J. Roland Pennock

Cultural Prerequisites to a Successfully Functioning Democracy: A Symposium.

The problem of sustaining and strengthening democratic institutions is of the first magnitude. The stakes are high. “Democracy,” whatever else may be included, implies free discussion and popular election of governors, with alternative choices available. Presumably the governors will include a representative element, normally in the form of a legislative or policy-adopting body. The term “cultural prerequisites” is less easily defined. The sociologists have an approach that sheds light upon that for which we are searching. They speak of the mores , those modes of thought as well as behavior by which men live and institutions are sustained. The mores are those elements of a culture which are regarded as essential for survival of the society itself. As regards democracy, our question is basically, “What is its cultural and psychological underpinning?” What cultural attitudes or mores will sustain democracy? In part they must do this by assuring its success in satisfying the psychological necessities of its citizens, in part by giving it and its institutions an emotional content which will make its survival a fighting matter for those who love it.

Responsiveness, Responsibility, and Majority Rule.

“Responsiveness,” “responsibility,” and “majority rule” comprise a trio of terms that are basic to the discipline of political science, and particularly to the analysis of democratic political institutions; yet so undeveloped is our science that they represent apples of discord rather than areas of agreement. Where we should have clear concepts for scientific analysis, we are confronted rather with thought receptacles whose unexplored ambiguities constitute standing solicitations to fallacy—solicitations, it may be added, that receive a bountiful response. In view of this situation, it is little wonder that, when we go beyond description to evaluation, we find the doctors in violent disagreement. This article is not limited to definitions. The writer takes a stand on more than one of the issues that plague and divide students of the democratic political process. It is written, therefore, not only in the firm belief that terms ought to be defined, but also with the conviction that in this case an analysis of meanings will lead almost automatically to a resolution of some of the mooted issues, while contributing substantially to a rational appraisal of others.

“Responsible Government,” Separated Powers, and Special Interests: Agricultural Subsidies in Britain and America.

Political scientists today are more cautious than they used to be about comparing forms of government and evaluating their virtues. Moreover, in such comparisons as we do make, we rightly lay more stress on party systems and even more informal aspects of government than on constitutional forms. Yet much of what is said by way of comparing and evaluating the disciplined and programmatic type of political party with the American type carries an undertone of the old arguments. Virtues once attributed to the British style of Parliamentary government, honorifically tagged “responsible government,” are now associated with “party government,” while the evils earlier (and still) attributed to the separation of powers are now frequently laid at the door of a weak party system. To be sure, many who criticize the American constitutional and political arrangements for irresponsibility make no claim that the British system is superior.

Hobbes's Confusing “Clarity”—The Case of “Liberty”

The Leviathan has been described as “original, persuasive, solid, coherent.” General commentaries on Hobbes usually single out his logic for special praise; more detailed critiques generally unearth a mass of confusions and inconsistencies. Confusions and inconsistencies there certainly are; more, I believe, than one would expect to find in the work of a man of such undeniable logical powers. Speculation upon the psychological explanation of this fact is intriguing, but no part of the purpose of the present article. It is part of my purpose, however, to contend that Hobbess passion for clarity and certainty may have played a part in leading him to adopt perverse definitions, to which even he did not consistently adhere and which constituted a major source of confusion. Conversely, I disagree with those who say his analytical system is sound and only his empirical assumptions about human nature are open to serious criticism. More specifically, one may profitably inquire whether there is some central concept that serves as a focal point for many of these difficulties. For example, it is often suggested, with merit, that Hobbess perversion, or inversion, of the traditional meaning of “jus naturale” plays such a role. Without making any exclusive claim or denying the insights that may be gained by concentrating attention upon other focal points, my hypothesis is that understanding of Hobbes may be deepened by an examination of his use of the word “liberty.” I shall deal first with his definitions of the term, and then in turn with his applications of it to natural right and natural law, to sovereignty by acquisition, and finally to the social contract. I shall argue that his method, as illustrated by his definitions, leads him occasionally into confusion or inconsistency, and more frequently tends to confuse the reader and so to enable Hobbes to make an unsound conclusion appear sound, by means of specious reasoning. In particular, I shall contend that Hobbess treatment of liberty (1) leads him into self-contradiction regarding the extent of natural liberty, (2) enables him to argue persuasively but speciously in support of the obligation to obey a sovereign who has attained his position by violence, and (3) prevents him from developing an acceptable theory of political obligation.

Democracy is Not Paradoxical: Comment

theory. Although these remarks are called forth by Donald Weiss’s recent article (19731, it is not so much that I disagree with his proposed solution; rather I believe a different approach will bring out more clearly the relation of Wollheim’s “paradox” (1962) to the main body ot political theory, and at the same time avoid some ( I believe) misleading remarks that are included in his discussion. Like Wollheini, I believe i t best t o start with a discussion o f how thc word “democracy” is best defined. One Inust distinguish at the outset between democracy as an ideal and democracy as a practical device for approximating the ideal. When this is done and when we consider carel’iilly what the latter does, i t will appear that the dlegcd paradox breaks down into t w o or more problems, including the aricierit problem o f political obligation and the more modern but still old problem ol‘ !lie du ty of‘ a representative. These problems have been abundantly discussed. They present no paradoxes and n o new issues, although individuals nay differ as t o their correct solutions. What, then, is denitxracy‘? Both etyniology arid tiistory suggest that its primary meaning certainly at least its original meaning refers to a torm

