James L. Phillips

Differential inputs as a determinant in the selection of a distributor of rewards

Perceived differences in the likelihood that others will allocate rewards equitably were investigated. Results indicated that Ss incorrectly perceived that individuals with inputs that were both the highest and most similar to their own would be the most equitable to them; instead, all distributors tended to allocate rewards equitably, regardless of their own inputs.

Social contacts in a three-person "political convention" situation

contact with one another and thereby move from an independent, noninteracting state into an interdependent state of interaction. This initial phase has been discussed by Shelly and Phillips (1966) as the social contact process. The social contact process is of particular importance in studies of group formation. A widely used experimental paradigm in the study of group formation has been the coalition-formation paradigm (Vinacke and Arkoff, 1957; Vinacke, 1959; Chertkoff, 1966). In essence, subjects in this experimental situation play a mixed-motive threeperson game, the object of which is to combine with another player and thus share in the determination of the outcome. That

The effects of divisibility of payoff on confederative behavior

In a recent study, Phillips and Nitz (1968) focused on the social contact process as a significant aspect of confederative behavior. The social contact process discussed occurs during a transitory phase of group formation when the potential group members move from an independent, noninteracting state into an interdependent state of interaction. The relative frequencies of social contacts were used to test hypotheses about coalition formation.

The propensity to attack others as a function of the distribution of resources in a three person game

The present study was designed to test the hypothesis that an apparently “strong” person would be disadvantaged in a three person game in which coalitions are possible. The experiment used a modified version of a truel which permitted a close examination of the interpersonal process prior to the formation of a coalition. Three conditions were studied: (1) all male Ss and no monetary payoff, (2) all female Ss and no monetary payoff, and (3) all female Ss and a monetary payoff. The “Strength is Weakness” effect was found under all conditions.

Sex and psychological need in triadic bargaining

Differences in bargaining behavior in a three-person coalition game were examined as a function of motivation—the need for safety and the need for self-esteem—and sex. Males tended to revise initial demands for reward downward over a bargaining session to a greater extent than did females. Ss high in safety needs tended to underrate the value of their own resources, but an attempt to account for the sex difference in terms of a need hierarchy was unsuccessful.

Conflict and Survival in Triads

A study of conflictive behavior in a three-person laboratory game provided support for five hypotheses or principles of survival in multipolar power systems: (1) the probability of survival is maximized by having as much or more power than the combination of all potential enemies; (2) if such hegemony is not possible, the probability of survival increases and conflict decreases following a transition from a multipolar to a bipolar power system; (3) disparity of power tends to increase conflict and reduce survival probabilities; (4) if power hegemony does not exist, survival is inversely related to power; and (5) aggressive (as opposed to pacific) behavior is positively related to survival. In addition, the conflict process was found to be a function of both structural and motivational factors.

The effects of asymmetric liking on the attribution of dominance in dyads

This study explored a feature of what might be called “implicit theories of interpersonal relations.” The question addressed concerns the nature of the interrelation that subjects placed on the violation of a salient schema which they held for dyadic affective relations. When presented with information concerning the degree of asymmetry of liking in a dyad, subjects inferred greater dominance on the part of the better liked person. This result is consistent with the view that subjects attend to structural characteristics of interpersonal relationships as cues in the interpretation of those relations.

Equity and Coalition Formation in Triads

The present study was an investigation of the role that the norm of equity plays in the formation of coalitions within triads. Past research on coalition formation (e.g., Vinacke & Arkoff, 1957) to a large extent has focused on the effect of differences in apparent power. Typically, power is defined as resources that enable their owner to achieve some goal; the greater the resources, the more easily the goal is reached. For example, in one case of Caplow’s (1968) Type 5 triad, resources are distributed in the