Jacques-Philippe Leyens

The Emotional Side of Prejudice: The Attribution of Secondary Emotions to Ingroups and Outgroups

If people favor their ingroup, are especially concerned with their own group, and attribute different essences to different groups, it follows that their essence must be superior to the essence of other groups. Intelligence, language, and certain emotions are all considered to be distinctive elements of human nature or essence. The role of inteligence and language in discrimination, prejudice, and racism has already been largely investigated, and this article focuses on attributed emotions. Specifically, we investigate the idea that secondary emotions are typically human characteristics, and as such, they should be especially associated with and attributed to the ingroup. Seondary emotions may even be denied to outgroups. These differential associations and attributions of specifically human emotions to ingroups versus outgroups should affect intergroup relations. Results from several initial experiments are summarized that support our reasoning. This emotional approach to prejudice and racism is contrasted with more classic, cognitive perspectives.

Stereotype content model across cultures: Towards universal similarities and some differences

The stereotype content model (SCM) proposes potentially universal principles of societal stereotypes and their relation to social structure. Here, the SCM reveals theoretically grounded, cross-cultural, cross-groups similarities and one difference across 10 non-US nations. Seven European (individualist) and three East Asian (collectivist) nations (N=1,028) support three hypothesized cross-cultural similarities: (a) perceived warmth and competence reliably differentiate societal group stereotypes; (b) many out-groups receive ambivalent stereotypes (high on one dimension; low on the other); and (c) high status groups stereotypically are competent, whereas competitive groups stereotypically lack warmth. Data uncover one consequential cross-cultural difference: (d) the more collectivist cultures do not locate reference groups (in-groups and societal prototype groups) in the most positive cluster (high-competence/high-warmth), unlike individualist cultures. This demonstrates out-group derogation without obvious reference-group favouritism. The SCM can serve as a pancultural tool for predicting group stereotypes from structural relations with other groups in society, and comparing across societies.

Does contact reduce prejudice or does prejudice reduce contact? A longitudinal test of the contact hypothesis among majority and minority groups in three European countries.

A widely researched panacea for reducing intergroup prejudice is the contact hypothesis. However, few longitudinal studies can shed light on the direction of causal processes: from contact to prejudice reduction (contact effects) or from prejudice to contact reduction (prejudice effects). The authors conducted a longitudinal field survey in Germany, Belgium, and England with school students. The sample comprised members of both ethnic minorities (n = 512) and ethnic majorities (n = 1,143). Path analyses yielded both lagged contact effects and prejudice effects: Contact reduced prejudice, but prejudice also reduced contact. Furthermore, contact effects were negligible for minority members. These effects were obtained for 2 indicators of prejudice: negative intergroup emotions and desire for social distance. For both majority and minority members, contact effects on negative emotions were stronger when outgroup contacts were perceived as being typical of their group. Contact effects were also mediated by intergroup anxiety. This mediating mechanism was impaired for minority members because of a weakened effect of anxiety on desire for social distance. Theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed.

Stereotypes and social cognition

Preface - Susan T Fiske The Concept and Measure of Stereotypes Classical Theories about Stereotypes Social Identity Theory The Social Cognition Approach Intergroup Phenomena A View from the Bridge Confirmation of Categorical Information Dilution of Stereotypes Overattribution Bias as Na[um]ive Theory Conclusion

Stereotype Threat Undermines Intellectual Performance by Triggering a Disruptive Mental Load

Research on stereotype threat has repeatedly demonstrated that the intellectual performance of social groups is particularly sensitive to the situational context in which tests are usually administered. In the present experiment, an adaptation of the Raven Advanced Progressive Matrices Test was introduced as a measure of cognitive ability. Results showed that individuals targeted by a reputation of intellectual inferiority scored lower on the test than did other people. However, when the identical test was not presented as a measure of cognitive ability, the achievement gap between the target and the control group disappeared. Using heart rate variability indices to assess mental workload, our findings showed that the situational salience of a reputation of lower ability undermined intellectual performance by triggering a disruptive mental load. Our results indicate that group differences in cognitive ability scores can reflect different situational burdens and not necessarily actual differences in cognitive ability.

Stereotype Threat: Are Lower Status and History of Stigmatization Preconditions of Stereotype Threat?

