Jaime Orrillo

Interest rates and default in unsecured loan markets

This paper investigates how interest rates affect the probability of default (PD) in a general equilibrium incomplete markets economy. We show that the PD depends positively on the loan interest rate and negatively on the economy base interest rate. Empirically, this finding is confirmed by estimation of the Cox proportional hazard model with time-varying covariates using a sample of 445 889 individual contracts from a large Brazilian bank. Among the controls are macroeconomic variables and specific characteristics of the contracts and borrowers. A lower base interest rate, implied by easing monetary policy, leads banks to lend more money for riskier borrowers, increasing the PD.

Taxa de juros e default em mercados de empréstimos colateralizados

This paper investigates how changes in interest rates affect the probability of default (PD) in a general equilibrium model with incomplete markets and collateral requirement. Theoretically, the PD has a positive relationship with the loan real interest rate and negative with the economy real interest rate. Empirically, those relationships are confirmed by the estimation of the Cox proportional hazard model for a large sample of collateralized loans. Among the control variables, there are characteristics of the individuals, contracts, and economy as a whole. Intuitively, a lower real interest rate reduces earnings from financial operations, leading the banks to increase their credit portfolios by lending for riskier individuals.

Existence of collateral Equilibrium without survival assumption

This paper shows the existence of a collateral equilibrium without assuming any hypotheses on the strict positivity, be they individual initial endowments, including the ex post initial endowments, or aggregated initial endowments. Because of dropping the strict positivity of social initial endowment we fail to get an equilibrium. Instead, we get a quasi-equilibrium. Then, appealing to the concept of irreducibility (introduced by McKenzie in 1959) which is adapted to the collateral model, we show that the quasi-equilibrium is indeed a legitime equilibrium.

Dissaving of the Past via Reverse Mortgages

We build a simple two-period general equilibrium model with incomplete markets which incorporates reverse market mortgages without appealing to the complicated framework required by the infinite horizon models. Two types of agents are considered: elderly agents and investors. The former are owners of physical assets (for instance housing) who will want to sell them to investors. For that end the elderly agents, who are assumed to not have any bequest motive, issue claims against physical assets they own. One of the claims issued will be interpreted as reverse mortgage (loan for seniors) and the other one as a call option written on the value of housing equity. By assuming that both the elderly agents and the investors are price takers, and by applying the generalized game approach, we show that the equilibrium in this economy always exists, providing the usual conditions on utilities and initial endowments are satisfied. We end with a remark on efficiency of the equilibrium.

Determinantes do Requerimento de Colateral em Empréstimos Empresariais

The goal of this paper is to evaluate the determinants of collateral requirement by the lender in the formal entrepreneurial sector of the Brazilian economy in the short-run horizon. The results indicate that the probability of using collateral is higher among borrowers with lower credit quality and borrowers who fulfill past financial promises. In addition, higher competition and rivalry in the credit market increase the probability of collateral utilization in short-run loans. Such evidence corroborates recent findings of the literature in the sense that the determinants of collateral requirement in financial loans might be distinct among different credit markets.

Making promises in infinite-horizon economies with default and collateral

We study an infinite-horizon economy with incomplete markets where default is explicitly allowed, contrary to the GE model (where default is ruled out by assumption). The time and uncertainty are modeled by a countable infinite event-tree with a unique initial node at initial date, and with a continuum of branches at each node of the tree. If we allow agents to sell promises subject to the purchase of durable goods serving as collateral, then it is possible to prove the existence of equilibria without imposing either constraint on agents asset holdings, or assumption on ex post endowments. The proof is independent of the manner in which households discount the future.

Manager's effort and endogenous economic discrimination

Assume a labor supply consisting of two types of workers, 1 and 2. Both workers are equally productive and exhibit supply functions with the same elasticity. We consider a firm (entrepreneur or shareholders) that is competitive in the output market and monopsonistic in input markets. The firm uses the services of a manager who has a high human capital and whose wage is given by the market. It is supposed that the manager does not like to work with one type of worker, say type 1. If we allow the managers effort to be an additional input without any extra (in addition to his salary) cost for the firm, then the firms pricing decision will be different for both workers. That is, there will be a wage differential and therefore endogenous economic discrimination2 in the labor markets.