Jack Knight

Changing Social Norms: Common Property, Bridewealth, and Clan Exogamy

Much has been written on change in social norms, but with few exceptions such efforts have failed to synthesize the growing theoretical literature with the specifics of empirical cases. Attempting such a synthesis, we develop a theoretical framework for explaining norm emergence and change that builds on Barths idea of generative models. We identify three mechanisms offered in the contemporary theoretical literature to account for the dynamic process of norm change: (I) coordination on focal points, (2) competitive selection among contracts, and (3) bargaining. We investigate three examples of norm change among the Galole Orma - common property rights, bridewealth, and clan exogamy - and show that examination of strategic decision making within the constraints presented by social context can produce adequate accounts of such change. We conclude that the primary mechanism in norm change among the Orma is bargaining and that the most important sources of such change are asymmetries in bargaining power.

Toward a Strategic Revolution in Judicial Politics: A Look Back, A Look Ahead

As papers presented at recent disciplinary conferences and articles published in major political science journals reveal, the field of judicial politics is undergoing a sea change. Variants of the social-psychological paradigm, which have long dominated thinking about law and courts, are giving way to approaches grounded in assumptions in rationality. More to the point, ever-growing numbers of scholars are now invoking the strategic account to understand judicial politics. In what follows, we investigate this “strategic revolution.” We begin by providing an intellectual history of the field, with special emphasis on why judicial specialists resisted strategic analysis for so long and why they are now (re)turning to it in ever-increasing numbers. Next, we consider the ways that analysts have begun to put the strategic account to work. This is an important task, for debates are already emerging over the “best” way to invoke the account to study judicial politics. We take the position that there is no one “right” way but rather four different approaches-all of which have the potential to provide us with important insights into law and courts.

The Priority of Democracy: Political Consequences of Pragmatism

Preface ix Part One Chapter 1: Preliminaries 1 Chapter 2: Pragmatism and the Problem of Institutional Design 25 Chapter 3: The Appeal of Decentralization 51 Part Two Chapter 4: The Priority of Democracy and the Burden of Justification 93 Chapter 5: Reconsidering the Role of Political Argument in Democratic Politics 128 Chapter 6: Refining Reflexivity 167 Part Three Chapter 7: Formal Conditions: Institutionalizing Liberal Guarantees 193 Chapter 8: Substantive Conditions: Pragmatism and Effectiveness 222 Chapter 9: Conclusion 256 References 287 Index 307

Explaining Economic Change: The Interplay Between Cognition and Institutions

Economic theory is built on assumptions about human behavior—assumptions embodied in rational-choice theory. Underlying these assumptions are implicit notions about how we think and learn. These implicit notions are fundamentally important to social explanation. The very plausibility of the explanations that we develop out of rational-choice theory rests crucially on the accuracy of these notions about cognition and rationality. But there is a basic problem: There is often very little relationship between the assumptions that rational-choice theorists make and the way that humans actually act and learn in everyday life. This has significant implications for economic theory and practice. It leads to bad theories and inadequate explanations; it produces bad predictions and, thus, supports ineffective social policies.

The norm of prior judicial experience and its consequences for career diversity on the U.S. Supreme Court

Introduction 906 I. The Norm of Prior Judicial Experience 909 A. Evidence for the Existence of the Norm 909 B. Career Homogeneity Resulting from the Norm 917 1. Occupation at Time of Appointment 918 2. Homogeneity of Career Paths 927 C . D iscussion 937 II. The Importance of Diversity in Institutions 941 A. A General Argument for Diversity 942 1. Diversity in Collective Decision-Making Bodies 944

Inquiry into Democracy: What Might a Pragmatist Make of Rational Choice Theories?