This research extended stereotype-threat effects outside of the academic domain and to a nonstigmatized group. Female and male students performed three decision tasks: lexical, valence, and affective processing. Half of the participants were told that, in general, men are poorer performers than are women in affective processing tasks. No differences between conditions were observed for the lexical and valence tasks. By contrast, for the affective task, threatened men made significantly more errors than did participants in the other three conditions. More precisely, threatened men tended to accept as affective words that were not affective. This latter result suggests that threatened men decreased their threshold for affectivity “to prove” the inapplicability of the stereotype to themselves. Moreover, stereotype endorsement did not mediate the results. Identification with the affective domain, on the other hand, moderated the effect of stereotype threat. Discussion considers the consequences of these findings for everyday interactions.

Dimensions of "uniquely" and "non-uniquely" human emotions

Emotion scientists often distinguish those emotions that are encountered universally, even among animals ( “primary emotions”), from those experienced by human beings ( “secondary emotions”). No attempt, however, has ever been made to capture the lay conception about this distinction and to find the criteria on which the distinction is based. The first study presented in this paper was conducted in three countries involving four languages, so as to allow for cross‐cultural comparisons. Results showed a remarkable convergence. People from all samples not only differentiated between “uniquely human” and “non‐uniquely human” emotions on a continuum, but they did so on the same basis as the one used by emotion scientists to distinguish between “primary” and “secondary” emotions. Study 2 focused on the implicit use of such a distinction. When confronted with a human (animal) context, participants reacted faster to secondary (vs primary) emotions. The implications of the human uniqueness of some emotions within the social and interpersonal contexts are discussed.

Differential Association of Uniquely and Non Uniquely Human Emotions with the Ingroup and the Outgroup

According to Leyens et al.’s (2000) theory, intergroup discrimination involves a differential appraisal of the ingroup’s and the outgroup’s uniquely human characteristics. Four experiments investigated how emotions that are considered uniquely (i.e. secondary emotions) and non uniquely (i.e. primary emotions) human (Demoulin et al., 2001a) are differentially associated with the ingroup and the outgroup. Using the Implicit Association Task (IAT) we found a stronger association of ingroup names with uniquely human emotions and of outgroup names with non uniquely human emotions, than the reverse. Whereas Study 2 used negative emotions, all other experiments used positive emotions. In Study 3, two IAT indices were collected: an emotional index and a standard evaluative one. While the outgroup was constituted by North African names in the first three studies, Study 4 staged French-speaking Belgians (i.e. the ingroup) versus Dutch-speaking Belgians (i.e. the outgroup). The results are discussed within the framework of psychological essentialism, according to which uniquely human characteristics form the essence of the ingroup.

Infrahumanization or Familiarity? Attribution of Uniquely Human Emotions to the Self, the Ingroup, and the Outgroup

People attribute more secondary emotions to their ingroup than to outgroups. This effect is interpreted in terms of infrahumanization theory. Familiarity also could explain this differential attribution because secondary emotions are thought to be less visible and intense than primary ones. This alternative explanation to infrahumanization was tested in three studies. In Study 1, participants attributed, in a between-participants design, primary and secondary emotions to themselves, to their ingroup, or to an outgroup. In Study 2, participants answered for themselves and their ingroup or for themselves and an outgroup. In Study 3, participants made attributions to the ingroup or a series of outgroups varying in terms of familiarity. The data do not support an explanation in terms of familiarity. The discussion centers on conditions not conducting to infrahumanization.

The Primacy of the Ingroup: The Interplay of Entitativity and Identification

In the present chapter, we move away from the traditional focus on the outgroup encountered in the literature on intergroup relations and argue that the ingroup is psychologically primary. We build upon the notion of entitativity first proposed by Campbell (1958) and suggest that entitative ingroups meet basic needs related to group membership better than less coherent ingroups. We provide initial support for the privileged status of entitative ingroups by reviewing contemporary research on group homogeneity. Next, we report on a research program showing that social identification and ingroup entitativity go hand in hand. First, we address the influence of ingroup identification on group entitativity in such phenomena as the “black sheep” effect and ingroup overexclusion. Second, we examine the impact of ingroup entitativity on social identification. We conclude by proposing that ingroup entitativity may also be related to a feeling of efficacy which need not produce conflict and discrimination toward outgroups. Globally, the accumulated evidence strongly suggests that the perception of ingroup entitativity plays a key role in intra- and intergroup relations. Ones own family is an ingroup; and by definition all other families on the street are outgroups; but seldom d o they clash… One knows that ones lodge has distinctive characteristics that mark it off from all others, but one does not necessarily despise the others. The situation it seems can best be stated as follows: although we could not perceive our own ingroups excepting as they contrast to outgroups, still the ingroups are psychologically primary. We live in them, by them, and sometimes, for them. Hostility toward outgroups helps strengthen our sense of belonging, but it is not required (Allport, 1954, pp. 40–41).