J. Rupert J. Gatti

A Dashboard for Online Pricing

One primary difference between the online marketplace and the high street is the quality of information about product characteristics and prices that are available to all consumers and retailers. Successful online retailers exploit this rich information through innovative dynamic pricing strategies. This article identifies important considerations for devising online pricing strategies. It presents five case studies that illustrate how these strategies have been applied by successful online retailers and discusses complementary practices in innovative management and data analysis. We present a 9Dashboard9 of market specific information that will help managers identify and respond to opportunities and threats arising in the online marketplace.

Online Price Dispersion Within and Between Seven European Countries

This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of online price dispersion in Europe, across a broad range of product categories and countries. Using the dominant European price comparison site we collected firm specific prices, weekly, from sevcn European countries (Denmark, France, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom) for 31 unique products, falling into five distinct product categories (printers, PDAs, scanners, games consoles, computer games and music), over the nine month period October 2001 to June 2002. The resulting data set comprises over 17,000 individual price observations. Using a number of alternative measures of price dispersion we find significant differences in the degree of price dispersion observed in online markets, both between countries and across product categories. We consider alternative explanations for online price dispersion and analyse their significance in explaining the observed differences.

The Biodiversity Bargaining Problem

We employ cooperative bargaining theory and Nash’s ‘rational threats’ idea to cast light on the biodiversity bargaining problem. The problem of global environmental negotiations is argued to be of the nature of a bargaining problem, in which bargainers must agree on the distribution of cooperative surplus in order to move to the bargaining frontier. We discuss the importance of both efficiency (bargaining frontier) and fairness (recognition of characteristics of bargainers) in the choice of the appropriate contract. We show that the incremental cost contract, used to resolve the biodiversity bargaining problem, is of the form of an extreme point contract that fails to recognise the contributions of the South to the production of cooperative surplus. A rational response to such a contract is the use of threats of biodiversity destruction. Contracts must evince both efficiency and fairness in order to represent lasting solutions.

A Note on the Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Games with Discontinuous Payoffs

This paper generalises the approach taken by Dasgupta & Maskin (1986) and Simon (1989) and provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of pure and mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in games with continuous strategy spaces and discontinuous payoff functions. The conditions can be applied widely, and examples for existence of pure strategy and monotonic equilibria in First-Price auctions are provided. The conditions are also appropriate for ensuring that computer generated equilibrium solutions can be extended to continuous strategy spaces.