James MacAllister

Dewey, Interest, and Well-Being: Prospects for Improving the Educational Value of Physical Education

Despite the current policy prominence of physical education, there is still unease about the subjects educational contribution. In this respect, we are surprised by how seldom John Deweys writings inform contemporary reviews of aims and values. We outline how his writings on connecting the child and the curriculum and schools with society are relevant to deliberations on how students could derive enhanced meaning from physical education. We address criticisms by Richard Peters of Dewey and discuss related issues on: interest and engagement, problem solving and criteria for personal growth. We discuss how the thinking of Dewey and Valerie Tiberius might inform the development of physical education curricular that are more deeply connected with the lives of students and which promote well-being. In particular, we argue there is a need for future curriculum to be designed in ways that invite students to cultivate informed and stable physical activity habits and values.

The ‘Physically Educated’ Person: Physical education in the philosophy of Reid, Peters and Aristotle

Abstract This article will derive a definition and account of the physically educated person, through an examination of the philosophy of Andrew Reid, Richard Peters and Aristotle. Initially, Reid’s interpretation of Peters’ views about the educational significance of practical knowledge (and physical education) will be considered. While it will be acknowledged that Peters was rather disparaging about the educational merit of some practical activities in Ethics and Education, it will be argued that he elsewhere suggests that such practical activities could be educationally worthwhile in and of themselves. In Education and the educated man he specified that practical activities should be regarded as educationally important if they are either transformed by theoretical understanding and/or pursued to the point of excellence. In suggesting that education involves the cultivation of both theoretical and practical human excellences it is argued that Peters’ philosophy of education begins to take on a more Aristotelian bent. After exploring Aristotle’s notion of virtue (human excellence) and his discussion of physical training in The politics, it is claimed that physical education activities might be most worthwhile when they extend the moral habits and/or modes of thought of pupils, towards excellence. It is concluded that physically educated persons should be defined as those who have learned to arrange their lives in such a way that the physical activities they freely engage in make a distinctive contribution to their long-term flourishing.

MacIntyre's Revolutionary Aristotelian Philosophy and his Idea of an Educated Public Revisited

In this article I revisit MacIntyres lecture on the idea of an educated public. I argue that the full significance of MacIntyres views on the underlying purposes of universities only become clear when his lecture on the educated public is situated in the context of his wider ‘revolutionary Aristotelian’ philosophical project. I claim that for MacIntyre educational institutions should both support students to learn how to think for themselves and act for the common good. After considering criticisms from Putnam, Wain and Harris I conclude that MacIntyres later work points towards an idea of educated ‘community’ that is more outward looking and open to difference than his earlier articulated idea of an educated ‘public’.

Searching for excellence in education: knowledge, virtue and presence?

This article addresses two main questions: (1) what is excellence and (2) should epistemic excellence be the main purpose of education? Though references to excellence have become increasingly frequent in the UK education policy, these questions are perhaps especially important in Scotland where the curriculum is explicitly for excellence. Following Hirst and Peters, it is hypothesised that if the term ‘education’ implies possession of a certain breadth of general knowledge and understanding, then the term ‘excellence’ may imply a deep grasp of a specific body of knowledge. However, after consideration of Deweys suggestion that being present in the moment is an excellence of childhood, it is concluded that (1) the development of epistemic excellence (having a deep grasp of valuable knowledge) should be regarded as an educational purpose rather than the only educational purpose and (2) pupil engagement with public traditions of knowledge provides necessary but not sufficient conditions for education.

Education for personal life: John MacMurray on why learning to be human requires emotional discipline

In this article I discuss the philosophy of John MacMurray, and in particular, his little-examined writings on discipline and emotion education. It is argued that discipline is a vital element in the emotion education MacMurray thought central to learning to be human, because for him it takes concerted effort to overcome the human tendency toward egocentricity. It is maintained that MacMurrays philosophy of education is of contemporary significance for at least two reasons. On the one hand it suggests an alternative vision for humanistic education. While liberal educationists such as Oakeshott and Peters stressed that the pursuit of knowledge and understanding was the main way in which persons could develop their humanity MacMurray instead emphasised that persons can only learn to become human by pursuing other-centred relationships. On the other hand his philosophy can also reveal the limitations in much contemporary debate in emotion education which critics (such as Ecclestone and Clack) suggest increasingly aims at little more than helping pupils feel better about themselves. According to MacMurray a genuine emotion education can enlarge humanity by supporting persons to feel and act for the sake of others rather than think about themselves. Despite sympathy for MacMurrays account of the purposes of education it is nonetheless concluded that the pursuit of knowledge as an end in itself does not necessarily constitute a negative expression of human agency (as MacMurray asserts)—but rather that the disciplined pursuit of knowledge may also form part of any education concerned to enrich human life.

