James Ker-Lindsay

The foreign policy of counter secession: preventing the recognition of contested states

How do states prevent the recognition of territories that have unilaterally declared independence? At a time when the issue of secession is becoming increasingly significant on the world stage, this is the first book to consider this crucial question. Analysing the efforts of the governments of Serbia, Georgia, and Cyprus to prevent the international recognition of Kosovo, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and northern Cyprus the work draws on in depth interviews with a number of leading policy makers to explain how each of the countries has designed, developed, and implemented its counter secession strategies. After explaining how the principle of the territorial integrity of states has tended to take precedence over the right of self-determination, it examines the range of ways countries facing a separatist threat can prevent recognition by other states and considers the increasingly important role played by international and regional organisations, especially the United Nations, in the recognition process. Additionally, it shows how forms of legitimisation or acknowledgement are also central elements of any counter-recognition process, and why steps to prevent secessionist entities from participating in major sporting and cultural bodies are given so much attention. Finally, it questions the effects of these counter recognition efforts on attempts to solve these territorial conflicts. Drawing on history, politics, and international law this book is the first and only comprehensive account of this increasingly important field of foreign policy.

‘Pre‐Accession Europeanization’: The Case of Serbia and Kosovo

This article argues that there is much confusion surrounding Serbias landmark decision to engage in a process of normalization with Kosovo. Rather than undergoing a process of Europeanization, whereby a fundamental transformation in the underlying rationale and processes of decision-making occurred, as some have argued, the changes in Serbias policy are in fact based on material concerns. By tracing relations in the EU-Serbia-Kosovo triangle, the article shows that change in Serbias approach towards Kosovo is based on pragmatism and political opportunism, rather than absorption, adaptation, convergence or identity formation. What we have witnessed is a more short-term, interest based policy shift serving very specific economic purposes. In conceptual terms, this is better understood as a policy of rationally instrumental ‘pre-Accession Europeanization’ rather than as a process of adaptive normative Europeanization as more conventionally understood in the literature.

Greek‐Turkish rapprochement: The impact of disaster diplomacy'?

This article challenges the widely held view that the Greek‐Turkish rapprochement of 1999 was the direct result of the collaboration following the earthquakes that hit both countries that year. The high‐level political and diplomatic efforts which form the basis of the improved relations and which preceded the earthquakes are examined. The article goes on to provide a detailed account of the efforts at governmental and nongovernmental levels to mitigate the effects of the disasters and illustrates the impact of the two disastrous events on public perceptions of the ‘enemy’ and on bilateral relations. In this context, the author warns against the simplistic assumption that diplomatic efforts should be causally linked with the occurrence of disasters. Instead, he asserts that disasters may have a multiplying and legitimising effect on diplomatic rapprochement.

Engagement without recognition: the limits of diplomatic interaction with contested states

This article examines the extent to which states are able to interact at an official level with a contested or de facto state—a state that has unilaterally declared independence but is not a member of the United Nations—without being understood to have recognized it. This is an area of increasing interest and relevance to policy-makers as the number of contested states has grown in recent years. In many cases, interaction may be important for ongoing peace efforts. However, there are also instances when a state is prevented from recognizing the territory in question for specific domestic or foreign policy reasons and so has to find alternative means by which to cooperate. Drawing on several key examples, notably Kosovo and the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’, but also with reference to Abkhazia, the article explores the limits of interaction across various different forms of bilateral and multilateral diplomatic activity. As is shown, albeit with some significant provisos, legal theory and historic practice suggest that diplomatic engagement does not constitute recognition if there is no underlying intent to recognize. This means that there is in fact a very high degree of latitude regarding the limits of diplomatic engagement with contested states. This is especially the case in bilateral contexts. Indeed, in some circumstances, the level of engagement can even amount to recognition in all but name.

Civil society and transitions in the Western Balkans

This book examines the ambiguous role played by civil society in state-building, democratisation and post-conflict reconstruction in the Western Balkans. In doing so, it challenges the received wisdom that civil society is always a force for good. Civil society actors have helped create the conditions for new, more constructive relations inside and between former Yugoslav countries. But, their agency has also rekindled nationalism hindering efforts to rebuild the region after the conflicts of the 1990s. The book demonstrates that diverse civil society effects cannot be captured without querying both the nature of civil society and the complexity of the ongoing transformation. So how can the emancipatory role of civil society be harnessed? This rigorous case study-driven reappraisal of the ability of civil society to support progressive transformation from an illiberal regime to democracy and from conflict to peace will be a valuable resource to scholars and practitioners alike.

