James Fenske

Does Land Abundance Explain African Institutions

I show how abundant land and scarce labor shaped African institutions before colonial rule. I present a model in which exogenous suitability of the land for agriculture and endogenously evolving population determine the existence of land rights, slavery, and polygyny. I then use cross-sectional data on pre-colonial African societies to demonstrate that, consistent with the model, the existence of land rights, slavery, and polygyny occurred in those parts of Africa that were the most suitable for agriculture, and in which population density was greatest. Next, I use the model to explain institutions among the Egba of southwestern Nigeria from 1830 to 1914. While many Egba institutions were typical of a land-abundant environment, they sold land and had disputes over it. These exceptions were the result of a period of land scarcity when the Egba first arrived at Abeokuta and of heterogeneity in the quality of land.

The causal history of Africa: A response to Hopkins

ABSTRACT In a recent paper for the Journal of African History, A.G. Hopkins writes that economists have spent the last decade writing a “new” economic history of Africa that has escaped the notice of historians. He labels the “ethnolinguistic fractionalization” and “reversal of fortune” theses as this literatures key insights. In this paper, I shall argue that the most valuable contributions to the new economic history of Africa are not distinguished by their broad theories, but by their careful focus on causal inference. I shall survey recent contributions to this literature, compare them with the “old” economic history of Africa, and revise Hopkinss advice to historians accordingly.

Does land abundance explain African institutions

I show how abundant land and scarce labor shaped African institutions before colonial rule. I present a model in which exogenous land quality and endogenously evolving population determine the existence of land rights, slavery, and polygyny. I use cross-sectional data on pre-colonial African societies to demonstrate that, as in the model, the existence of land rights, slavery, and polygyny occurred where land was most suitable for agriculture, and where population density was greatest. These results are robust to alternative measures of institutions and historical population, and better fit the data than alternative theories of slavery.

The causal history of Africa : replies to Jerven and Hopkins : debate

ABSTRACT In this article I reply to critiques by Jerven and Hopkins of my review “The causal history of Africa: response to Hopkins” (2010). I agree, with caveats, that non-econometric approaches are valuable, that data quality matters, and that the compression of history can be a bad thing. Historians should not dismiss technique for being technique, should not discard imperfect data, and should be careful making inferences from small samples. The strategies of econometric identification should guide non-quantitative work.

Imachi Nkwu: Trade and the Commons

The conventional view is that an increase in the value of a natural resource can lead to private property over it. Many Igbo groups in Nigeria, however, curtailed private rights over palm trees in response to the palm produce trade of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. I present a simple game between a resource owner and a thief. An increase in the resource price leads the owner to prefer a communal harvesting arrangement that simplifies monitoring, leaving the thief no worse off. I use this model along with colonial court records to explain property disputes in interwar Igboland.

The battle for rubber in Benin

At the start of the Second World War, British policies restricted rubber planting in Nigerias Benin region. After Japan occupied Southeast Asia, Britain encouraged maximum production of rubber in Benin. Late in the war, officials struggled with the planting boom that had occurred. The war was a period of both continuity and change. Producers gained experience and capital. Forestry policies restricting planting survived, and output quality continued to occupy officials after the war. The colonial state was hindered by a lack of knowledge and resources, and by its pursuit of conflicting objectives in giving incentives to both producers and traders.