James M. Acton

Chapter One: Central deterrence

After two decades of stagnation, Russia and the United States have pledged their support for reductions in nuclear warheads. But the vision of mutual disarmament remains plagued by doubts on all sides. Russia, the US and American allies struggle as ever with the notion that downsizing would be a step into the unknown, and hold on to the belief that, when it comes to deterrence, size matters. Until now, the reasons behind this anxiety – and whether it is justified – have not been properly explored. Based on a series of interviews with opinion formers in Russia and the US, this Adelphi examines long-held concerns about the effectiveness of deterrence (including extended deterrence) at low numbers, the possible incentives to use nuclear weapons first in a crisis, the potential for rearmament and risks surrounding nuclear multipolarity. Deep reductions in nuclear arsenals are much less problematic than commonly perceived, as the experience of the USSR and the US in the early Cold War, and China, France and the United Kingdom over a longer period demonstrates. Taking into account these examples, together with potential stumbling blocks and crisis scenarios, this book contends that arsenal size has little bearing on many of the security challenges usually associated with low numbers, and accordingly, that making deep cuts would not undermine international security.

Chapter Four: Rearmament stability

After two decades of stagnation, Russia and the United States have pledged their support for reductions in nuclear warheads. But the vision of mutual disarmament remains plagued by doubts on all sides. Russia, the US and American allies struggle as ever with the notion that downsizing would be a step into the unknown, and hold on to the belief that, when it comes to deterrence, size matters. Until now, the reasons behind this anxiety – and whether it is justified – have not been properly explored. Based on a series of interviews with opinion formers in Russia and the US, this Adelphi examines long-held concerns about the effectiveness of deterrence (including extended deterrence) at low numbers, the possible incentives to use nuclear weapons first in a crisis, the potential for rearmament and risks surrounding nuclear multipolarity. Deep reductions in nuclear arsenals are much less problematic than commonly perceived, as the experience of the USSR and the US in the early Cold War, and China, France and the United Kingdom over a longer period demonstrates. Taking into account these examples, together with potential stumbling blocks and crisis scenarios, this book contends that arsenal size has little bearing on many of the security challenges usually associated with low numbers, and accordingly, that making deep cuts would not undermine international security.

Chapter Five: Nuclear multipolarity

After two decades of stagnation, Russia and the United States have pledged their support for reductions in nuclear warheads. But the vision of mutual disarmament remains plagued by doubts on all sides. Russia, the US and American allies struggle as ever with the notion that downsizing would be a step into the unknown, and hold on to the belief that, when it comes to deterrence, size matters. Until now, the reasons behind this anxiety – and whether it is justified – have not been properly explored. Based on a series of interviews with opinion formers in Russia and the US, this Adelphi examines long-held concerns about the effectiveness of deterrence (including extended deterrence) at low numbers, the possible incentives to use nuclear weapons first in a crisis, the potential for rearmament and risks surrounding nuclear multipolarity. Deep reductions in nuclear arsenals are much less problematic than commonly perceived, as the experience of the USSR and the US in the early Cold War, and China, France and the United Kingdom over a longer period demonstrates. Taking into account these examples, together with potential stumbling blocks and crisis scenarios, this book contends that arsenal size has little bearing on many of the security challenges usually associated with low numbers, and accordingly, that making deep cuts would not undermine international security.

Chapter Two: Extended deterrence

After two decades of stagnation, Russia and the United States have pledged their support for reductions in nuclear warheads. But the vision of mutual disarmament remains plagued by doubts on all sides. Russia, the US and American allies struggle as ever with the notion that downsizing would be a step into the unknown, and hold on to the belief that, when it comes to deterrence, size matters. Until now, the reasons behind this anxiety – and whether it is justified – have not been properly explored. Based on a series of interviews with opinion formers in Russia and the US, this Adelphi examines long-held concerns about the effectiveness of deterrence (including extended deterrence) at low numbers, the possible incentives to use nuclear weapons first in a crisis, the potential for rearmament and risks surrounding nuclear multipolarity. Deep reductions in nuclear arsenals are much less problematic than commonly perceived, as the experience of the USSR and the US in the early Cold War, and China, France and the United Kingdom over a longer period demonstrates. Taking into account these examples, together with potential stumbling blocks and crisis scenarios, this book contends that arsenal size has little bearing on many of the security challenges usually associated with low numbers, and accordingly, that making deep cuts would not undermine international security.

Appendix: Where are we now?

