James A. Swaney

Common Property, Reciprocity, and Community

This article examines common property as both concept and institutional structure and suggests that common property, reciprocity, and community are complementary, useful constructs for institutional analysis. The argument is based on the following key premises: undesirable consequences of private markets and desirable consequences of alternative institutional arrangements have generally been overlooked and underestimated; purely private markets, although providing incentives and rewards for initiative and innovation, also create increasingly harmful side-effects; and anthropogenic ecosystem disruption requires major social and economic restructuring, including fundamental changes in beliefs, attitudes, and incentives. The argument is that common property, reciprocity, and community development can all play constructive roles in this restructuring. The weaknesses and inconsistencies in the neoclassical conception of common property are addressed, followed by a discussion of common property institutions, and of reciprocity and community.

Economics, Ecology, and Entropy

Erich Zimmermanns statement continues to serve as the foundation of the institutionalist theory of resources. Though he never referred directly to Zimmermann, Clarence Ayres strengthened this foundation and built upon it with The Theory of Economic Progress,2 wherein he argued that the prevailing technology defines natural resources. The 1970s witnessed the energy crisis and several studies questioning the prospects for economic growth. Most controversial among these was the Club of Romes The Limits to Growth,3 roundly criticized by mainstream economists and largely ignored by institutionalists. The former castigated the Club of Rome model for unrealistic assumptions, and cited the lessons of price theory along with empirical work such as Harold J. Barnett and Chandler Morses Scarcity and Growth to demonstrate that (price-induced) substitution effects and technological advances had actually reduced the scarcity of a wide range of natural resources.4 The latter had known about knowledge and technology all along, and had never been much impressed with fancy models containing scores of unrealistic assumptions. Other studies raised provocative questions about the desirability of continued economic growth. E. J. Mishan and others detailed the specific environmental costs of growth,5 Kenneth Boulding alerted economists to

Julian Simon versus the Ehrlichs: An Institutionalist Perspective

The debate between those, like the Ehrlichs, who see population growth as a global problem and those, like Julian Simon, who maintain that population growth acts as a catalyst for development is reviewed. The author maintains that both schools are at fault in focusing on the number of people rather than on their behavior. He concludes that the carrying capacity of the planet is indeed limited, whether an ecological or an economic approach to the problem is employed.