Jalal Kazempour

Exploiting flexibility in coupled electricity and natural gas markets: A price-based approach

Natural gas-fired power plants (NGFPPs) are considered a highly flexible component of the energy system and can facilitate the large-scale integration of intermittent renewable generation. Therefore, it is necessary to improve the coordination between electric power and natural gas systems. Considering a market-based coupling of these systems, we introduce a decision support tool that increases market efficiency in the current setup where day-ahead and balancing markets are cleared sequentially. The proposed approach relies on the optimal adjustment of natural gas price to modify the scheduling of power plants and reveals the necessary flexibility to handle stochastic renewable production. An essential property of this price-based approach is that it guarantees no financial imbalance (deficit or surplus) for the system operator at the day-ahead stage. Our analysis shows that the proposed mechanism reduces the expected system cost and efficiently accommodates high shares of renewables.

Impact of Public Aggregate Wind Forecasts on Electricity Market Outcomes

Following a call to foster a transparent and more competitive market, member states of the European transmission system operator are required to publish, among other information, aggregate wind power forecasts. The publication of the latter information is expected to benefit market participants by offering better knowledge of the market operation, leading subsequently to a more competitive energy market. Driven by the above regulation, we consider an equilibrium study to address how public information of aggregate wind power forecasts can potentially affect market results, social welfare, as well as the profits of participating power producers. We investigate, therefore, a joint day-ahead energy and reserve auction, where producers offer their conventional power strategically based on a complementarity approach and their wind power at generation cost based on a forecast. In parallel, an iterative game-theoretic approach (diagonalization) is incorporated in order to investigate the existence of an equilibrium for various values of aggregate forecast. As anticipated, variations in public forecasts will affect market results and, more precisely, underforecasts can mislead power producers to make decisions that favor social welfare, while overforecasts will cause the opposite effect. Furthermore, energy and reserve market prices can also be affected by deviations in aggregate wind forecasts altering, inevitably, the profits of all power producers.

A Bilevel Model for Participation of a Storage System in Energy and Reserve Markets

We develop a decision-making tool based on a bilevel complementarity model for a merchant price-maker energy storage system to determine the most beneficial trading actions in pool-based markets, including day-ahead (as joint energy and reserve markets) and balancing settlements. The uncertainty of net load deviation in real-time is incorporated into the model using a set of scenarios generated from the available forecast in the day-ahead. The objective of this energy storage system is to maximize its expected profit. The day-ahead products of energy storage system include energy as well as reserve commitment (as one of the ancillary services), whereas its balancing product is the energy deployed from the committed reserve. The proposed model captures the interactions of different markets and their impacts on the functioning of the storage system. It also provides an insight for storage system into clearing process of multiple markets and enables such a facility to possibly affect the outcomes of those markets to its own benefit through strategic price and quantity offers. The validity of the proposed approach is evaluated using a numerical study.

A Stochastic Market Design With Revenue Adequacy and Cost Recovery by Scenario: Benefits and Costs

Two desirable properties of electricity market mechanisms include: 1) revenue adequacy for the market, and 2) cost recovery for all generators. Previously proposed stochastic market-clearing mechanisms satisfy both properties in expectation only, or satisfy one property by scenario and another in expectation. Consequently, market parties may perceive significant risks to participating in the market since they may lose money in one or more scenarios, and therefore be discouraged from offering in the market or perhaps even from investing. We develop a stochastic two-stage market-clearing model including day-ahead and real-time settlements with an energy-only pricing scheme that ensures both properties by scenario. However, this approach is cost-inefficient in general and may sacrifice other desirable market attributes. Undesirable consequences include: One group of participants will have to pay more to ensure that all other participants have their costs covered, and thus their prices will not be equilibrium supporting; and day-ahead and real-time prices are not arbitraged in expectation, although this can be fixed by allowing virtual bidders to arbitrage but at the potential cost of increased market inefficiency. Considering these pros and cons, we propose our model as an appropriate tool for market analysis, and not for clearing actual markets. Numerical results from case studies illustrate the benefits and costs of the proposed stochastic market design.

