J.H.A.M. Grijpink

Privacy Law: Biometrics and privacy

Abstract Biometrics offers many alternatives for protecting our privacy and preventing us from falling victim to crime. Biometrics can even serve as a solid basis for safe anonymous and semi-anonymous legal transactions. In this article Jan Grijpink clarifies which concepts and practical applications this relates to. A number of practical basic rules are also given as a guide to proceeding in a legally acceptable manner when applying biometrics.

Identity fraud as a challenge to the constitutional state

Abstract This article explains that not only the arsenal of identity instruments, but also our identity verification methods have to change if we are to meet the challenge of identity fraud in the future. Existing identity policies are not up to the task of guaranteeing our security and privacy in an information society. Because of the prevailing legal-administrative approach, more vigorous procedures and new technologies often backfire. Therefore, this article calls for a new approach to identity verification that effectively frustrates and combats identity fraud. It presents an analysis based on Dutch law, but the conclusions will be valid in most western constitutional states. Some suggestions are presented to improve the quality of identity checks. Dutch law appears to offer sufficient starting points to achieve this.

Public Information Infrastructures and Identity Fraud

During the past 4 years, more than twenty Dutch large-scale chain cooperation cases have been studied in the chain research program at the Institute of Information and Computer Sciences of Utrecht University, using the guidelines and the chain analysis tools provided by the doctrine of chain-computerization. This chain research program has led to some valuable insights and breaking views with regard to both public information-infrastructures and identity fraud. The chain perspective focuses on the interplay of forces that determine the effectiveness of large-scale information exchange; the perspective of identity fraud focuses on the fact that the misuse of somebody else’s identity leaves behind many traces that, however, point towards the victim instead of towards the culprit.

Digital Anonymity on the Internet

This article sets out the most important conclusions of the first stage of a study into the dimensions of digital anonymity. It is intended to set out the problem, make people aware of the intricacies of the problem and thus stimulate the debate on useful legal structures for anonymity. The article focuses on Holland’s private law dimensions, addressing situations where consumers want to purchase anonymously on the Internet.

Two barriers to realizing the benefits of biometrics: a chain perspective on biometrics and identity fraud as biometrics' real challenge

Along at least twelve dimensions biometric systems might vary. We need to exploit this variety to manoeuvre biometrics into place to be able to realise its social potential. Subsequently, two perspectives on biometrics are proposed revealing that biometrics will probably be ineffective in combating identity fraud, organised crime and terrorism: (1) the value chain perspective explains the first barrier: our strong preference for large scale biometric systems for general compulsory use. These biometric systems cause successful infringements to spread unnoticed. A biometric system will only function adequately if biometrics is indispensable for solving the dominant chain problem. Multi-chain use of biometrics takes it beyond the boundaries of good manageability. (2) the identity fraud perspective exposes the second barrier: our traditional approach to identity verification. We focus on identity documents, neglecting the person and the situation involved. Moreover, western legal cultures have made identity verification procedures known, transparent, uniform and predictable. Thus, we have developed a blind spot to identity fraud. Biometrics provides good potential to better checking persons, but will probably be used to enhance identity documents. Biometrics will only pay off if it confronts the identity fraudster with less predictable verification processes and more risks of his identity fraud being spotted. Standardised large scale applications of biometrics for general compulsory use without countervailing measures will probably produce the reverse. This contribution tentatively presents a few headlines for an overall biometrics strategy that could better resist identity fraud.

Digital Anonymity on the InternetDIGITAL ANONYMITY ON THE INTERNET: New rules for anonymous electronic transactions?

This article sets out the most important conclusions of the first stage of a study into the dimensions of digital anonymity. It is intended to set out the problem, make people aware of the intricacies of the problem and thus stimulate the debate on useful legal structures for anonymity. The article focuses on Holland’s private law dimensions, addressing situations where consumers want to purchase anonymously on the Internet.

PERSONAL NUMBER MANAGEMENT

Abstract For the sake of clarity and manageability, this article is in the form of a checklist. It will be published in two parts. The first part in this issue presents some practical and juridical characteristics of personal number systems. But at the end of the day, it is the number strategy that matters. The second part in the next issue, therefore, covers some important aspects of any number strategy and presents a step-by-step plan for the choice, design or assessment of number systems and strategies. Within the Dutch government there is a discussion going on about the introduction of a general personal number for compulsory use by every government agency or any private organization with a public task. The main conclusion of the analysis in this article is, however, that such a number strategy is not good enough for a complex information society. Sectoral personal numbers are the cornerstones of safety and privacy. They should not be put at stake. This article has the Dutch situation in mind, but the analysis and conclusions apply to many other democratic jurisdictions as well.