Jacobus Erasmus

Craig’s Kalām Cosmological Argument

William Lane Craig, the contemporary Christian philosopher of religion, is the foremost advocate of the kalām cosmological argument. Although Craig’s kalām cosmological argument is not totally unique, he advances the kalām cosmological argument in at least two distinct ways. First, he takes modern set theory into account in his defence of the impossibility of an actual infinite, ensuring that the kalām cosmological argument is in line with contemporary mathematics. Second, unlike his predecessors, Craig presents scientific arguments together with the philosophical arguments in support of a beginning of the universe. As a result, Craig has helped foster interaction between philosophers and physicists regarding the origin of the universe. This chapter offers an analysis of Craig’s formulation and defence of the argument.

The Doctrine of Creatio ex Nihilo

The kalām cosmological argument is a philosophical argument in favour of the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo (creation out of nothing ), which states that God brought the universe into existence out of nothing or without the use of pre-existing materials. In this chapter I discuss the theological background of the kalām cosmological argument, first, by evaluating whether there is any biblical support for creatio ex nihilo and, second, by examining several ancient influential Jewish and Christian thinkers who affirmed creatio ex nihilo .

The Rise of Set Theory and Modern Cosmology

Philoponus and al-Ghazāli could not have anticipated the rise of set theory and modern cosmology that occurred during the nineteenth century. These two independent fields have a direct bearing on the kalām cosmological argument. Set theory challenges the mediaeval concept of infinity, while cosmology has much to say about the nature of time and the origin of the universe. Consequently, one cannot understand the modern versions of the kalām cosmological argument without a basic understanding of both set theory and cosmology, nor can one defend the argument today without interacting with these two fields. Therefore, this chapter offers a brief overview of set theory and cosmology.

Can Cosmology Justify Belief in an Eternal Universe

Most physicists and cosmologists who believe that the universe is, or can be, eternal justify this belief by the fact that one may, conceivably, construct an eternal cosmological model, that is, a cosmological model that includes or entails an eternal universe. But is this correct? Can an eternal cosmological model, by itself, justify belief in the possibility of an eternal universe? In this chapter I argue that the answer to this question is negative. First, I argue that, if one does not engage with the philosophical arguments for a beginning of the universe, and if one does not included in the pool of explanatory options the hypothesis of an absolute beginning when evaluating which hypothesis best explains the discoveries of modern cosmology, then one’s belief in the possibility of an eternal universe cannot be justified solely by the fact that there exist several eternal cosmological models. I then argue, second, that even if an eternal cosmological model can justify this belief, no such model is currently successful, and the hypothesis that the universe had a beginning is, at present, the best explanation of the discoveries of cosmology.

Philoponus’ Creatio ex Nihilo Argument

John Philoponus was an influential sixth century Christian theologian, philosopher, and scientist. Philoponus was the first Christian to make use of the concept of infinity to formulate philosophical arguments in favour of creatio ex nihilo (creation out of nothing ), the view that God created the universe out of nothing. In this chapter I examine Aristotle’s notion of infinity, which inspired Philoponus ’ infinity arguments. I then survey Philoponus ’ three infinity arguments, namely, the argument based on the impossibility of the existence of an actual infinite, the argument based on the impossibility of traversing an actual infinite, and the argument based on the impossibility of increasing an actual infinite.

Al-Ghazālī’s Kalām Cosmological Argument

Al-Ghazāli was a Muslim lawyer, theologian, and mystic. Today al-Ghazāli is regarded as one of the most important kalām scholars in Muslim intellectual history. In his two books The Incoherence of the Philosophers (Tahāfut al-falāsifa) and Moderation in Belief (Al-Iqtiṣād fi al-I‘tiqād), al-Ghazāli makes a significant contribution to the kalām cosmological argument. In this chapter I examine this contribution by surveying al-Ghazāli’s cosmological argument.

Problems with the Infinity Argument

According to the Infinity Argument, an actually infinite regress of past events cannot exist because an actual infinite cannot exist. The Infinity Argument is one of the most common arguments for a beginning of the universe espoused by advocates of the kalām cosmological argument. However, in this chapter I argue that the Infinity Argument is inconclusive and not a good argument in support of theism because it depends on controversial metaphysical positions. I show that the Infinity Argument is, first, incompatible with Platonism, second, incompatible with the standard definition of omniscience and, third, relies on a controversial metaphysical intuition.

Philosophical Arguments for a Beginning

A key premise of the kalām cosmological argument is that the universe came into existence. In this chapter I defend three arguments in support of this premise, namely, the argument based on traversing infinite time, the argument based on ungrounded causal chains, and the argument based on the paradoxes of beginningless time. Before defending these arguments, however, I offer a detailed analysis of what it means for the universe to come into existence.