Price-Taker Offering Strategy in Electricity Pay-as-Bid Markets

The recent increase in the deployment of renewable energy sources may affect the offering strategy of conventional producers, mainly in the balancing market. The topics of optimal offering strategy and self-scheduling of thermal units have been extensively addressed in the literature. The feasible operating region of such units can be modeled using a mixed-integer linear programming approach, and the trading problem as a linear programming problem. However, the existing models mostly assume a uniform pricing scheme in all market stages, while several European balancing markets (e.g., in Germany and Italy) are settled under a pay-as-bid pricing scheme. The existing tools for solving the trading problem in pay-as-bid electricity markets rely on nonlinear optimization models, which, combined with the unit commitment constraints, result in a mixed-integer nonlinear programming problem. In contrast, we provide a linear formulation for that trading problem. Then, we extend the proposed approach by formulating a two-stage stochastic problem for optimal offering in a two-settlement electricity market with a pay-as-bid pricing scheme at the balancing stage. The resulting model is mixed-integer and linear. The proposed model is tested on a realistic case study against a sequential offering approach, showing the capability of increasing profits in expectation.

Value of Flexible Resources, Virtual Bidding, and Self-Scheduling in Two-Settlement Electricity Markets with Wind Generation—Part I: Principles and Competitive Model

Part one of this two-part paper presents new models for evaluating flexible resources in two-settlement electricity markets (day-ahead and real-time) with uncertain net loads (demand minus wind). Physical resources include wind together with fast- and slow-start demand response and thermal generators. We also model financial participants (virtual bidders). Wind is stochastic, represented by a set of scenarios. The two-settlement system is modeled as a two-stage process in which the first stage involves unit commitment and tentative scheduling, while the second stage adjusts flexible resources to resolve imbalances. The value of various flexible resources is evaluated through four two-settlement models: 1) an equilibrium model in which each player independently schedules its generation or purchases to maximize expected profit; 2) a benchmark (expected system cost minimization); 3) a sequential equilibrium model in which the independent system operator first optimizes against a deterministic wind power forecast; and 4) an extended sequential equilibrium model with self-scheduling by profit-maximizing slow-start generators. A tight convexified unit commitment allows for demonstration of certain equivalencies of the four models. We show how virtual bidding enhances market performance, since, together with self-scheduling by slow-start generators, it can help a deterministic day-ahead market to choose the most efficient unit commitment.

Cost-Optimal ATCs in Zonal Electricity Markets

In contrast to existing frameworks for available transfer capacity (ATC) determination, we propose to define ATCs in an integrated and data-driven manner, optimizing for expected operational costs of the whole system to derive cost-optimal ATCs. These ATCs are purely financial parameters, separated from the physical ATCs based on security indices only typically used in zonal electricity markets today. Determining cost-optimal ATCs requires viewing ATCs as an endogenous market construct, and leads naturally to the definition of a market entity whose responsibility is to optimize ATCs. The optimization problem that this entity solves is a stochastic bilevel problem, which we decompose to yield a computationally tractable formulation. We show that cost-optimal ATCs depend nontrivially on the underlying network structure, and the problem of finding a set of cost-optimal ATCs is in general nonconvex. On a European-scale test system, cost-optimal ATCs achieve expected total costs midway between those for nonintegrated ATCs and a fully stochastic nodal setup. This benefit comes from qualitatively different ATCs compared to typical definitions, with ATCs which exceed the physical cross-border capacity by a factor of 2 or more, and ATCs which are zero between well-connected areas. Our results indicate that the perceived efficiency gap between zonal and nodal markets may be exaggerated if nonoptimal ATCs are used.

Evaluating the cost of line capacity limitations in aggregations of commercial buildings

The trend towards electrification of the heating sector in many cases leads to the replacement of fossil-fueled heating systems with electric heat pumps. This may result to significantly higher consumption and potentially violations of the distribution grid operational limits. We propose a day-ahead optimization strategy to assess the cost of imposing capacity limitations in the total consumption of individual buildings, as well as aggregations of buildings. We show that such capacity limitations lead to an increase for the buildings operational costs, which can be interpreted as the value of these limitations. Based on such calculations, the aggregator can value capacity-limitation services to the distribution system operator. Moreover, the value of aggregation is also highlighted, since it leads to lower costs than imposing the same total capacity limitation on individual buildings.