James C. Clingermayer

Development Policy Choice: Four Explanations for City Implementation of Economic Development Policies

This research attempts to account for the number of adoptions of four economic development policies in large American cities. Four explanations focusing upon fiscal stress, growth coalitions, government institutions, and competition among cities are examined in the light of a typology that classifies the polices on the basis of their visibility and distributional impact. We hypothesize the applicability of the four explanations to be contingent upon the particular policy being explained and its visibility and distributional consequences. Poisson regression analyses of data drawn from large U.S. cities reveal inconsistent support for these expectations. We discuss the importance of policy characteristics in the prediction of policy adoption.

Governmental uncertainty and leadership turnover: Influences upon contracting and sector choice for local services

CONSIDERABLE RESEARCH has been conducted on the phenomena of privatization, voucher systems, and governments contracting out for social services (see DeHoog 1984; Donahue 1989; Ferris and Graddy 1986; Hanke 1987; Stein 1990; Clingermayer and Feiock 1997). Much less analysis has been directed toward the choice of sector (private for-profi t, nonprofi t, and other governmental entities) through which external delivery of services occurs. Perhaps the best work has been carried out by Stein (1990) and by Ferris and Graddy (1994), who argue that transaction costs (the costs of negotiating, enacting, and enforcing agree ments) are critical to understanding the contracting decision and the choice of sector. These authors generally argue that certain aspects of services are likely to create high transaction costs and may encourage internal service delivery or joint contracting in which both the government and an external service-delivery agent share responsibility for a service. They particularly focus on the ease with which those attributes may be defi ned, measured, and monitored, as well as the dangers of opportunism in cases in which markets are unlikely to have multiple service providers. Some of the literature on nonprofi ts has suggested that when service quality is diffi cult to monitor, consumers will trust nonprofi t providers more than profi t-seeking enterprises because they feel that profi t seekers will exploit information advantages to shortchange consumers (see Hansmann 1980). In this article, we explore how transaction costs may affect municipal governments’ decisions to assign responsibility for delivering mental health programs and elderly services to another unit of government, a profi t-seeking fi rm, or a nonprofi t organization.

Political Conflict, Fiscal Stress, and Administrative Turnover in American Cities

is often citedas a coveted feature of the civilservice, top-level administratorsat all levels of government usually cannot ex-pect to stay very long in any particular po-sition. Sometimes top administrators suffera falling out with elected officials and may bedismissed (or at least fail to gain reappoint-ment) for an additional term. In other cases,high-level executives may seek out greenerpastures, often with another government thatoffers higher salaries , better working condi-tions, or perhaps more satisfying work. Thistrend has been especially striking for high-ranking city administrators, including citymanagers. In response to this trend, severalrecent empirical analyses have examined thefactors that account for turnover of localgovernment managers (DeSantis and Renner1993; Renner 1990; DeHoog and Whitaker1990; Whitaker and DeHoog 1991; Feiockand Stream 1998).Much of this research suggests that tenureand turnover patterns of local governmentadministrators are affected by “push” and“pull” factors (see, e.g., DeHoog and Whit-

Distributive politics, ward representation, and the spread of zoning

This analysis examines two alternative explanations for the adoption of comprehensive zoning ordinances in the years immediately following its initial adoption in New York City. The market failure explanation predicts zoning adoption in cities where externality problems (represented by heavy incidence of manufacturing) exist. The distributive policymaking model treats zoning as a form of regulation that is most likely to be found in cities where local legislators are elected from geographically-concentrated constituencies (e.g., wards) and therefore try to target policy benefits to their own constituencies while spreading the policy costs over all constituencies. Some support is found for each model. Especially striking is the interactive effect of ward representation and of economic interest (i.e., levels of home ownership).

Sector choices for public service delivery The transaction cost implications of executive turnover

The question of whether private firms should contract out for products and services or provide them internally (i.e. become more vertically integrated) has been a topic that has concerned scholars for many years. This article argues that the transaction costs in local contracting choices are linked to the characteristics of political systems that influence political and administrative uncertainty. Our analysis examines the transaction costs that result from executive turnover. Specifically, we are concerned with how uncertainty resulting from turnover in leadership positions in city government affects the ability of a municipality to negotiate contracts, make credible commitments to suppliers and faithfully uphold and enforce contracts once they are in force. We find that manager turnover reduces the likelihood of contracting with private sector providers. Mayor turnover has the opposite effect increasing contracting with both government and for-profit providers.

An Analysis of Institutional and Political Factors Affecting State Capital Expenditure

Abstract This article examines state government spending patterns for capital projects during the late 1970s and early 1980s as a function of some of the institutional arrangements and procedural characteristics of state legislatures. The analysis is informed by the literature on distributive policymaking, which argues that lawmakers seek to send targetable benefits, such as capital projects, to their constituencies in pursuit of personal electoral benefits. Using a pooled, cross‐sectional time‐series approach, the authors find that states with a large number of seats in the lower chambers of their legislatures devoted a somewhat smaller portion of their state budgets to capital projects than did states with smaller lower chambers, ceteris paribus. Contrary to some log‐rolling models, the number of appropriations bills employed by a legislature seems to discourage capital spending, as does membership turnover in the upper chamber. This indicates that the capital budgeting process is not nearly as dominated by the executive branch as is commonly believed.

Asset Forfeiture and Police Priorities: The Impact of Program Design on Law Enforcement Activities:

This article examines the use of asset forfeiture by law enforcement units within the greater Cincinnati area, using the results of a survey distributed among state and local government law enforcement agencies. The analysis reveals what kinds of assets are confiscated, what kind of legal authority is used to accomplish asset forfeiture, and which individuals are involved in the decisions to confiscate assets and to select a particular kind of legal authority under which the forfeiture will be authorized. The data indicate that the use of asset forfeiture does not have a substantial impact on the policing priorities of local agencies. The sampled jurisdictions tend to use either a criminal forfeiture statute as the legal authority for the seizure or a court-imposed settlement to confiscate assets. By using the criminal court process, jurisdictions avoid sharing the value of the assets.

Turnover, Trust, and Transfers: An Examination of Local Government Budget Execution

Abstract Studies of budget execution focus either on the procedural aspects of internal controls and adjustments or the necessity of the changes made in the original budget. Adjustments made on an ongoing basis without undermining the integrity of the budget has been generally seen as a necessary means of creating flexibility while maintaining appropriate controls. In this context, our article addresses one aspect of the local government budget—whether turnover in key leadership and professional position affects the amount of transfer and reprogramming made during the execution process. Based on surveys of municipal budget offices in the Greater Cincinnati area, we report that turnover in some leadership positions does affect budget transfers. This finding also supports the proposition that the stability of key budget roles is an important factor in the budget execution process.

Dollars and Decisions: Fiscal Policy and Administration in the American States

Books reviewed in this article: Glenn Beamer, Creative Politics: Taxes and Public Goods in a Federal System David Brunori, State Tax Policy: A Political Perspective Kurt M. Thurmaier and Katherine G. Willoughby, Policy and Politics in State Budgeting