James Clay Moltz

Closing the NPT loophole on exports of naval propulsion reactors

James Clay Moltz is Research Professor and Assistant Director of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. He also directs the Newly Independent States Nonproliferation Project at CNS. From 1993-98 (Vols. 1-5), Dr. Moltz was Editor of this journal. When the authors of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) crafted their landmark document in the mid-1960s, the “bargain” they reached with the non-nuclear weapon states required them to leave a number of nuclear activities in the category of “acceptable” uses. This grouping covered a broad range because the nonnuclear weapon states wanted to maintain the widest possible options in return for giving up their right to nuclear weapons. Beyond nuclear research and power reactors, these allowed uses included so-called “peaceful nuclear explosions” (or PNEs) for industrial purposes and the operation of naval propulsion reactors (NPRs) for commercial shipping.

Russian nuclear submarine dismantlement and the naval fuel cycle

Dr. James Clay Moltz is Assistant Director and Research Professor at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies of the Monterey Institute of International Studies, where he also directs the NIS Nonproliferation Project. He was the first Editor of The Nonproliferation Review (1993-98) and is co-editor of The North Korean Nuclear Program: Security, Strategy, and New Perspectives from Russia (Routledge, 2000).

FUTURE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION SCENARIOS IN NORTHEAST ASIA

Northeast Asia is a nuclear tinderbox that could easily be set off, given rising regional tensions, widespread nuclear power capabilities, and the absence of strong regional security institutions. Given this context, states need to identify and seek to prevent “trigger events”—circumstances that could stimulate proliferation cascades. While it is important to continue the current emphasis on strengthening supply-side constraints (such as the Proliferation Security Initiative), new efforts to address the demand side are sorely needed. These efforts should include shoring up currently weakened global nonproliferation norms, facilitating direct talks among states on issues of military concern, and renewing efforts to address underlying sources of regional conflict (historical problems, territorial disputes, and the still unresolved Korean War). While difficult, these new approaches offer the best chance of keeping two and a half nuclear states in Northeast Asia from becoming six.Northeast Asia is a nuclear tinderbox that could easily be set off, given rising regional tensions, widespread nuclear power capabilities, and the absence of strong regional security institutions. Given this context, states need to identify and seek to prevent “trigger events”—circumstances that could stimulate proliferation cascades. While it is important to continue the current emphasis on strengthening supply-side constraints (such as the Proliferation Security Initiative), new efforts to address the demand side are sorely needed. These efforts should include shoring up currently weakened global nonproliferation norms, facilitating direct talks among states on issues of military concern, and renewing efforts to address underlying sources of regional conflict (historical problems, territorial disputes, and the still unresolved Korean War). While difficult, these new approaches offer the best chance of keeping two and a half nuclear states in Northeast Asia from becoming six.

Missile proliferation in East Asia: Arms control vs. TMD Responses

Dr. James Clay Moltz is Assistant Director and Research Professor at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies of the Monterey Institute of International Studies. He has published widely on Russian Far Eastern and East Asian security issues. The rise of theater ballistic missile capabilities in East Asia—particularly in China and North Korea—has raised fears among the United States, South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan that the post-Cold War era may be one of heightened vulnerability. As Director of the U.S. Department of Defense’s Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) Lt. Gen. Lester Lyles has testified: “...the threat from foreign theater missiles has grown steadily as sophisticated missile technology becomes available on a wider scale.” North Korea’s Nodong series has been the most-cited threat, but the spring 1996 Taiwan Straits crisis—where China brazenly tested short-range Dong Feng (East Wind)-15 ballistic missiles in the seas around its island neighbor—has also raised the specter of possible Chinese use of offensive missiles.

Preventing Conflict in Space: Cooperative Engagement as a Possible U.S. Strategy

Traditional responses to international security concerns include the heightening of distrust, mutual disengagement, and arms deployment. Fortunately, serious threats to security in space do not yet exist. Therefore, an alternative means of diffusing possible problems may be cooperative threat reduction—a tool that has been used effectively by the United States and other countries since 1991 in dealing with the former Soviet Unions weapons of mass destruction legacy. This article analyzes the conceptual rationale for a similar approach to space threats. It also describes the results of a recent project to consider advantages and disadvantages of possible U.S. adoption of such policies with respect to seven current or emerging space rivals.

The Impact of National Missile Defense on Nonproliferation Regimes

Dr. James Clay Moltz is Associate Director and Research Professor at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies of the Monterey Institute of International Studies, where he also heads the Newly Independent States Nonproliferation Program. He is co-editor of The North Korean Nuclear Program: Security, Strategy, and New Perspectives from Russia (Routledge, 2000) and the author of articles in Arms Control Today, Asian Survey, Demokratizatsiya, PostSoviet Geography, and World Politics.

Russia in Asia in 1996: Renewed Engagement

Russian policy in Asia has seemed on the verge of a breakthrough for some time, and yet Russia still remains a second-class citizen across much of the region, excluded from many regional organizations and negotiations. Many of its wealthier East Asian neighbors, for example, seem reluctant to accept it unconditionally, still fearing its military heritage and its frequent tendency to behave in unpredictable ways. In the past year, however, Russia has succeeded in stabilizing its relations with a number of key states in the region, reversing recent negative trends. Politically, despite some setbacks, Russia is becoming more adept at assuring its neighbors of its respect for national sovereignty and the reliability of commitments made by its leaders. A number of key personnel changes indicate that Moscow has raised the relative importance of Asian countries in its foreign policy, signaling that positive changes may be in the making. Economically, Russia has taken some significant measures to settle its debts in the region and encourage investors. Russias allure, especially for those in heavily populated and resource-poor Northeast Asia, is that it remains the largest single piece of undeveloped real estate in the Pacific Rim. Yet progress remains slow. Despite advances in 1996, Russian policy in Asia continues to suffer from three underlying weaknesses: (1) a lack of personal initiatives from President Boris Yeltsin; (2) the continued reluctance of conservative Russian regional leaders to open to the East (fearing that they will lose the remaining economic subsidies from Moscow and put themselves at risk to foreign control); and (3) the continued failure of the Russian legal system to provide foreign investors with adequate protections against illegal state, local government, or

REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON LOW NUCLEAR NUMBERS

President Barack Obama has outlined a course toward lower numbers of US nuclear weapons. Much attention has been paid to the US-Russian context, where deterrence is believed to be basically stable and conditions ripe for gradually reducing arsenals on both sides. But considerably less attention has been paid to the possible implications of lower nuclear numbers on other regions of the world and the reactions of both adversaries and US allies. If nuclear reductions are to be stabilizing and beneficial to security, reassurance and strengthened nonproliferation efforts in various regions need to accompany nuclear cuts. But the specific problems and remedies across regions vary. This article summarizes the results of a multi-author study. It concludes that regions with US allies and formal extended deterrence pledges may pose more vexing problems than those areas of the world without such close allies or commitments.

WHEN THE COLD WAR WAS HOT

15 Minutes: General Curtis LeMay and the Countdown to Nuclear Annihilation, by L. Douglas Keeney. St. Martins Press, 2011. 384 pages,

INTRODUCTION: Where Are the P-5 Headed?

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