J. P. Moreland

Restoring the Substance to the Soul of Psychology

Currently, the self has replaced the soul as the major focus of much psychological theorizing. I argue that this shift is due to a number of confusions regarding the nature and justification of substance dualism. I also claim that this focus on the self, without a framework that treats it as a substantial soul, leads to a number of conceptual problems and terminological equivocations. Moreover, I show that certain features of widely accepted views of the self actually seem to require a substantial soul to make sense. To substantiate these claims, Section I contains a discussion of a set of current misunderstandings about the nature of a substance (e.g., that a substance is a static thing unrelated to other things), and a treatment of key problems with current models of the self (e.g., that the self is a construct of language). Section II compares two very different views of wholes with parts-substances vs. property-things. Section III clarifies the essence of substance dualism by describing five states of the soul and the nature of a faculty of the soul. The section closes with a sketch of the main types of considerations that justify belief in substance dualism. In the final section, I argue that the self is the soul by showing how key features of certain psychological models of the self seem to require substance dualism to make sense and by clarifying a set of psychological terms/concepts in light of what has been argued earlier.

Should a Naturalist Be a Supervenient Physicalist

I clarify a widely accepted form of contemporary naturalism and argue that supervenient physicalism should not be considered an option for those who embrace this version of naturalism. Among other things, my thesis implies that if there are insuperable difficulties for strict physicalism, then the move toward supervenience views of the mind/body problem amounts to an abandonment of this version of naturalism and not a minor adjustment of it. More precisely, my argument is this: strict physicalism excludes both substance and property or event dualism. But the supervenience thesis entails some form of property or event dualism. So strict physicalism excludes the supervenience thesis. Moreover, given the nature of a widely accepted contemporary understanding of naturalism, it is best construed along strict physicalist lines and naturalists of this persuasion should not be supervenient physicalists. To make my case, I offer a characterization of a ubiquitous version of contemporary naturalism followed by an analysis of the most plausible version of supervenient physicalism consistent with this form of naturalism. I then try to show why this version of supervenient physicalism should not be an option for a naturalist of a certain persuasion.

A conceptualist argument for a spiritual substantial soul

I advance a type of conceptualist argument for substance dualism –minimally, the view that we are spiritual substances that have bodies – based on the understandability of what it would be for something to be a spirit, e.g. what it would be for God to be a spirit. After presenting the argument formally, I clarify and defend its various premises with a special focus on what I take to be the most controversial one, namely, if thinking (i.e. conscious) matter is metaphysically possible, it is not the case that we have a distinct positive concept of God’s being a divine spirit. In an important, recent book, Robert Koons and George Bealer correctly point out that for the last fifty years or so, materialism has been waning (Koons & Bealer (), xvii–xxi). In this article I hope to contribute to the aforementioned decline by presenting what to my knowledge is a new argument for a substantial, simple, spiritual soul – a type of conceptualist argument. The conceptualist argument Even if spirits/souls do not exist, it seems that we have an understanding of what it would be for such things to be real. Thus, we can understand what it would be for demons or angels to exist, Cartesian egos to obtain in some possible world, and God to be a spirit. In light of this, I shall advance a type of conceptualist argument for substance dualism –minimally, the view that we are spiritual substances that have bodies – based on the understandability of what it would be for something to be a spirit, e.g. what it would be for God to be a spirit. After presenting the argument formally, I shall clarify and defend its various premises with a special focus on what I take to be the most controversial one. Religious Studies (2013) 49, 35–43

Intelligent Design Psychology and Evolutionary Psychology: A Comparison of Rival Paradigms

The purpose of this article is to flesh out some details of the ideas at the core of the Intelligent Design movement as they apply to the field of psychology and to compare intelligent design psychology (IDP), specifically, a Christian version of IDP (IDPC), with its chief rival, evolutionary psychology (EP), specifically, a naturalistic version of EP (EPN). After providing some preliminary remarks about scientific research programs and scientific theory assessment, I shall will sketch out some of the details of IDPC and contrast it with EPN. Along the way, I will draw out various explanatory or predictive issues relevant to comparing the two, and provide an occasional critique of EPN.

Tweaking Dallas Willard's Ontology of the Human Person

While my own philosophical views are largely in keeping with my mentor, Dallas Willard, nevertheless, I find his conception of the human person puzzling, hard to specify precisely, and prima facie contradictory in a few places. Dallass central goal in formulating his anthropology was to develop a model that shed light on, allowed for deeper insight into, and fostered interest in spiritual formation, especially the role of the body in spiritual maturation. I share this goal, and agree with most of his model. But in what follows, I will make more precise what his views were, try to clear up what, prima facie, seem to be contradictions in his theory, and, finally, recommend an alternative that captures the central concerns Dallas had for his own position. Thus, I will lay out a few general points of Dallass ontology (points with which I agree), provide a description of his philosophical/theological anthropology, along with two problems that seem to be present, and offer a slightly adjusted alternative to his position that accomplishes his main goal (regarding spiritual formation) in a way with which I believe he would be satisfied.

Intelligent Design Psychology and Evolutionary Psychology on Consciousness: Turning Water into Wine

From the titles of some recent evolutionary psychology publications on the mind, one could get the impression that the mystery of consciousness has been solved, but serious questions and doubts persist. Many scientists have deep reservations about Darwinian theory. Some of these scientists promote the Intelligent Design movement, which has received recent attention from scholars in biology, biochemistry, mathematics, philosophy, and theology. Intelligent Design theory both challenges the naturalistic evolutionary account of life and proposes an alternative scientific research program. Its aim is to investigate the natural world for evidence of divine causes and to detect the patterns or fingerprints of an intelligent designer. The implications of this theory for the field of psychology are examined, and a new field, a Christian version of Intelligent Design Psychology (IDPC) is proposed. The article then briefly compares the psychological implications of IDPC with its chief rival, a naturalistic version of evolutionary psychology (EPN), in relation to consciousness and self-consciousness, including why these phenomena provide serious difficulties for EPN, while at the same time providing positive support for IDPC. Both approaches are examined for their comparative abilities to describe, explain, and predict various facets of human persons that center on consciousness and self-conscious emotions.

Topic neutrality and the parity thesis: a surrejoinder to Williams

In an important paper, Clifford Williams advanced a Lockean-style argument to justify the parity thesis, viz., that there is no intellectual advantage to Christian physicalism or Christian dualism. In an article in Religious Studies I offered a critique of Williamss parity thesis and he has published a rejoinder to me in the same journal centring on my rejection of topic neutrality as an appropriate way to set up the mind–body debate. In this surrejoinder to Williams, I present his three main arguments and respond to each: (1) The dualist rejection of topic neutrality is flawed because it expresses a conceptual approach to the mind–body problem instead of the preferable empirical approach. The latter favours physicalism and, in any case, clearly supports topic neutrality. (2) If the dualist rejects the first argument, then a second parity thesis can be advanced in which an essentialist view of soul and the brain are presented in which each is essentially a thinking and feeling entity. Thus, an essentialist parity thesis is preserved. (3) If the dualist rejects the second argument, a new topic neutrality emerges in the dialectic, so topic neutrality is unavoidable. Against the first argument, I claim that Williams makes two central confusions that undermine his case and that he fails to show how the mind–body debate can be settled empirically. Against the second argument, I claim that it leaves Williams vulnerable to a topic-neutral approach to God and it merely proffers a verbal shift with a new dualism between normal and ‘special’ matter. Against the third argument, I point out that it misrepresents the dualist viewpoint and leads to two counterintuitive features that follow from topic neutrality.