Jack M. Feldman

Self-Generated Validity and Other Effects of Measurement on Belief, Attitude, Intention, and Behavior

Drawing from recent developments in social cognition, cognitive psychology, and behavioral decision theory, we analyzed when and how the act of measuring beliefs, attitudes, intentions, and behaviors affects observed correlations among them. Belief, attitude, or intention can be created by measurement if the measured constructs do not already exist in long-term memory. The responses thus created can have directive effects on answers to other questions that follow in the survey. But even when counterparts to the beliefs, attitudes, and intentions measured already exist in memory, the structure of the survey researchers questionnaire can affect observed correlations among them. The respondent may use retrieved answers to earlier survey questions as inputs to response generation to later questions. We present a simple theory predicting that an earlier response will be used as a basis for another, subsequent response if the former is accessible and if it is perceived to be more diagnostic than other accessible inputs. We outline the factors that determine both the perceived diagnosticity of a potential input, the likelihood that it will be retrieved, and the likelihood that some alternative (and potentially more diagnostic) inputs will be retrieved. This article examines the effects of measurement operations on revealed correlations among survey measures of belief, attitude, intention, and behavior. The potential reactivity of measurement has long been of concern in psychology. Methodologists (e.g., Campbell & Stanley, 1966; Cook & Campbell, 1979; Runkel & McGrath, 1972) warn of measurement-induced distortions relating to social desirability, evaluation apprehension, and sensitization to experimental treatments. Although it is true that the problem of reactivity of measurement affects work in both the social and physical sciences, in the physical sciences, measurement effects are expressed in terms of substantive theory. For instance, Heisenbergs uncertainty principle links basic

Memory Beliefs as Social Cognition: A Reconceptualization of What Memory Questionnaires Assess

Few attempts have been made to integrate research on memory beliefs across adulthood with related constructs in social cognition. This article addresses the issue of how respondents formulate answers to memory-beliefs questions from a social–cognitive perspective. We propose that reported memory beliefs represent the outcomes of a process that involves both the retrieval of previously stored information about self and about memory and on-line constructive processes. This article offers a set of assumptions that clarifies existing data on memory beliefs and generates new hypotheses regarding the interactions between beliefs about the aging process, memory, and constructs such as memory self-efficacy and how such variables combine with the on-line constructive processes to produce individual differences in responses.

Processing objective and question order effects on the causal relation between memory and judgment in performance appraisal: The tip of the iceberg.

This study extends the research on information processing in performance appraisal judgments. A critical aspect of this research is the relation between memory and judgment processes. Performance appraisal researchers have traditionally assumed that performance judgments are based on memory for specific behaviors; implicit in this assumption is the idea that as memory for specific behaviors improves, judgmental accuracy should also improve. We elaborate the circumstances under which performance ratings are more or less likely to be based on previously formed judgments as opposed to memory for specific information. Results indicate that the causal relation between memory and judgment is driven by contextual factors at the time ratings are required as well as at the time information is encoded

Thinking About Values in Prospect and Retrospect: Maximizing Experienced Utility

Decision-makers often do not or cannot predict at the time of choice howtheir tastes may change by the time the outcomes are experienced. This paperexplores the implications of making decisions by maximizing experiencedutility ex post rather than ex ante. Focusing on being satisfied with choicein retrospect results in quite different kinds of problems than aprospective orientation that projects ones current preferences into thefuture. We examine a number of ways that people can easily mistake theirreactions to outcomes in the future, and propose a series of hypothesesrelated to how people will be dissatisfied with their choices. Finally, werelate these barriers to good decisions to prescriptive processes thatassist people in making decisions with which they will be happy in thefuture.

Accountability and Need for Cognition Effects on Contrast, Halo, and Accuracy in Performance Ratings

In the present study, the authors investigated the effects of accountability and need for cognition on contrast errors, halo, and accuracy of performance ratings examined in good and poor performance context conditions, as well as in a context-free control condition. The accountability manipulation reduced the contrast effect and also modified rater recall of good ratee behavior. Accountability reduced halo in ratings and increased rating accuracy in a poor performance context. Accountability also interacted with need for cognition in predicting individual rater halo.

A Case for Homogeneity of Personality at the Occupational Level

The forces of attraction–selection–attrition have been hypothesized to create homogeneity of personality within organizations, and vocational choice theory predicts that these forces lead to a ‘modal personality’ within given occupations. This study compared the homogeneity of a set of personality characteristics for 6582 incumbents from eight organizations in eight occupations. The results indicated that (1) the homogeneity hypothesis was supported both within organizations as well as within occupations; and (2) the homogeneity within occupations was higher than that found in organizations.

The case for non-analytic performance appraisal

Abstract Two broad frameworks for the construction of performance appraisal systems exist, both aimed at increasing the reliability, validity, accuracy, and utility of appraisals. The analytic framework seeks to eliminate biases sometimes occuring in human judgment by eliminating or at least limiting judgments role in appraisal. The non-analytic (intuitive and quasi-rational) framework seeks to retain and capitalize on the flexibility and adaptive power of human judgment by creating conditions favoring reliable, valid, and accurate ratings. I argue that the analytic model is inapplicable to many if not most jobs, fails to recognize its dependence on human value systems, and (where judgment enters) is based on assumptions about human information processing unlikely to be met in most circumstances. The alternative framework, based on current theories of information processing and judgment, proposes that a system based on explicit consideration of organizational value systems, the role of elaborated values and expert knowledge in judgment processes, and the effects of the conditions under which judgment occurs permits both accuracy and flexibility in appraisals. Methods for the construction and validation of such a system are presented.

Culture and perceptions of selfother similarity

In testing possible cultural effects of the use of the self as an habitual reference point to which others are compared, we expected that: (a) individualistic participants (i.e., those who give priority to personal goals) would rate self-other similarity higher when asked “How similar is X to you?” than when asked “How similar are you to X?”, whereas nondirectional similarity judgements (“How similar are these two people?”) would resemble the former directional comparison; (b) collectivistic participants (i.e., those who give priority to in-group goals) would show a weaker or, possibly, reversed pattern, especially using in-group comparison others. Neither hypothesis was upheld. However, the individualists perceived the in-group to be relatively more similar to themselves as compared to the collectivists. This difference cannot be explained by response bias, status asymmetry, or role differentiation. We propose an explanation in terms of the differential relationship between self and other representations...