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Journal of Social Psychology | 1982

Factors Affecting Extraordinary Belief

Laura P. Otis; James E. Alcock

Summary The extent of belief in a wide variety of extraordinary phenomena was examined among people of different educational backgrounds. A questionnaire, which included a 30-item Extraordinary Belief Inventory, as well as demographic and personal questions, was completed by 113 students, 352 university professors, and 251 members of the general public. University professors were found to be significantly more skeptical than students and members of the general public regarding belief in extraordinary phenomena. Professors in the English department were significantly less skeptical with regard to some extraordinary beliefs than were professors in other departments. Correlations between a number of demographic factors and belief in extraordinary phenomena were generally low in all groups.


Behavioral and Brain Sciences | 1987

Parapsychology: Science of the anomalous or search for the soul?

James E. Alcock

Although there has been over a century of formal empirical inquiry, parapsychologists have clearly failed to produce a single reliable demonstration of “paranormal,” or “psi,” phenomena. Although many parapsychological research projects have been carried out under what have been described as well-controlled conditions, this does not by itself make a science, for unless and until it can be demonstrated that paranormal phenomena really exist, there is no subject matter around which a science can develop. Indeed, parapsychologists have not even succeeded in developing a reasonable definition of paranormal phenomena that does not involve, or imply, some aspect of mind-body dualism. Moreover, parapsychology has developed several principles (such as the experimenter effect) which can be used to explain away failures, and the use of these principles contributes to making the psi-hypothesis unfalsifiable. The “anything goes” attitude in parapsychology, which seems to lend credence to virtually any “paranormal” claim, serves to weaken the credibility of parapsychological endeavors in the eyes of critics. This general willingness to suspend doubt is another indication that parapsychology is more than the quest to explain anomalous experiences, as is claimed. It is argued in this paper that parapsychological inquiry reflects the attempt to establish the reality of a nonmaterial aspect of human existence, rather than a search for explanations for anomalous phenomena.


Psychological Reports | 1980

CRITICAL THINKING AND BELIEF IN THE PARANORMAL

James E. Alcock; Laura P. Otis

The critical thinking ability of 13 believers and 13 nonbelievers in paranormal phenomena was examined in two studies. In the first study, believers and skeptics were given Watson and Glasers (1964) Critical Thinking Appraisal Scale as well as Trodahl and Powells (1965) Dogmatism Scale. Skeptics showed a significantly higher level of critical thinking ability than believers and were significantly less dogmatic than believers. A second study was carried out to evaluate the critical thinking ability of believers and skeptics on a task dealing with the paranormal. 18 believers and 17 skeptics were asked to evaluate critically either a research article on a paranormal phenomenon (psychokinesis) or an almost identical article on a nonparanormal phenomenon (pain tolerance). It was anticipated that believers would show a bias in favor of the paranormal article; however, results indicated that believers and nonbelievers were equally critical of the paranormal article.


Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences | 1995

THE PROPENSITY TO BELIEVE

James E. Alcock

E A R E MAGICAL BEINGS in a scientific age. Notwithstanding all the remarkable achievements of our species in terms of underw standing and harnessing nature, we are born to magical thought and not to reason. The nervous system of the newborn is primed to learn. Entering this world with little to guide it apart from some basic reflexes and some rudimentary perceptual ability, the infant immediately sets out on the long journey of trying to make sense of the vast swirl of sensory stimulation with which it is bombarded. Gradually, the child develops an internal representational model of the outside world, a model so powerful that the resultant perceptions of the world seem to occur outside the brain. We logically know that perception takes place in the brain, but when we look at objects or listen to sounds or sniff the air, it is as though our perceptions of reality actually are reality. We do not see an image of an apple; we see the apple. It is very difficult for most people to accept that what they perceive is not always isomorphic with what is really “out there.” Our perceptual apparatus constantly and automatically seeks meaningful patterns among the myriad stimuli that impinge upon our senses. Many of these patterns that we detect are truly meaningful, while some are not; and it is difficult, if not impossible, for us to tell the difference on the basis of perceptual processing alone. We do such pattern finding unconsciously and automatically, but we are limited in two ways. First, there are limits imposed by the incoming dataL: it may be distorted or fragmentary. For example, walking to our campsite late at night, we see a shadow in the woods, ill-defined, fleeting. What is it? Our mental set and anxiety level and past experience will influence what we perceive. Second, there are limits imposed by the perceptual process itself. Our attention is selective. We cannot focus on everything at once, and so we collect only some of the information, particularly in situations of emotional impact. However, our perception goes beyond these limits; it goes beyond the available information. We fill in the gaps-again usually automatically and without awareness-and perceive and recognize whole objects or events. Much of the time this works well. Sometimes it leads to egregious errors. Our perception


Cognitive Neuropsychiatry | 2007

Semantic–episodic interactions in the neuropsychology of disbelief

Ricki Ladowsky-Brooks; James E. Alcock

Introduction. The purpose of this paper is to outline ways in which characteristics of memory functioning determine truth judgements regarding verbally transmitted information. Method. Findings on belief formation from several areas of psychology were reviewed in order to identify general principles that appear to underlie the designation of information in memory as “true” or “false”. Results. Studies on belief formation have demonstrated that individuals have a tendency to encode information as “true” and that an additional encoding step is required to tag information as “false”. This additional step can involve acquisition and later recall of semantic–episodic associations between message content and contextual cues that signal that information is “false”. Semantic–episodic interactions also appear to prevent new information from being accepted as “true” through encoding bias or the assignment of a “false” tag to data that is incompatible with prior knowledge. Conclusions. It is proposed that truth judgements are made through a combined weighting of the reliability of the information source and the compatibility of this information with already stored data. This requires interactions in memory. Failure to integrate different types of memories, such as semantic and episodic memories, can arise from mild hippocampal dysfunction and might result in delusions.


World Futures | 2003

Belief and Survival

James E. Alcock

Our ability to survive in a world beset by looming global perils depends ultimately on our collective will to harness our intellects and change our behaviors. In order to respond appropriately, people must first believe that serious problems exist, that there are potential solutions, and that they have a role to play in finding and implementing them. Without such beliefs, individual change is unlikely. In order to promote belief change, it is important to understand how beliefs are learned, what their functions are, and why they are so often resistant to change. These issues are discussed in this article, along with the role that social dilemmas play in inhibiting individually prosocial behavior.


Behavioral and Brain Sciences | 1998

Science, pseudoscience, and anomaly

James E. Alcock

My criticisms of parapsychology are neither based on its subject matter per se, nor simply on a charge of sloppy research, but rather on the whole pattern of theory and research in this domain. The lack of a positive definition of psi, the use of ad hoc principles such as psi-missing and the experimenter psi effect to account for failures to confirm hypotheses, and the failure to produce a single phenomenon that can be replicated by neutral investigators are among the major problems that keep parapsychology outside regular science. Glicksohn and I agree that anomalous experiences should be investigated.


Personality and Individual Differences | 2015

Relationships between conspiracy mentality, hyperactive agency detection, and schizotypy: Supernatural forces at work?

Jan van der Tempel; James E. Alcock


Behavioral and Brain Sciences | 1987

A to-do about dualism or a duel about data?

James E. Alcock


Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology | 2009

Prejudice or propaganda.

James E. Alcock

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