J. Keith Murnighan

When Talk Is Not Cheap: Substantive Penance and Expressions of Intent in Rebuilding Cooperation

Interpersonal relationships can be fragile. The mere perception of opportunistic behavior can lead to a breakdown in cooperation. Once damaged, the question then arises as to whether and how cooperation might be restored. Noncooperative game theory raises serious doubts about the possibilities, although interactional justice and impression management research have shown that verbal explanations can dampen reactions to aversive behavior. Philosophical, anthropological, and ethological research all suggest that genuine forgiveness may require something more tangible and substantive than an explanation. Thus, the current experiment investigated the effects of explanations and varying forms of substantive amends on the restoration of mutual cooperation. The results confirm that rebuilding cooperation is feasible. Apologies and simple explanations can be effective to a degree, though substantive amends have significantly more positive effects than explanations alone. In contrast to prior findings on interactional justice, acknowledgments were more effective than denials in repairing short interactions. This research demonstrates that, once breached, cooperation can be reestablished and that actions as well as explanations and apologies can augment the process in important and sometimes subtle ways.

Equilibrium behavior and repeated play of the prisoner's dilemma

Abstract This paper examines a model of the prisoners dilemma in which the nature of the Nash equilibria of the game can be varied. Two equilibrium indices are derived and are compared with two cooperation indices proposed by Rapoport and Chammah (1965) . Preliminary experimental results indicate that the nature of the equilibria of a game affect the amount of cooperation.

An experimental investigation of ultimatum games: information, fairness, expectations, and lowest acceptable offers

Abstract We designed two laboratory experiments to test popular hypotheses explaining the failure of subgame-perfect equilibrium models to explain behavior in ultimatum games. The first experiment varied information available to respondents. When respondents did not know the amount being divided, offerers offered (and respondents accepted) significantly lower offers than when the respondents knew the amount being divided. The second experiment replicated this result and also showed that people occasionally reject “free” money (i.e., offers with no strings attached). This evidence does not support earlier explanations for ultimatum anomalies and identifies conditions where subgame-perfect models apply.

Expecting continued play in prisoner's dilemma games: A test of several models.

Several models of prisoners dilemma interactions were tested in a series of twelve games whose termination point was determined probabilistically. A new model was introduced to discriminate among equilibrium and nonequilibrium situations on the basis of a players expected benefits or losses for cooperating. The experiment included twelve payoff matrices, three probabilities for continuing, two opponent strategies, and the players sex as independent variables. Results showed that both the game payoffs and the probability that the game would continue interacted to affect the rates of cooperation observed, and that the equilibrium model predicted this outcome most accurately. While the predictions of each of the models were supported, the equilibrium models appeared to be superior to the others. The discussion highlights the importance of considering the likelihood of a game terminating as a major determinant of the cooperation that can be expected in mixed—motive interactions.

Striving for the Moral Self: The Effects of Recalling Past Moral Actions on Future Moral Behavior

People’s desires to see themselves as moral actors can contribute to their striving for and achievement of a sense of self-completeness. The authors use self-completion theory to predict (and show) that recalling one’s own (im)moral behavior leads to compensatory rather than consistent moral action as a way of completing the moral self. In three studies, people who recalled their immoral behavior reported greater participation in moral activities (Study 1), reported stronger prosocial intentions (Study 2), and showed less cheating (Study 3) than people who recalled their moral behavior. These compensatory effects were related to the moral magnitude of the recalled event, but they did not emerge when people recalled their own positive or negative nonmoral behavior (Study 2) or others’ (im)moral behavior (Study 3). Thus, the authors extend self-completion theory to the moral domain and use it to integrate the research on moral cleansing (remunerative moral strivings) and moral licensing (relaxed moral strivings).

Ultimatum bargaining by children and adults

Recent research on ultimatum bargaining, the fact that children often confront and use ultimatums, and theories of developmental psychology all combine to suggest that studying childrens ultimatum behavior will be particularly enlightening, both theoretically and with respect to the development of bargaining behavior. The results from two experiments indicate that younger children made larger offers and accepted smaller offers than older participants. Boys took greater strategic advantage of asymmetric information than girls; this dichotomy began with nine-year-olds (third graders) and continued for twelve- and fifteen-year-olds (sixth and ninth graders) as well as for college students. Like adults, children accepted smaller offers when they did not know how much was being divided. Older children required increasingly higher offers, except for college students who were willing to accept considerably less than others. Also, some of the nine-year-olds displayed an extremely strong sense of fairness. The discussion focuses on the development of bargaining strategies and concerns for fairness.

Attributions of trust and the calculus of reciprocity

Abstract This research investigated trust and reciprocity in two experiments using the Trust Game. In the Trust Game, Player 1 can “trust” an unknown Player 2 by sending some portion of a monetary endowment. The amount sent triples on its way to Player 2, who can then “reciprocate” by returning as much as he or she wishes to Player 1. Initial endowments were either

Cheap talk in bargaining experiments: Lying and threats in ultimatum games

10 or

NORMAL ACTS OF IRRATIONAL TRUST: MOTIVATED ATTRIBUTIONS AND THE TRUST DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

20 and were known to recipients; amounts sent were experimentally manipulated and varied from

Dormant Ties: The Value Of Reconnecting

2 to the entire endowment. Although many trusted parties returned enough money to equalize outcomes, trustors only benefited, on average, when they sent all or almost all of their endowments. Results suggested that recipients viewed sending less than everything as a lack of trust and that felt obligations mediated choices to reciprocate. These and other results contrast markedly with traditional, incremental models of the trust process, which suggest that initial trustors should take small risks and build trust gradually.