J. Robert Cox

Memory, Critical Theory, and the Argument from History

This essay explores the function of memory in Critical Theory, particularly in the work of Herbert Marcuse, as the basis for a critical argumentation. Marcuse viewed memory as a dialectical force within history—as a negation or “going beyond” (Aufhebung) the given form of the present. Such a view, the essay argues, also implies that an argument from history is located in a particular type of discursive capacity—the “subverting use: of the terms of political culture. In recalling historical forces and potentialities that condition present social relations, Marcuse implies argument is a “re-membering” of what had been split asunder—reason, imagination, and the capacity of action.

Argument and the “definition of the situation”

Actors’ “definitions of the situation”; provide a basis for understanding the rationality of practical judgment and action. Such definitions arise in social interaction. An analysis of actors’ definitions reveals three inventional heuristics—closure, counting, and coherence.

Loci communes and thoreau's arguments for wilderness in “walking” (1851)

Perelman and Olbrechts‐Tytecas concept of loci communes is investigated for its contributions to a critical methodology. It is argued that discourse relying upon different loci may lead to different construals of the APPEARANCE‐REALITY pair and, hence, to different interpretations of the value of a given object, idea, or action. Analyses of Henry David Thoreaus “Walking” (1851) and other Transcendentalist writings on behalf of wilderness are used to illustrate theoretical and methodological claims.

The rhetoric of child labor reform: An efficacy‐utility analysis

Two variables influenced the rhetorical choices of Progressive leaders in their fight against harsh working conditions of children: the ability of auditors to affect the aggrieved conditions (efficacy); and the valuation associated with the object of protest (utility). Success in achieving the movements goal depended upon the adaptation of desirable objectives to groups that possessed the necessary power to induce change.

Attitudinal inherency: Implications for policy debate

The presence of attitudinal obstacles to reform cited by affirmative debaters implies a greater burden in demonstrating the adoption, implementation, and enforcement of the proposed policy. Requirements for the agency of change include (1) an efficacious mechanism for adoption of the policy, (2) authority to implement its key features, and (3) the ability to withstand circumvention of the policy goals. The experience of federal regulatory agencies suggests several areas of permissible “fiat” power in academic debate: (1) incorporation of deliberate bias in the agencys personnel and structure, and (2) the power of ongoing policy decisions under the rule‐making grant of the Administrative Procedure Act.