THE POLITICAL POWER OF BRITISH AGRICULTURE

of application. The individualistic democracy advocated by Mill sets the problem of government as one primarily of elucidating values and is devised to allow a wide diversity of values to rise to the surface. Turning, however, to the problem of realizing values, it is more difficult to regard democracy simply as a method consistent with all values. It tends to become a value itself, and therefore not always placed first in the total list of values. It is well known that democratic forms of government easily suffer if everyone wants quickly two bowls of rice instead of one, or if men are urgently preoccupied with defence from internal or external danger. It would be useful to have a realistic discussion on whether democracy ought to suffer. On this problem Mill left a loophole for himself by maintaining that his theory applied only beyond a certain level of civilization. Unless we use the word ‘civilization’ in a completely question-begging way, however, this distorts the issue, which is based upon circumstance rather than civilization. Even in a western democracy, how much unemployment would there have to be before one rated the form of government at a value below that of getting a job?; or how much danger, before one placed security first? It may be objected that this is just to pick out emergencies. But there are no emergencies in political theory; it is simply that situations where radical choices have to be faced are more infrequent in some societies than in others, but their theoretical significance is the same. I cannot see that Mr. Greaves has helped at all with this interesting and difficult problem, though he may do so later. It would have been appropriate here, because it is not strictly a matter of the application of democratic theory, but a part of the theory itself, which is otherwise incomplete. The question of the limits of the method advocated by Mr. Greaves is also clearly the question of its validity. There is, of course, an entirely different question of application where, for example, one discusses electoral systems or the schools from which civil servants are recruited, and this is concerned with institutional consequences. I very much hope that Mr. Greaves will develop his system, but that he will consider the first kind of application and not merely the second. Until then we cannot say how far he has escaped agnosticism.

Liberalism under Attack.

The title of this article is much broader than its subject matter, which discusses political liberalism only and only a selection of the attacks that have been made upon it and some of the responses they have elicited. More specifically, certain large and important topics are almost wholly excluded: to wit, the Marxist attacks, the concept of liberty, and rights and justice. It will appear as we proceed that the arguments develop on various levels: philosophical (especially epistemological) foundations, practical ethics, and theories of governmental operation. However, these will not be used as the basis of organization in what follows. Liberalism may be considered as a kind of individualism, a fact that is relied upon by both its proponents and its opponents. Individualism comes in many varieties (see Lukes 1973). Oversimplifying, I shall reduce them to three. The first of these (with which many critics of liberalism identify it) may be called “atomistic” individualism. It represents the extreme view of the priority (both chronologically and in terms of value) of the individual as opposed to society. The works of Thomas Hobbes, F. A. Hayek, and Robert Nozick are representative of this type of theory. They tend to think of the individual as having a fixed nature dominated by rational self-interest, emphasizing the satisfaction of preferences. In the words of Christopher J. Berry, individuals “are depicted variously as alienated, selfish, competitive, possessive, apathetic, and so on” (Berry 1989, 2).

The Life and Times of Liberal DemocracyMacphersonC. B..New York: Oxford University Press, 1977. Pp. 120.

Macpherson rides again, this time in a brief, compact, and unified review of liberal democratic theory and preview (he hopes) of democratic practice. He opens with the debatable proposition, which he attributes to “most, though not all political theorists of all persuasions,” that “the workability of any political system depends largely on how all other institutions, social and economic, have shaped, or might shape, the people with whom and by whom’the political system must operate“ (p. 4). One cannot help but reflect on Albert 0. Hirschman’s recent demonstration (The Passions and the Iiireresrs) that the key concepts of modern capitalism came into being well before its institutions. The life of democratic theory, Macpherson finds, can best be depicted in terms of four models: ( I ) the “protective democracy” of Bentham and James Mill, (2) the “developmental model” of J. S. Mill, (3) “equilibrium democracy” (“the pluralist, elitist equilibrium model”), and (4) “participatory democracy.” On the whole, his descriptions of these well-known theories are accurate, but his’comments often evoke critical reactions. For instance, after quoting Bentham as saying that “needs and enjoyments” provide the motivation for work, he goes on immediately to treat himas re1yingupon“fear ofstarvation”(pp. 27-28). He explains the fact that manhood suffrage did not bring about the class government that Mill feared by the extraordinary success of the party system in tamingdemocracy. The argument is tortuous and makes no reference to Madison’s “refining” of the popular will, t o the plurality of interests, to the inactivism of the poor, nor to Olson-type reasoning that it is arguably rational for many (most?) people in less favored classes to lay their bets on outdoing their peers rather than t o hope for a major social transformation. And why, by the way, are our parties declining, as clearly they are? I would gather it is not from the disappearance of what Macpherson sees as their “chief function” (p. 65)blunting class conflict.

9.65, cloth;

The fifty-one essays in this volume, covering a range of subjects as broad as the domain of liberal thought, have been gleaned from the files of the past thirty years. Nearly half of them originally appeared in the pages of The New Republic; twenty-one were book reviews. Each once served a useful purpose; but for most of them it is difficult to see the justification for re-publication. How much better it would have been if Professor Cohen could have found time to present us with a single, orderly exposition of his philosophy of liberalism!