J.E. Isaac

Performance Related Pay: The Importance of Fairness:

Performance related pay (PRP) has been revived as a ‘new idea’ in recent years in connection with workplace reform and enterprise bargaining. Yet it has been tried many times in the past without achieving the increases in efficiency promised by its advocates. The challenge for PRP is to establish a pattern of pay which is seen as fair by employees, which uses reasonably objective measures of performance, which can stand the strain of change, which sustains the object of the system, is not too large a portion of the pay packet and is not too costly to administer. If a ‘conventional’ view of fairness is maintained in relation to PRP, the net returns may not be sufficient for the majority of employees. Much depends on whether a new concept of fairness is emerging which accepts differential increases based on performance rather than the rate for the job.

Reforming Australian Industrial Relations? The 21st Foenander Lecture, 28 August 2006

The Australian industrial system has undergone significant changes over the last 100 years. Through most of that period, the changes in principles and procedures have been incremental and were developed, at the federal level, mostly by the tribunals guided by the prevailing economic climate and the submissions of employers, unions and governments. More recently, the changes have been driven by legislation. The Work Choices legislation marks a radical departure in scope and philosophy from the past. This article reviews the new legislation against the background of the requirements of an economically efficient and socially fair industrial relations system. It concludes that the case for the new system rests mainly on assertions and is not supported by persuasive evidence or argument. By promoting individual bargaining at the expense of collective bargaining and by greatly weakening union power and the role of the industrial umpire, the balance of economic power has been tilted greatly in favour of employer. These circumstances will encourage wage-cost cutting rather than deliver productivity improvement. They violate ILO Conventions; they go against the Australian ethos of a fair society and have the potential of being socially divisive.

The Arbitration Commission: Prime Mover or Facilitator?

* Department of Economics, University of Melbourne, Parkville, Vic. 3052. This address was delivered as the Tenth Sir Richard Kirby Lecture in Industrial Relations at the University of Wollongong on 5 October 1988. Since then the Australian Conciliation and Arbitration Commission has been renamed the Australian Industrial Relations Commission. I confess to embarrassment when I recall my early prattling on industrial relations, and the forbearance and generosity with which Sir Richard Kirby treated that bumptious academic who, although innocent of the rough and tumble of industrial life, had the audacity to tell the Australian Conciliation and Arbitration Commission what it should be doing. Let me confess, too, that since then, I have come under Sir Richard’s spell; for what I have to say this evening draws on his writings, his decisions and his wisdom imparted in personal discussion. However, I have extended what I have learnt from him to events and developments beyond the time of his retirement from the commission in 1973. And he may well disagree with my extrapolation. He is, therefore, not responsible for what I have to say. The theme of my paper is reflected in its title. I come to the conclusion that the Australian Conciliation and Arbitration Commission, like its predecessor, the Conciliation and Arbitration Court, is essentially a facilitator rather than a prime mover or an innovator, reactive rather than proactive, in the formulation and application of industrial principles. This conclusion may not seem obvious from a reading of tribunal decisions, particularly the earlier ones, or from media commentaries or indeed from the expositions of some academic writers. The impression is easily drawn from the announcement of a new principle or a new approach to wage fixing that, in some sense, the tribunal is its author or creator. And credit or blame is heaped on the tribunal, usually on its president, as the genius, benign or evil, rather than on the parties which appear before the tribunal. It is assumed that the tribunal has a kind of magic wand, with the aid of which it can do this or that as it wishes, based on its own philosophy of what is good, a free agent able to take initiatives against the tide of forces in the labour market and beyond,

Dr. Hancock On Collective Bargaining

bargaining and the particular points I have raised in support of it arises, I believe, from a misunderstanding for which I am largely to blame. I did not state as explicitly and as clearly as might be desirable the nature of my analysis and the assumption on which it rests. Let me say at once that I do not believe that the general case for or against collective bargaining has been &dquo;proved&dquo;. This case must rest ultimately on personal judgment based on a priori reasoning and the general facts of human experience. It cannot be established simply by resort to an enumeration

Penal Provisions Under Common wealth Arbitration

These penal provisions are administered under the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act and are directed at registered organisations which, in the cases mentioned, have been unions. Another set of Commonwealth penal provisions operate under the Stevedoring Industry Act (S52A) and are directed at the individual workers who go out on strike. Between June, 1961, when S52A was inserted, and the end of May, 1963, 200 declarations were made under this section and over 200,000 workers were penalised,¢ 4

Why are Australian Wages Lagging and What Can Be Done About it

Wages in Australia have lagged behind the growth in labour productivity in recent years. This has been associated with a significant change in the distribution of income in favour of high†income earners. Although a number of factors appear to have been involved in this development, an important explanation is also to be found in the change in the balance of power in favour of employers and against workers and unions. As changes in industrial relations laws have contributed substantially to this imbalance, a return to the earlier laws may be necessary to restore the institutional mechanism for wages growth.

Book Review: The Structure and Determinants of Wage Relativities: Evidence from Australia:

these ‘non-core’ labour standards (wages and working hours) to be added in. In terms of obtaining this, Chan notes the usefulness of the anti-sweatshop campaign––a prosaic mix of groups from unions, consumers, churches, communities and students––in exposing abuses and focusing media spotlight on Western multinationals operating in China. Similarly, international organisations had focused mainly on core rights (freedom of association and collective bargaining). Now she argues, there is a need to (1) widen the focus from core rights; (2) treat labour rights as human rights and integrate them into relevant discourse and practice and; (3) apply pressure on government to persuade it to regulate labour conditions. The book raises a few queries. For example, there seems to be some inconsistency with her third proposal above. Chan seems to forget her opening points about some of the reasons such abuses were out in the open in the first place, such as the fragmented nature of government. This does not bode well for her suggestions it now take a role. Also, there is a problem with views that the trade union movement focused on issues (such as collective bargaining) because of their importance to organising efforts. There are also other reasons for this. For instance, in the UK the solution to the ‘two faces’ of the labour problem (sweated conditions and militancy) from the 19th century was seen as collective bargaining. Indeed, this became the focus for much practical, policy and academic industrial relations during the 20th century. Of a minor nature, I was not keen on the publisher’s house style with its voluminous endnotes. For example, the first chapter’s 44 endnotes ran for 4.5 sides. There was also some variability between chapters; for instance, chapter 5 was under 11 sides of text and very short compared to others. Nevertheless, these are minor points as overall the book it to be welcomed. It is an important topic and is dealt with in a refreshing and interesting fashion. In terms of its readership and suitability, it may find its way onto some of my readings lists for students as background reading. Also, it is a useful resource, and should be taken by libraries and read by not only academics and researchers in areas such as sociology, employment studies, human resource management and business, but also by those involved in public policy, government, trade unions and even managers. Then next time we see the ubiquitous ‘Made in China’ on a product, we will begin to grasp and understand some of the labour that went into it.

Review of Wage Policy, 1958

The movements in various statistical series since the cessation of cost-ofliving adjustments in August, 1953, are shown below. It is interesting to notice first that the effect of both the 1957 and 1958 basic wage increases was to offset. the increases in the &dquo;C&dquo; Series Index. Second, the level of average weekly wage rates rose a little more than the &dquo;C&dquo; Series as a result of increases in margins in the period December, 1954, to March, 1955. Thus, although the real basic wage declined a little since 1953, the general level of real wage rates stayed virtually unchanged. Third, the difference in the movements of average weekly earnings and average weekly wage rates records the extent of overtime and/or over-award payments (since the weekly wage rates index represents substantially award rates). But since 1956, these two series seem to have kept in step with each other.