We begin by positing a conception of pragmatism that is characterized by three basic philosophical commitments: consequentialism, fallibilism, and anti-skepticism. In light of that conception we challenge prevalent views that hold that pragmatism entails no particular moral and political positions. We argue instead that pragmatism generally has democratic implications and, more specifically, that it has implications for the assessment and justification of political institutions. To develop this position we draw in part on the political insights of Dewey. Dewey argued that the greater social and economic complexity of twentieth century life creates significant problems for democratic society and its institutions. The most important of these problems is that growing complexity makes it difficult for a democratic public to effectively identify either itself or its enduring interests. In lieu of a specific remedy, Dewey proposed a form of social inquiry that can, by entering into democratic deliberation, contribute to the process by which the public might more readily define its common interests and, thereby, itself. We argue that rational choice theory can assist us in undertaking such a pragmatist social inquiry. We draw on two main bodies of recent research-on the political economy of U.S. macroeconomic policy and on mechanism design-to show the relevance of the rational choice approach. We argue both that this research reinforces pragmatist preoccupation with democratic deliberation and, because pragmatists are naive about institutional matters, that their preoccupation is very nearly utopian in the pejorative sense.

The Priority of Democracy: A Pragmatist Approach to Political-Economic Institutions and the Burden of Justification

Politics reflects a seemingly incontrovertible condition—any imaginable human population is diverse across multiple, overlapping dimensions including material interests, moral and ethical commitments, and cultural attachments. Such diversity means, in turn, that disagreement and conflict are unavoidable. Under these circumstances politics largely consists in contests over the contours of shared institutional arrangements. Given that there almost always are a number of ways to institutionalize social interaction, any population occupying the circumstances of politics must determine which institutional form or arrangement to rely on in any particular domain. The “priority” of democracy, on our account, derives from its usefulness in approaching this crucial task. This priority derives from features that are, in our view, unique to democracy, namely a level of reflexivity that distinguishes it from other ways of coordinating ongoing social interaction. As we demonstrate, much of the literature on social institutions tacitly and improperly privileges a quite different component of our institutional arrangements, namely markets. We show that once one clarifies the premises and argumentative strategies common to this literature, it simply is not possible to sustain the privilege it accords to markets. In fact, we argue that the analytical models and explanatory strategies that institutionalists deploy actually sustain our case for the priority of democracy.

Suboptimality and Social Institutions: The Relationship Between Cognition and Context

The motivating theme of this symposium is the interplay among rationality, cog nition and institutions. This relationship is a complex one and there is much about it that we do not yet understand. There are a few basic ideas that generate the interest in this relationship and that structure the growing body of research. They can be stated simply as a set of causal relations: cognition affects rational decisionmaking, rational decisionmaking affects the development of institutions, institutions affect rational decisionmaking, institutions affect cognition, institutions affect social outcomes. These beliefs about the reciprocal causal relations have led many to the conclusion that in order to understand institutional change and the resulting effects on social change, we need to develop a better understanding of the relationship between cognition and rationality on the one hand and social institutions on the other.

A Pragmatist Approach to the Proper Scope of Government

What is the proper scope of government? In this paper, I argue that efforts to define a clear and distinct boundary for the scope of government are misplaced. This argument takes two forms. First, and primarily, I set out a positive argument for a pragmatic approach. Given the complexity of modern life, a pragmatic approach to government will provide the most reasonable way of institutionalizing the differences between public and private activity. Second, I show that theoretical efforts to establish a clearly defined boundary cannot be reasonably sustained. They run into problems internal to their own justifications.

Roundtable on Epistemic Democracy and its Critics

On September 3, 2015, the Political Epistemology/Ideas, Knowledge, and Politics section of the American Political Science Association sponsored a roundtable on epistemic democracy as part of the APSA’s annual meetings. Chairing the roundtable was Daniel Viehoff, Department of Philosophy, University of Sheffield. The other participants were Jack Knight, Department of Political Science and the Law School, Duke University; Hélène Landemore, Department of Political Science, Yale University; and Nadia Urbinati, Department of Political Science, Columbia University. We thank the participants for permission to republish their remarks, which they edited for clarity after the fact.