James P. Pfiffner

US Blunders in Iraq: De-Baathification and Disbanding the Army

Abstract In May 2003 Paul Bremer issued CPA Orders to exclude from the new Iraq government members of the Baath Party (CPA Order 1) and to disband the Iraqi Army (CPA Order 2). These two orders severely undermined the capacity of the occupying forces to maintain security and continue the ordinary functioning of the Iraq government. The decisions reversed previous National Security Council judgments and were made over the objections of high ranking military and intelligence officers. The article concludes that the most likely decision maker was the Vice President.

Establishing the Bush Presidency

George Bush began his presidency with the politics of consolidation. The policy directions of the Reagan Administration were reinforced, but not extended, and the major trends in the conduct of the Presidency were moderated, but not reversed. This article examines how George Bush accomplished three of the major tasks of a new President: putting his own stamp on the Presidency, grasping control of the executive branch, and establishing a modus vivendi with Congress. This article examines how President Bush conducted his transition into office, establishing his own persona and agenda. It then turns to how the Bush Cabinet and its relations with the White House staff differ from those of his predecessors, especially President Reagans. Finally, it analyzes Bushs early dealings with Congress which were marked by compromise and conciliation. The conclusion is that President Bush performed successfully in these activities, but that his early presidency was marred by his failure to address the budget deficit issue.

Marching in time: Alliance politics, synchrony and the case for war in Iraq, 2002-2003

This article considers how three countries—the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia—approached the lead-up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003 by examining how the leaders’ decision-making interacted, the commonalities of their policy-making processes, and the approach to policy justification taken in terms of their domestic political environments. In particular, it examines the extent to which their claims as to why invasion was necessary went in synchrony. Having decided on war, all three national leaders sought to persuade their publics of the moral imperative for invasion and the immediacy of the threat that needed to be eradicated, and each made secret intelligence public in so doing. The selective use of intelligence allowed the politial leaders to shift the focus of the blame from policy-makers to intelligence accuracy when the immediate threat from weapons of mass destruction turned out to be illusory.

Elliot L. Richardson: Exemplar of Integrity and Public Service

Abstract This article examines the career and ideas of Elliot Richardson as an exemplar of integrity and public service. The analysis proceeds from an overview of Richardson’s career to an examination of his acts as a political appointee and his stance toward career civil servants. It then discusses his confrontation with President Nixon over the Watergate special prosecutor, which ended in his resignation. It concludes by analyzing the ideas about government that underpinned Richardson’s public acts.

The national performance review in perspective

The National Performance Review was one of the most ambitious, far-reaching and thoroughly prepared management reform efforts of the twentieth century. This article examines some of the main themes and principles of the NPR. It begins with the Clinton administrations marketing of the effort and goes on to analyze the arguments of its major scholarly critics. It then presents the more practical public management critiques of the NPR implementation. The article concludes with a comparison of the most important contributions and drawbacks of the total effort and delineates the public management dilemmas that the NPR presents to federal managers.

The President's Legislative Agenda

The president has come to be known as our chief legislator within the past fifty years, with Franklin Roosevelt and his successors taking a much more active role in the legislative process than nineteenth-century presidents took. Despite elaborate efforts and a fully developed congressional liaison capacity in the White House, however, only three presidents have been markedly successful with Congress: Franklin Roosevelt, Lyndon Johnson, and Ronald Reagan. This article examines some of the lessons that have been learned about presidential effectiveness with Congress. Even the most successful presidents, however, have not been able to sustain their legislative effectiveness throughout their terms, and this article analyzes the frustrations of divided government and proposals for constitutional reform to alleviate the problem. The article concludes that whether one approves of these reform proposals depends how one conceives of the problem.

The Efficacy of Coercive Interrogation

After President Obama issued executive orders forbidding the use of any interrogation techniques harsher than those specified in the Army Field Manual, former vice president Richard Cheney criticized him for putting the United States at risk by forbidding their use. Republican candidates for the presidency in 2011 and 2012 agreed that the use of “enhanced interrogation techniques” (EITs), particularly waterboarding, was necessary in order to protect the United States. Representative Michelle Bachman declared, “If I were president I would be willing to use waterboarding. I think it was very effective” (Rugenberg and Parker 2011). Candidates Herman Cain and Rick Santorum and Governor Rick Perry agreed. In July 2012, Mitt Romney’s aides said that he did not believe that waterboarding is torture, and that he would not rule out using EITs (Gharib 2012). Only libertarian Ron Paul and former Utah governor John Huntsman refused to endorse coercive interrogation. In 2013, the film Zero Dark Thirty implied that key intelligence for locating Osama bin Laden was obtained through torture. Thus torture continued to be an important public policy debate in the United States.

The Presidency and the Persian Gulf War

Introduction by James P. Pfiffner The Presidency and War-Making Presidential Policy-Making and the Gulf War by James P. Pfiffner The Conflict Between Congress and the President Over War by Robert J. Spitzer The Power of Commander in Chief by Louis Fisher George Bush Goes to War Figuring Out Saddam Hussein by Betty Glad The Case FOR the War by Raymond A. Moore The Case AGAINST the War by Marcia Lynn Whicker The Home Front Vietnam and the Gulf War: Comparing Decision-Making in Americas Longest and Shortest Wars by Harold Birch Media Coverage of the Persian Gulf War by Mark J. Rozell The Threat of Terrorism: State-Sponsored Terrorism, the Bush Administration, and the Persian Gulf War by Ruth Ann Strickland The Aftermath of the War The Direct and Indirect Costs of the Persian Gulf War by Lawrence J. Korb The President, the Persian Gulf War, and the United Nations by Donald J. Puchala U.S. Foreign Policy: The Past and the Future by Jim Anderson Conclusion: Some Lessons Learned by Marcia Lynn Whicker Selected Bibliography Index

Presidential Leadership and Advice about Going to War

The growth of the presidency has paralleled the growth of the U.S. government in terms of size and complexity. Leadership of large, complex systems cannot be accomplished by single individuals. Each president depends on the government’s operational officers who will implement policies once they have been adopted. But before policies are adopted, presidents need both expert and general advice on the wisdom of adopting various policy options. This chapter will examine presidential decision making and the dynamics of advisory systems. More specifically, it will focus on how presidents can use their advisors to elicit the best policy advice. There is nothing automatic about this; it is a challenge for each president.

Judging Presidential Character

Abstract This article takes the character issue seriously by addressing how presidents ought to be judged with respect to truthfulness, sexual probity, and promise-keeping. It argues that it is beneficial rather than destructive to examine the faults of political leaders along with their virtues. The analysis concludes that democratic politics makes it unlikely that our leaders will often be moral paragons, and that while we ought not to condone wrongdoing, neither should we expect perfection.