J. Samuel Baixauli-Soler

Ownership Structure and Board Effectiveness as Determinants of TMT Compensation in Spanish Listed Firms

This study analyzes the influence of ownership structure and the board of directors on top management team (TMT) pay levels in a sample of Spanish listed firms. When panel data methodology is applied, the results show that TMT pay level is affected by the supervisory effectiveness of the board. This, in turn, is influenced by ownership concentration and the type of major shareholders. When ownership is dispersed, the board is more effective in their supervision and TMT pay level is lower. However, when ownership is concentrated, the quality of supervision and, consequently, TMT pay levels depend upon the type of shareholder that is predominant.

CEO reputation and top management team compensation

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to clarify the influence of chief executive officer (CEO) reputation on top management team (TMT) compensation, proposing corporate governance characteristics as a moderator of the relationships between the power of top managers to extract rents and the importance of external signals. The study aims to expand the domain of executive compensation literature by including the role of CEO reputation in the context of non-Anglo-Saxon corporate governance systems. Design/methodology/approach – The paper opted for a panel methodology for the period 2004-2009, including 534 observations from Spanish listed companies. Data were obtained from several sources. Compensation and governance information was obtained from the Spanish Stock Exchange National Commission; data regarding CEO reputation were obtained from Spanish Corporate Reputation Monitor, and, finally, financial statement was obtained from the OSIRIS database. Findings – The paper provides empirical insights on the C...

Several risk measures in portfolio selection: Is it worthwhile?

ABSTRACT This paper is concerned with asset allocation using a set of three widely used risk measures, which are the variance or deviation, Value at Risk and the Conditional Value at Risk. Our purpose is to evaluate whether solving the asset allocation problem under several risk measures is worthwhile or not, given the added computational complexity. The main contribution of the paper is the solution of two models that consider several risk measures: the mean-variance-VaR model and the mean- VaR-CVaR model. The inclusion of VaR as one of the objectives to minimize leads to nonconvex problems, therefore the approach we propose is based on a heuristic: multi-objective genetic algorithms. Our results show the adequacy of the multi-objective approach for the portfolio optimization problem and emphasize the importance of dealing with mean-σ-VaR or mean-VaR-CVaR models as opposed to mean-σ-CVaR, where both risk measures are redundant.

Are we using the wrong letters? An analysis of executive stock option Greeks

Greek letters, in particular delta and vega based on the Black–Scholes model (BS), have been widely used to estimate the sensitivity of CEO wealth to changes in stock price (delta) and stock return volatility (vega) and to evaluate the executive stock options (ESOs) granted on the basis of performance and risk. However, the BS model does not take into account the main features of ESOs and therefore the delta and vega values it produces are not valid. The Cvitanic–Wiener–Zapatero model (CWZ) is an alternative model to Black–Scholes for valuing ESOs. It has a closed formula and considers the main features of ESOs. We carry out a sensitivity analysis to show that research on option-based compensation and its risk-taking effects is not robust in ESO pricing models. The sensitivity analysis consists of comparing the impact of the common parameters of the BS and CWZ models, as well as the effect of the specific parameters of the CWZ model, on the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock price and stock volatility. Additionally, using panel data methodology, we develop an empirical analysis to illustrate the influence of stock return volatility and different corporate policies on both CEO wealth sensitivities.

Executive directors' compensation and monitoring: the influence of gender diversity on Spanish boards

AbstractThis study presents evidence of the influence of gender diversity on the pay system and the monitoring of executives in Spain. In this country/context, characterized by a few male dominant shareholders acting simultaneously as executives, there is an ongoing discussion regarding the enactment of laws to promote gender equality on the boards of directors of large listed companies. This paper presents several contributions. On the one hand, the scarce previous evidence on this topic is focused on US firms. On the other hand, this study includes the role of ownership structure as a factor that indirectly moderates the relationships between gender diversity on board and monitoring effectiveness in terms of executive directors’ compensation. Furthermore, this paper makes an important effort to control endogeneity. The sample examined includes 120 companies listed on the Spanish stock market during the period 2004–2011. The results show a positive and highly significant effect of the presence of women i...

Minimising value-at-risk in a portfolio optimisation problem using a multi-objective genetic algorithm

In this paper, we develop a general framework for market risk optimisation that focuses on VaR. The reason for this choice is the complexity and problems associated with risk return optimisation (non-convex and non-differential objective function). Our purpose is to obtain VaR efficient frontiers using a multi-objective genetic algorithm (GA) and to show the potential utility of the algorithm to obtain efficient portfolios when the risk measure does not allow calculating an optimal solution. Furthermore, we measure differences between VaR efficient frontiers and variance efficient frontiers in VaR-return space and we evaluate out-sample capacity of portfolios on both bullish and bearish markets. The results indicate the reliability of VaR-efficient portfolios on both bullish and bearish markets and a significant improvement over Markowitz efficient portfolios in the VaR-return space. The improvement decreases as the portfolios level of risk increases. In this particular case, efficient portfolios do not depend on the risk measure minimised.

Say on pay effectiveness, corporate governance mechanisms, and CEO compensation alignment

Say on pay (SOP) is a relatively new governance mechanism that allows shareholders to pronounce on the suitability on executives’ compensation. The literature has mainly examined SOP effects on Anglo Saxon contexts of corporate governance, reporting mixed results and highlighting the need to deepen our understanding of its real impact, as well as its interactions with other mechanisms of governance. Concerning these gaps, the present research analyzes the effectiveness of SOP as a mechanism for aligning CEO compensation in the context of Spanish listed companies – a good representative model of continental European systems of corporate governance–. It also examines the moderating effect of board monitoring and ownership structure. Using panel data and linear regression methodologies on a set of companies from 2013 to 2016, the results show that SOP generally increases the alignment of CEO compensation, although its effectiveness is reduced in companies with overcompensated CEOs and in owner-managed companies.

A naïve approach to speed up portfolio optimization problem using a multiobjective genetic algorithm

Genetic algorithms (GAs) are appropriate when investors have the objective of obtaining meanvariance (VaR) efficient frontier as minimising VaR leads to nonconvex and nondifferential riskreturn optimisation problems. However GAs are a timeconsuming optimisation technique. In this paper, we propose to use a naive approach consisting of using samples split by quartile of risk to obtain complete efficient frontiers in a reasonable computation time. Our results show that using reduced problems which only consider a quartile of the assets allow us to explore the efficient frontier for a large range of risk values. In particular, the third quartile allows us to obtain efficient frontiers from the 1.8% to 2.5% level of VaR quickly, while that of the first quartile of assets is from 1% to 1.3% level of VaR.