Jacob Rosenberg

Rent-Seeking for Pure Public Goods

In this paper we present a formal analysis of rent-seeking for public goods by two or more groups with different numbers of individuals. We begin by considering equally wealthy groups under risk neutrality, a case which constitutes our basic model. Several surprising and interesting results emerge from the analysis of this basic case. The problem is then extended to deal with (a) groups with different wealth levels, and (b) risk aversion. This last extension brings about a further crop of interesting and useful results.

Rent-seeking for budgetary allocation: Preliminary results for 20 countries

Concluding commentsIn this paper we present quantitative measures of the ‘proneness’ of different countries to respond to pressure groups in determining the composition of their spending. These, in turn, help us to derive simple measures of the rent-seeking done in relation to the governments spending pie.Despite the fact that these measures are indicative rather than conclusive they do provide some means of comparing the extent of this rent-seeking waste (or at least its rank distribution) across countries. Also, with the appropriate provios the measures may be used as first approximations for the actual waste generated by rent-seeking activities for government spending.Such measures may be of considerable importance when the question of the optimality of government intervention in a given country is considered. Alternatively, it may be of use when an aid package to a given country from an international agency or a major economy is being considered. At least the rank of a given economy in Tables 1 and 2 can profitably be taken as an additional decision parameter in such cases.But over and above the specific results and methodology used herein we consider the contribution of this paper to be in hopefully stirring interest in the important but much neglected issue of macroeconomic rent-seeking.We feel that this paper has shown that the problem of estimating rent-seeking at the macro level can be attempted. Of course, we expect that our approach will eventually be superseded by further work in the area. Nonetheless, this paper will have achieved its main aim if it stimulates further developments in this hereto barren field.

The economic model of voter participation: A further test

5. Summary and conclusionsThe central hypothesis of the economic model of voter participation was put to an empirical test. It was found that the coefficient of population size, which represents the subjective probability of affecting election results, is negative and significant in municipal local elections, but insignificant in national Knesset elections. Therefore, this variable is unable to represent subjective probability in the latter case.It was suggested that the economic model is more relevant to local elections than to Knesset elections. The empirical results revealed that the regression coefficients of municipal elections that took place separately from Knesset elections fit the expected outcome of the economic model whereas when municipal elections were held simultaneously with the Knesset election this did not hold true.

The demand for liquid assets and involvement in exports; some empirical results

The hypothesis that the greater a firms involvement in exports, the greater will be that firms demand for liquid assets, is empirically tested in this paper. The results are supportive of the hypothesis. In addition it was found that firms owned by labor cooperatives have lower demand for liquid assets than other firms.

Support in the guise of criticism: Extraneous observations and the Katz-Rosenberg measure of rent-seeking

ConclusionWhereas Schnytzer views his comments as a negation of our measure of RSB, we think that they are very supportive of them.Our proposed measure has been praised rather than buried. Nonetheless, as we did in our original paper, we invite Schnytzer and other readers to contribute to this subject by trying to find and apply a “better” measure.