Jacob D. Abernethy

Web spam identification through content and hyperlinks

We present an algorithm, witch, that learns to detect spam hosts or pages on the Web. Unlike most other approaches, it simultaneously exploits the structure of the Web graph as well as page contents and features. The method is efficient, scalable, and provides state-of-the-art accuracy on a standard Web spam benchmark.

Efficient Market Making via Convex Optimization, and a Connection to Online Learning

We propose a general framework for the design of securities markets over combinatorial or infinite state or outcome spaces. The framework enables the design of computationally efficient markets tailored to an arbitrary, yet relatively small, space of securities with bounded payoff. We prove that any market satisfying a set of intuitive conditions must price securities via a convex cost function, which is constructed via conjugate duality. Rather than deal with an exponentially large or infinite outcome space directly, our framework only requires optimization over a convex hull. By reducing the problem of automated market making to convex optimization, where many efficient algorithms exist, we arrive at a range of new polynomial-time pricing mechanisms for various problems. We demonstrate the advantages of this framework with the design of some particular markets. We also show that by relaxing the convex hull we can gain computational tractability without compromising the market institution’s bounded budget. Although our framework was designed with the goal of deriving efficient automated market makers for markets with very large outcome spaces, this framework also provides new insights into the relationship between market design and machine learning, and into the complete market setting. Using our framework, we illustrate the mathematical parallels between cost-function-based markets and online learning and establish a correspondence between cost-function-based markets and market scoring rules for complete markets.

Eliciting Consumer Preferences Using Robust Adaptive Choice Questionnaires

We propose a framework for designing adaptive choice-based conjoint questionnaires that are robust to response error. It is developed based on a combination of experimental design and statistical learning theory principles. We implement and test a specific case of this framework using Regularization Networks. We also formalize within this framework the polyhedral methods recently proposed in marketing. We use simulations as well as an online market research experiment with 500 participants to compare the proposed method to benchmark methods. Both experiments show that the proposed adaptive questionnaires outperform existing ones in most cases. This work also indicates the potential of using machine learning methods in marketing.

An optimization-based framework for automated market-making

We propose a general framework for the design of securities markets over combinatorial or infinite state or outcome spaces. The framework enables the design of computationally efficient markets tailored to an arbitrary, yet relatively small, space of securities with bounded payoff. We prove that any market satisfying a set of intuitive conditions must price securities via a convex cost function, which is constructed via conjugate duality. Rather than deal with an exponentially large or infinite outcome space directly, our framework only requires optimization over a convex hull. By reducing the problem of automated market making to convex optimization, where many efficient algorithms exist, we arrive at a range of new polynomial-time pricing mechanisms for various problems. We demonstrate the advantages of this framework with the design of some particular markets. We also show that by relaxing the convex hull we can gain computational tractability without compromising the market institutions bounded budget.

Graph regularization methods for Web spam detection

We present an algorithm, witch, that learns to detect spam hosts or pages on the Web. Unlike most other approaches, it simultaneously exploits the structure of the Web graph as well as page contents and features. The method is efficient, scalable, and provides state-of-the-art accuracy on a standard Web spam benchmark.

Interior-Point Methods for Full-Information and Bandit Online Learning

We study the problem of predicting individual sequences with linear loss with full and partial (or bandit) feed- back. Our main contribution is the first efficient algorithm for the problem of online linear optimization in the bandit setting which achieves the optimal Õ(√(T)) regret. In addition, for the full-information setting, we give a novel regret minimization algorithm. These results are made possible by the introduction of interior-point methods for convex optimization to online learning.

Information aggregation in exponential family markets

We consider the design of prediction market mechanisms known as automated market makers. We show that we can design these mechanisms via the mold of exponential family distributions, a popular and well-studied probability distribution template used in statistics. We give a full development of this relationship and explore a range of benefits. We draw connections between the information aggregation of market prices and the belief aggregation of learning agents that rely on exponential family distributions. We develop a natural analysis of the market behavior as well as the price equilibrium under the assumption that the traders exhibit risk aversion according to exponential utility. We also consider similar aspects under alternative models, such as budget-constrained traders.

Low-Cost Learning via Active Data Procurement

We design mechanisms for online procurement of data held by strategic agents for machine learning tasks. The challenge is to use past data to actively price future data and give learning guarantees even when an agent’s cost for revealing her data may depend arbitrarily on the data itself. We achieve this goal by showing how to convert a large class of no-regret algorithms into online posted-price and learning mechanisms. Our results in a sense parallel classic sample complexity guarantees, but with the key resource being money rather than quantity of data: With a budget constraint B, we give robust risk (predictive error) bounds on the order of 1/ √ B. Because we use an active approach, we can often guarantee to do significantly better by leveraging correlations between costs and data. Our algorithms and analysis go through a model of no-regret learning with T arriving pairs (cost, data) and a budget constraint of B. Our regret bounds for this model are on the order of T/ √ B and we give lower bounds on the same order.

Continuous experts and the binning algorithm

We consider the design of online master algorithms for combining the predictions from a set of experts where the absolute loss of the master is to be close to the absolute loss of the best expert. For the case when the master must produce binary predictions, the Binomial Weighting algorithm is known to be optimal when the number of experts is large. It has remained an open problem how to design master algorithms based on binomial weights when the predictions of the master are allowed to be real valued. In this paper we provide such an algorithm and call it the Binning algorithm because it maintains experts in an array of bins. We show that this algorithm is optimal in a relaxed setting in which we consider experts as continuous quantities. The algorithm is efficient and near-optimal in the standard experts setting.

A general volume-parameterized market making framework

We introduce a framework for automated market making for prediction markets, the volume parameterized market (VPM), in which securities are priced based on the market makers current liabilities as well as the total volume of trade in the market. We provide a set of mathematical tools that can be used to analyze markets in this framework, and show that many existing market makers (including cost-function based markets [Chen and Pennock 2007; Abernethy et al. 2011, 2013], profit-charging markets [Othman and Sandholm 2012], and buy-only markets [Li and Vaughan 2013]) all fall into this framework as special cases. Using the framework, we design a new market maker, the perspective market, that satisfies four desirable properties (worst-case loss, no arbitrage, increasing liquidity, and shrinking spread) in the complex market setting, but fails to satisfy information incorporation. However, we show that the sacrifice of information incorporation is unavoidable: we prove an impossibility result showing that any market maker that prices securities based only on the trade history cannot satisfy all five properties simultaneously. Instead, we show that perspective markets may satisfy a weaker notion that we call center-price information incorporation.