Jae Yong Shin

Less Pay and More Sensitivity? Institutional Investor Heterogeneity and CEO Pay

In this article, the authors develop and test a theory on the effect of institutional investor heterogeneity on CEO pay. Their theory predicts that institutional investors’ incentives and capabilities to monitor CEO pay are determined by the fiduciary responsibilities, conflicts of interest, and information asymmetry that institutional investors face. Their theory suggests, in contrast to previous literature, that public pension funds and mutual funds exert different effects on CEO pay at their portfolio firms because they do not have the same monitoring incentives and capabilities. Using a longitudinal sample of S&P 1500 firms for the years 1998 to 2002, the authors find that public pension fund ownership is more negatively—indeed, oppositely—associated with both the level of CEO pay and CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity than mutual fund ownership. Their findings suggest that (a) researchers’ use of institutional investor classifications that do not distinguish public pension fund ownership and mutual fund ownership can be misleading and (b) while CEO pay critics have called for pay plans that are in line with the “less pay and more sensitivity” principle, this may be an ineffective goal to pursue.

Supervisor Discretion in Target Setting: An Empirical Investigation

In a setting in which corporate headquarters dictates total sales targets, we study how supervisors allocate sales targets to individual stores. Specifically, we analyze whether supervisors strategically use discretion in the target-setting process to address compensation contracting issues. We first examine whether supervisors use discretion to manage compensation risk. The results are consistent with the agencytheoretic prediction that supervisors provide easier targets to stores facing higher levels of store-specific risk. Next, we examine whether discretion is used to mitigate fairness concerns. The results suggest that, consistent with behavioral arguments, supervisors use discretion to deal with fairness issues, even if the area of the supervisor’s discretion is not the source of the fairness concerns. Finally, we analyze whether supervisors use discretion in the target-setting process to reduce their potential confrontation costs. Consistent with research in psychology, we find that supervisors provide easier targets to store managers with relatively higher hierarchical status.

Determinants and Performance Effects of Executive Pay Multiples: Evidence from Korea

The authors examine factors influencing the executive pay multiple (executive-employee pay disparity) and its effects on performance. Using unique data from Korea, where all publicly listed firms are required to provide detailed information on average employee pay in their annual reports, they find that a substantial portion of cross-sectional variation in the executive pay multiple is explained by the firm’s economic and political characteristics. Results also indicate that the executive pay multiple has a statistically significant negative relation with subsequent operating and stock return performance. A two-stage approach, however, reveals that the performance effects of the executive pay multiple are likely to be influenced more by deviations from the expected executive pay multiple, estimated using the first-stage determinant model, than by the absolute pay multiple per se. The study sheds light on recent debates regarding the usefulness of executive pay multiple disclosure.

Determinants and Performance Effects of Executive Pay Multiples

The authors examine factors influencing the executive pay multiple (executive-employee pay disparity) and its effects on performance. Using unique data from Korea, where all publicly listed firms are required to provide detailed information on average employee pay in their annual reports, they find that a substantial portion of cross-sectional variation in the executive pay multiple is explained by the firm’s economic and political characteristics. Results also indicate that the executive pay multiple has a statistically significant negative relation with subsequent operating and stock return performance. A two-stage approach, however, reveals that the performance effects of the executive pay multiple are likely to be influenced more by deviations from the expected executive pay multiple, estimated using the first-stage determinant model, than by the absolute pay multiple per se. The study sheds light on recent debates regarding the usefulness of executive pay multiple disclosure.

An Empirical Analysis of a Relative Performance-Based Incentive Plan: Evidence from a Postal Service

Using 1997-1999 annual performance evaluation data of 214 postal stores in Korea, we find that introduction of a relative performance evaluation (RPE)-based incentive plan is positively associated with financial performance and that under the new incentive plan, the degree of common uncertainty is positively associated with store profitability. We also find evidence that the incentive effect of the RPE-based plan is mitigated in stores at which the level of dysfunctional behavior is likely to be high. Finally, we find that the net benefits of introducing the RPE contract may be highly conditional on the degree of common uncertainty, which appears to be inversely related to the likelihood of dysfunctional behavior attributable to the RPE-based contract.

Compensation Consultant Fees and CEO Pay

While compensation consultants are known to play an important role in the design of executive compensation contracts, evidence on the effect of compensation consultants on CEO pay is mixed. Using a sample of 3,198 compensation consultant engagements and 576 executive compensation consulting fee observations from S&P 1500 firms for fiscal years 2009 to 2011, we examine the relation between executive compensation consulting (EC) fees and non-EC fees paid to executive compensation consultants and CEO pay. We find that CEO pay is higher when compensation consultants receive higher EC consulting fees. Additional analysis suggests that compensation consultants recommend higher CEO pay when they receive greater than expected fees for EC consulting. We further find that the positive association between EC fees and CEO pay is driven largely by weakly governed firms. We find limited evidence, however, that consultants’ cross-selling incentives are associated with greater CEO pay.