The Policies of Greece and Cyprus towards Turkey’s EU Accession

Abstract This essay analyzes the views of the governments of Greece and Cyprus towards the question of Turkish membership in the European Union. Specifically, it shows that fundamental differences have emerged in the way in which the two perceive the benefits of Turkish engagement with the EU. For Greece, Turkish accession is seen as a transformative process. For the Greek Cypriots, the process of Turkish accession is viewed as a form of leverage. Moreover, and contrary to the prevailing view in certain quarters, there is no evidence of Greek collusion in Greek Cypriot thinking. Indeed, the ability of the Greek government to influence the Greek Cypriot leadership is rather limited.

EU accession and UN peacemaking in Cyprus

This work traces the attempts by the United Nations to bring about the reunification of Cyprus prior to the islands accession to the European Union on 1 May 2004. In addition to charting the course of previous efforts to solve the Cyprus issue, the book recounts the direct discussions between the two sides from January 2002 through to April 2004, when a UN-sponsored peace plan was defeated in a referendum. The book pays particular attention to the ways in which the positions of the main protagonists - Turkey, the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots - changed during the two and half years of negotiations and analyses how the best chance to solve the Cyprus issue in thirty years eventually failed despite the best efforts of the United Nations, the European Union and the United States.

Kosovo: four futures

The recent opinion by the International Court of Justice on the legality of Kosovos declaration of independence has not provided a definitive answer to Kosovos status. The International community remains divided. For this reason, a political solution will need to be found. Possible scenarios for the future of Kosovo include continuation of the status quo; enforcing Pristinas full authority across all of Kosovo; partition or partial territorial readjustment between Kosovo and Serbia; or some form of extended autonomy for northern Kosovo. While each of the models has its advantages and drawbacks, on balance the case for some form of extensive autonomy or a territorial readjustment remain the most compelling options for resolving the conflict in a manner most acceptable to Belgrade and Pristina, and which would open the way for Kosovo to gain wider, if not full, international acceptance.

From autonomy to independence: the evolution of international thinking on Kosovo, 1998–2005

When Kosovo declared independence, in February 2008, it was quickly recognized by the USA and by most of the European Union (EU). However, just 10 years earlier, these states had taken a very different view on the question of statehood for the province. In 1998, when the conflict first came to international attention, the prevailing opinion of the international community was that Kosovo did not merit independence alongside the republics of former Yugoslavia. Indeed, in the media it was often referred to as a ‘separatist conflict’. To this extent, efforts to resolve the situation were centred on providing the province with some form of meaningful self-government. Indeed, even after the NATO intervention, in 1999, which brought to an end Belgrade’s direct rule over Kosovo, and instituted UN administration, some form of autonomy remained the preferred outcome for Kosovo. And yet, by late 2005, when the decision was taken to start status talks, it was clear that a change of opinion had already taken place. Instead of self-government, the mainstream view appeared to be that independence was the only viable option for the province. This paper examines how and why this transformation occurred. It traces the development of theKosovo issue upuntil the start of status talks, showing that the move from autonomy to independence was a direct result of growing instability caused by the lack of a formal and finalized status, and the realization that any attempt to push for the retention of Serb sovereignty over the province would lead to further fighting. In other words, the argument that Kosovo required independence was not based on any change in attitudes towards the resolution of ethnic conflict, a wider acceptance of the principle of self-determination

Preventing the Emergence of Self-Determination as a Norm of Secession: An Assessment of the Kosovo ‘Unique Case’ Argument

When Kosovo declared independence, in February 2008, it was stated that the move was not an act of self-determination. Instead, the key states that supported the decision insisted that the case for statehood arose from a unique set of circumstances. Kosovo was not a precedent; it was a sui generis case in international politics. This essay considers the arguments underpinning this claim to exclusivity and argues that, taken either individually or collectively, the main justifications used to support Kosovos ‘unique’ statehood—such as the abuse of human rights—in fact have serious consequences for other separatist conflicts elsewhere.