislation

\tilde g

Path Dependence and Creation in Venture Capital Investment

. This game form encapsulates beliefs of the party elite about the nature of both electoral risk and the post-election coalition bargaining game. It is demonstrated, under the assumption that