What should educational institutions be for

ABSTRACT In this article, I respond to the work of Gert Biesta regarding the question of what education should be for. He maintains education ought to be oriented towards the ‘good’ rather than measurement, accountability and efficiency. While sympathetic to such claims, I nonetheless question his avowal that discussion of the purposes of education needs to entail reflection upon tripartite processes of qualification, socialisation and subjectification. I also argue that the concept of subjectification presented by Biesta is elusive. He says educators cannot plan to produce it in students. He also suggests there is an unhelpful surplus of reason in education that constrains possibilities for subjectification. According to Biesta, education partly reproduces ‘rational communities’ that stifle the emergence of human uniqueness and inhibit persons from challenging accepted social orders. In response to this, I argue there is currently a deficit rather than a surplus of reason in education concerning the common good. Following MacIntyre, I claim that educational institutions should support students to learn how to think for themselves and act for the common good. I conclude that such utopian thinking about the purposes of education may be needed, now, more than ever.

Living in the Senses and Learning with Love--John Macmurray's Philosophy of Embodied Emotion.

Abstract In this article we analyse the central role that the body plays in John MacMurray’s account of learning to be human. As with Merleau-Ponty, MacMurray rejected mind-body dualisms and argued for the need to understand what it means to be a person. Through our analysis we highlight the key principles that characterize MacMurray’s philosophy in relation to personhood and the body, namely: 1) all human knowledge and action should be for the sake of friendship and 2) human persons exist first and foremost in their bodies as ‘knowing agents’ rather than in their minds as ‘knowing subjects’. We thereafter explain MacMurray’s views on education and how it must support people to live in personal rather than functional relation with each other by attending more to bodily experience and education of the emotions. Accordingly, MacMurray considered that persons can either ‘use’ their bodily senses as mere instruments for functional purposes or they can ‘live’ in their bodily senses by learning to love (not ‘using’ but rather apprehending the real value of) other persons. In conclusion, we suggest that MacMurray’s philosophy can open up a different way of thinking about the educational value of physical activity. For MacMurray shared physical pursuits are especially educational when carried out for their own sake and when all persons’ present experience moments of bodily joy and togetherness and a better understanding of each other.

Why discipline needs to be reclaimed as an educational concept

This paper considers different conceptualisations of school discipline within both UK education policy and wider educational and philosophical literature. Initially, it is noted that notions of “behaviour management” dominate discourses about school discipline. It is suggested that this is unhelpful as behaviour management skills are underpinned by a behaviourist understanding of learning that denies pupils an important degree of agency over their own development – pupils are rather portrayed as unruly and morally deficient. It is therefore maintained that discipline needs to be reclaimed as an educational concept as it can be a valuable personal quality whose possession indicates a capacity to set important goals for oneself and see them through even in the face of difficulty. With reference to the diverse philosophies of Dewey, P.S. Wilson, Durkheim, Oakeshott, and MacMurray, it is contended that a re-conceived notion of school discipline might enable less controlling and behaviourist and more educational discipline in at least three ways: the ethical (by guiding the ethical development of pupils), the humanising (by encouraging pupils to act for the sake of others rather than only think about themselves) and the epistemic (by supporting pupils to engage in the pursuit of valued interests and knowledge).

Philosophy in Scotland and Scottish education

ABSTRACT In this paper, we consider how philosophy in Scotland has shaped beliefs about Scottish education. We begin by charting Macmurray’s views on education generally and Scottish education specifically. We thereafter examine the nature of ‘Scottish philosophy’ and explore continuities and discrepancies in the thought of Hume, Reid, Davie, MacIntyre, Graham and Macmurray. We suggest that while Davie thought Scottish education should remain true to the Enlightenment tradition of intellectual democracy, Macmurray thought Scottish education should have a new focus, it should seek to develop a more emotionally rational humanity. We conclude that philosophy in Scotland has supplied three main beliefs about Scottish education. First, that education should further conditions of intellectual democracy by supporting students to question social orders and develop the capacities necessary to engage in informed public debate. Second, that in-depth study of different traditions of thought can help further conditions of intellectual democracy. Third, persons can only learn to think well and act morally in relation with other persons and where recognition is given to the necessarily embodied and relational nature of human being and knowing. We claim that even though these beliefs are partly mythological, they continue to shape how Scottish education policy is framed today.

Education for personal life

In this article I discuss the philosophy of John MacMurray, and in particular, his little-examined writings on discipline and emotion education. It is argued that discipline is a vital element in the emotion education MacMurray thought central to learning to be human, because for him it takes concerted effort to overcome the human tendency toward egocentricity. It is maintained that MacMurrays philosophy of education is of contemporary significance for at least two reasons. On the one hand it suggests an alternative vision for humanistic education. While liberal educationists such as Oakeshott and Peters stressed that the pursuit of knowledge and understanding was the main way in which persons could develop their humanity MacMurray instead emphasised that persons can only learn to become human by pursuing other-centred relationships. On the other hand his philosophy can also reveal the limitations in much contemporary debate in emotion education which critics (such as Ecclestone and Clack) suggest increasingly aims at little more than helping pupils feel better about themselves. According to MacMurray a genuine emotion education can enlarge humanity by supporting persons to feel and act for the sake of others rather than think about themselves. Despite sympathy for MacMurrays account of the purposes of education it is nonetheless concluded that the pursuit of knowledge as an end in itself does not necessarily constitute a negative expression of human agency (as MacMurray asserts)—but rather that the disciplined pursuit of knowledge may also form part of any education concerned to enrich human life.