After two decades of stagnation, Russia and the United States have pledged their support for reductions in nuclear warheads. But the vision of mutual disarmament remains plagued by doubts on all sides. Russia, the US and American allies struggle as ever with the notion that downsizing would be a step into the unknown, and hold on to the belief that, when it comes to deterrence, size matters. Until now, the reasons behind this anxiety – and whether it is justified – have not been properly explored. Based on a series of interviews with opinion formers in Russia and the US, this Adelphi examines long-held concerns about the effectiveness of deterrence (including extended deterrence) at low numbers, the possible incentives to use nuclear weapons first in a crisis, the potential for rearmament and risks surrounding nuclear multipolarity. Deep reductions in nuclear arsenals are much less problematic than commonly perceived, as the experience of the USSR and the US in the early Cold War, and China, France and the United Kingdom over a longer period demonstrates. Taking into account these examples, together with potential stumbling blocks and crisis scenarios, this book contends that arsenal size has little bearing on many of the security challenges usually associated with low numbers, and accordingly, that making deep cuts would not undermine international security.

Chapter Three: Crisis stability

After two decades of stagnation, Russia and the United States have pledged their support for reductions in nuclear warheads. But the vision of mutual disarmament remains plagued by doubts on all sides. Russia, the US and American allies struggle as ever with the notion that downsizing would be a step into the unknown, and hold on to the belief that, when it comes to deterrence, size matters. Until now, the reasons behind this anxiety – and whether it is justified – have not been properly explored. Based on a series of interviews with opinion formers in Russia and the US, this Adelphi examines long-held concerns about the effectiveness of deterrence (including extended deterrence) at low numbers, the possible incentives to use nuclear weapons first in a crisis, the potential for rearmament and risks surrounding nuclear multipolarity. Deep reductions in nuclear arsenals are much less problematic than commonly perceived, as the experience of the USSR and the US in the early Cold War, and China, France and the United Kingdom over a longer period demonstrates. Taking into account these examples, together with potential stumbling blocks and crisis scenarios, this book contends that arsenal size has little bearing on many of the security challenges usually associated with low numbers, and accordingly, that making deep cuts would not undermine international security.

Chapter Two: Verifying the Transition to Zero

Nuclear disarmament is firmly back on the international agenda. But almost all current thinking on the subject is focused on the process of reducing the number of weapons from thousands to hundreds. This rigorous analysis examines the challenges that exist to abolishing nuclear weapons completely, and suggests what can be done now to start overcoming them. The paper argues that the difficulties of ‘getting to zero’ must not preclude many steps being taken in that direction. It thus begins by examining steps that nuclear‐armed states could take in cooperation with others to move towards a world in which the task of prohibiting nuclear weapons could be realistically envisaged. The remainder of the paper focuses on the more distant prospect of prohibiting nuclear weapons, beginning with the challenge of verifying the transition from low numbers to zero. It moves on to examine how the civilian nuclear industry could be managed in a nuclear‐weapons‐free world so as to prevent rearmament. The paper then considers what political‐security conditions would be required to make a nuclear‐weapons ban enforceable and explores how enforcement might work in practice. Finally, it addresses the latent capability to produce nuclear weapons that would inevitably exist after abolition, and asks whether this is a barrier to disarmament, or whether it can be managed to meet the security needs of a world newly free of the bomb.

Chapter One: Establishing Political Conditions to Enhance the Feasibility of Abolishing Nuclear Weapons

Nuclear disarmament is firmly back on the international agenda. But almost all current thinking on the subject is focused on the process of reducing the number of weapons from thousands to hundreds. This rigorous analysis examines the challenges that exist to abolishing nuclear weapons completely, and suggests what can be done now to start overcoming them. The paper argues that the difficulties of ‘getting to zero’ must not preclude many steps being taken in that direction. It thus begins by examining steps that nuclear‐armed states could take in cooperation with others to move towards a world in which the task of prohibiting nuclear weapons could be realistically envisaged. The remainder of the paper focuses on the more distant prospect of prohibiting nuclear weapons, beginning with the challenge of verifying the transition from low numbers to zero. It moves on to examine how the civilian nuclear industry could be managed in a nuclear‐weapons‐free world so as to prevent rearmament. The paper then considers what political‐security conditions would be required to make a nuclear‐weapons ban enforceable and explores how enforcement might work in practice. Finally, it addresses the latent capability to produce nuclear weapons that would inevitably exist after abolition, and asks whether this is a barrier to disarmament, or whether it can be managed to meet the security needs of a world newly free of the bomb.