Jakob Tolstrup

When can external actors influence democratization? Leverage, linkages, and gatekeeper elites

This article engages in the flourishing debate on the external dimension of democratization by proposing a theoretical model of when external actors can influence democratization. The argument takes its departure in a critical assessment of existing structural contributions. It is argued that structural approaches are useful in explaining interregional differences in external influence, but have difficulties coping with cases that do not adhere to the overall structural pattern – that is, with intraregional differences. To deal with these problems, I turn to Levitsky and Ways renowned framework of leverage and linkage, and argue that their theory, giving primacy to structures, is not entirely valid. The structural determinants (linkages) that constitute the basis of their explanation are not non-amenable as they claim, but can be influenced to a great extent by what I term the gatekeeper elites of the target country. That is, I claim that domestic elites should not only be perceived as mere objects of external influence, as they are in the structural accounts, but rather as gatekeepers that actively facilitate or constrain ties to external actors. Hence, to fully understand when external actors can influence democratization, we need to breathe dynamism into the structural accounts by carefully evaluating, not just leverage and linkages, but also elite agency.

Black knights and elections in authoritarian regimes: Why and how Russia supports authoritarian incumbents in post‐Soviet states

In the last decade, studies have documented how autocrats use elections as a way of legitimising and stabilising their regimes. Simultaneously, a literature on negative external actors (also known as ‘black knights’) has developed, emphasising how various international actors use anti-democracy promotion strategies to undergird authoritarian regimes. In this article, these two literatures are fused in an attempt to shed light on the external dimension of authoritarian elections and what is termed ‘black knight election bolstering’. First, five mechanisms are elucidated, through which external assistance increases the chances of ‘winning’ elections in authoritarian settings (signaling invincibility, deterring elite defection, undermining opposition activities, dealing with popular protests, and countervailing pressure from foreign democracy promoters). Second, it is argued that external actors are most likely to offer election bolstering when they face a particularly acquiescent partner or when electoral defeat is perceived to lead to radical and undesired regime change. The relevance of both factors is augmented when uncertainty of the electoral outcome is high. Finally, four cases of Russian intervention during elections in three authoritarian neighbour countries (Ukraine in 2004, Belarus in 2006, and Moldova in 2005 and 2009) are analysed. The case studies corroborate the theoretical arguments: not only does Russia engage in all five types of black knight election bolstering, but it does so only when one or more of the three explanatory factors are present.

Gatekeepers and Linkages

Abstract:Recently, scholarly interest for the external dimension of regime change has risen considerably. However, we still poorly understand what makes external actors able (or unable) to push a country toward democracy or autocracy. I argue that the prevalent theory on external influences, Levitsky and Way’s leverage-linkage theory, is insufficient as it does not capture how domestic elites (“gatekeeper elites”) can increase or decrease ties with this or that external actor. Through an empirical analysis of Russian and European influences in Ukraine and Belarus I show that gatekeepers can explain why politically consequential ties wax or wane in a given country and I argue that this has important implications for democracy promotion.

Signals of Support From Great Power Patrons and the Use of Repression During Nonviolent Protests

When autocrats face threats of nonviolent mass mobilization, they are likely to respond with repression. However, when will the autocrat initiate, step up, or downscale repressive behavior during such protest events? We propose that signals of support from great power patrons play a pivotal role in emboldening rulers to engage in and intensify repressive behavior. To probe this hypothesis, we analyze how supportive and nonsupportive actions and statements of the great powers in the United Nations Security Council shape the repressive behavior of authoritarian regimes during three recent, and similar, cases of protest events: Burma 2007, Zimbabwe 2008, and Burkina Faso 2014. The cases show that the more unequivocal and consistent patron support for the besieged regime is the firmer and more violent are the responses to the domestic challengers.