Jacob Abadi

Tunisia and Israel: relations under stress

ABSTRACT This article provides an analysis of the relations between Tunisia and Israel. The author argues that Israels attempt to establish diplomatic relations with Tunisia was motivated largely by its quest to reach the countries in the periphery of the Middle East. In addition, the author argues the Israeli leaders were concerned about the fate of the Jewish community in Tunisia. At the same time, the Tunisian ruling Neo Destour party was motivated by the pragmatic considerations of its leader Habib Bourguiba who sought to pursue a unique policy towards Israel based on a willingness to recognize its existence and a just solution to the Palestinian question. Furthermore, the author argues that although the Tunisian regime criticized Israel for its occupation of Arab territories, the contacts between the two countries never ceased entirely. The bilateral connections reached their climax after 1993, when the Oslo accord between Israel and the Palestinians was signed. Despite the continuing tension, both sides remained interested in keeping the contacts and it was primarily Tunisias concern for its tourism industry that kept it from severing its relations with Israel. The article also shows that Tunisias Western orientation had a salutary effect on the bilateral relations.

Constraints and Adjustments in Portugal's Policy toward Israel

Throughout most of its existence the State of Israel had only a handful of friends and allies. However, even during the era of pan-Arabism, when Arab nationalism held sway over the Middle East, engulfing the Third World and the non-aligned nations, Western European countries, with the exception of those of the Iberian Peninsula, had already established diplomatic relations with the Jewish State. Despite its small size and its distance from Israel, Foreign Ministry officials in Jerusalem attached considerable importance to Portugal. This was largely due to its strategic location at the entrance to the Mediterranean basin. Already prior to Israels establishment, the Jewish Agency considered the Portuguese coast essential in facilitating illegal immigration of Jews to Palestine. 1 Whilst many Israelis tended to dismiss the importance of diplomatic relations with Portugal, others rejected the idea on the grounds that Israel need not associate itself with dictatorships. Nevertheless, some Foreign Ministry officials remained steadfast in their conviction that ties with Portugal were essential and continued advocating greater efforts in order to earn Lisbons goodwill. This article argues that the Israeli-Portuguese rapprochement that began by the mid 1970s, was not possible until the demise of the dictatorship and the rise of a socialist government in Portugal, many of whose members were sympathetic to the socialist enterprise of the Zionist Labour movement. In addition, the article argues that Portugals withdrawal from its African colonies accelerated the normalization process. This was largely because Portuguese withdrawal had considerably reduced criticism from Arab and other Third World countries, which tended to regard both Portugal and Israel as imperialist countries. At the same time, however, there were other factors, which deterred the new socialist regime in Lisbon and delayed the normalization process. Foremost among these was Portugals overwhelming dependence on Arab oil. Some members of the Portuguese socialist government were loyal to the Soviet Union and did not wish to promote foreign policy ventures that were not in Moscows interest. Moreover, the

The road to the Israeli‐Moroccan rapprochement

Moroccos relations with Israel are noted for their moderation and cordiality. With the exception of former Tunisias President Habib Bourguiba, who called upon the Arab states to come to terms with Israel, King Hassan II was the only Arab head of state that favoured negotiations with the Jewish State. But unlike any other leader in the region, he agreed to meet Israeli leaders in an attempt to find a solution to the Arab‐Israeli conflict. Observers and commentators on Middle Eastern affairs had often argued that Arab countries, which do not share common borders with Israel, tend to be hostile, because they have little to lose by doing so. As a country situated far from the focus of the Arab‐Israeli conflict, Morocco was an exception to this rule. What were the reasons for such a conciliatory attitude on Moroccos part and why did Hassan decide to embark on such a dangerous course of action, which exposed him to intense criticism from the Arab world, are some of the questions, which this essay attempts to answer. This essay argues that Moroccos conciliatory attitude was a by‐product of both domestic and external constraints, which were not dealt with in adequate depth in the preliminary studies written on this topic, and which profoundly altered Moroccos policy toward Israel.

Israel and the Balkan States

The demise of the Soviet Union constituted a turning point in the diplomatic relations between Israel and the states of the Balkan peninsula. Like all states of the former Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria and Albania were determined to establish new relationships in order to enhance their unique character as independent nations. It was inevitable therefore, that their newly acquired freedom would lead them to renounce Communism, introduce Western ideas and encourage the development of laisez-faire economies. The newly acquired freedom had transformed their foreign policies as well. It manifested itself in greater openness, and a forthcoming attitude toward the United States, western Europe, and indirectly, Israel. All four Balkan states examined here maintained a certain degree of liberty in foreign affairs. Yugoslavia had taken the liberty to define its role as a leader independently of the non-aligned Third World nations. Romania pursued its foreign policy objectives with almost complete disregard to Moscows wish. Albania had always made attempts to establish relations that suited its interests. Its leaders preferred to establish ties with China, in order to offset both Yugoslav and Soviet influence. Only Bulgaria demonstrated a near total submission to the Soviet Union. The demise of the Soviet Union reinforced this trend. These countries were no longer compelled to maintain a low profile or covert foreign relations. Independence for the Balkan state meant that the Soviet market was no longer available to them. Therefore, they sought to become more selfsufficient and to fashion a foreign policy suitable to their economic needs. Israel, with its extraordinary scientific and technical resources seemed an attractive ally, and a bridge to the United States. Furthermore, the onset of the Arab-Israeli dialogue and the decline of pan-Arabism had greatly diminished the risk that a rapprochement with Israel entailed. From Israels point of view, normal relations with the Balkan states were regarded as part of the diplomatic momentum which earned it the friendship of other countries in the region, such as Greece and Turkey. Nevertheless, the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Balkan states, as this article shows, entailed risks and complications. This was especially the case in Yugoslavia, whose leadership adopted non-alignment as one of the tenets of its foreign policy. The fear of antagonizing its large Muslim minority