Jaap van Heerden

The concept of validity

This article advances a simple conception of test validity: A test is valid for measuring an attribute if (a) the attribute exists and (b) variations in the attribute causally produce variation in the measurement outcomes. This conception is shown to diverge from current validity theory in several respects. In particular, the emphasis in the proposed conception is on ontology, reference, and causality, whereas current validity theory focuses on epistemology, meaning, and correlation. It is argued that the proposed conception is not only simpler but also theoretically superior to the position taken in the existing literature. Further, it has clear theoretical and practical implications for validation research. Most important, validation research must not be directed at the relation between the measured attribute and other attributes but at the processes that convey the effect of the measured attribute on the test scores.

The theoretical status of latent variables

This article examines the theoretical status of latent variables as used in modern test theory models. First, it is argued that a consistent interpretation of such models requires a realist ontology for latent variables. Second, the relation between latent variables and their indicators is discussed. It is maintained that this relation can be interpreted as a causal one but that in measurement models for interindividual differences the relation does not apply to the level of the individual person. To substantiate intraindividual causal conclusions, one must explicitly represent individual level processes in the measurement model. Several research strategies that may be useful in this respect are discussed, and a typology of constructs is proposed on the basis of this analysis. The need to link individual processes to latent variable models for interindividual differences is emphasized.

Fantasy proneness, but not self-reported trauma is related to DRM performance of women reporting recovered memories of childhood sexual abuse

Extending a strategy previously used by , we administered a neutral and a trauma-related version of the Deese-Roediger-McDermott paradigm to a sample of women reporting recovered (n=23) or repressed memories (n=16) of childhood sexual abuse (CSA), women reporting having always remembered their abuse (n=55), and women reporting no history of abuse (n=20). We found that individuals reporting recovered memories of CSA are more prone than other participants to falsely recalling and recognizing neutral words that were never presented. Moreover, our study is the first to show that this finding even held when trauma-related material was involved. Correlational analyses revealed that fantasy proneness, but not self-reported traumatic experiences and dissociative symptoms were related to false recall and false recognition.

Different Kinds of DIF: A Distinction Between Absolute and Relative Forms of Measurement Invariance and Bias

In this article, a distinction is made between absolute and relative measurement. Absolute measurement refers to the measurement of traits on a group-invariant scale, and relative measurement refers to the within-group measurement of traits, where the scale of measurement is expressed in terms of the within-group position on a trait. Relative measurement occurs, for example, if an item induces a within-group comparison in respondents. These distinctions are discussed within the framework of measurement invariance, differentiating between absolute and relative forms of measurement invariance and bias. It is shown that items for relative measurement will produce bias as classically defined if the mean and/or variance of the trait distribution differ between groups. This form of bias, however, does not result from multidimensionality but from the fact that measurement is on a relative scale. A logistic regression procedure for the detection of relative measurement invariance and bias is proposed, as well as a model that allows for the incorporation of items for relative measurement in test analysis. Implications of the distinction between absolute and relative measurement are discussed and prove to be especially relevant for the domain of personality research.

Functional Thought Experiments

The literature on thought experiments has been mainly concernedwith thought experiments that are directed at a theory, be it in aconstructive or a destructive manner. This has led somephilosophers to argue that all thought experiments can beformulated as arguments. The aim of this paper is to drawattention to a type of thought experiment that is not directed ata theory, but fulfills a specific function within a theory. Suchthought experiments are referred to as functional thoughtexperiments, and they are routinely used in applied statistics. An example is given from frequentist statistics, where a thoughtexperiment is required to establish the probability space. It isconcluded that (a) not all thought experiments can be formulated asarguments, and (b) the role of thought experiments is more generaland more important to scientific reasoning than has previouslybeen recognized.

A constructive replication of White's alleged refutation of Nisbett and Wilson and of Bem: Limitations on verbal reports of internal events

Abstract Some points were made by P. White (1980, Psychological Review, 87 , 105–112) concerning R. Nisbett and T. Wilsons work on the limitations to conscious awareness of mental processes. White showed that report accuracy can be improved by memory for the events of the relevant process. His experimental findings are opposed to those of Nisbett and Wilson. In the present article Whites statistical analysis is criticized. A reanalysis of his data demonstrates no evidence for Whites hypothesis that report accuracy is improved by memory for the events of the relevant process. In addition, Whites experimental design is queried and a constructive replication of his experiment is designed and executed. The results of the present study give no support to Whites hypothesis. Therefore, Whites experimental findings cannot be considered a refutation of Nisbett and Wilsons stance.