James R. Wible

The Instrumentalisms of Dewey and Friedman

Ironic perplexities seem to pervade economic science-both in theory and in methodology. In the theoretical domain, the allegedly micro-oriented Chicago School increasingly pursues the highly aggregative rational expectations hypothesis. Furthermore, it is the supposedly macro-oriented post-Keynesians who investigate the microfoundations and who originate policy proposals with significant institutional detail.1 In the methodological domain, there is ostensibly a similar reversal of intellectual sensitivities. Milton Friedmans essay on positive economicswritten as a repudiation of institutional economics-has recently been reinterpreted as an instrumentalist philosophy of economic science.2 The institutional school has philosophical roots in the instrumental philosophy of John Dewey. The purpose of this article is to compare the instrumentalist views of Friedman and Dewey. The argument suggests that while Friedman has not reversed his methodological position, his views can be interpreted, in a philosophical sense, as a special case of Deweys.

Fraud in Science An Economic Approach

In recent years, there have been multiple instances of misconduct in science, yet no coherent framework exists for characterizing this phenomenon. The thesis of this article is that economic analysis can provide such a framework. Economic analysis leads to two categories of misconduct: replication failure and fraud. Replication failure can be understood as the scientist making optimal use of time in a professional environment where innovation is emphasized rather than replication. Fraud can be depicted as a deliberate gamble under conditions of uncertainty: The scientist takes advantage of the complexity of science and undermines the integrity of science for personal gain or advancement.

An Epistemic Critique of Rational Expectations and the Neoclassical Macroeconomic Research Program

For more than a decade, the rational expectations (RE) hypothesis has had a profound impact on macroeconomic theory and policy. The idea that private transactors efficiently use all available information has provided a theoretical rationale for the ineffectiveness of conventional monetary and fiscal policies. However, recent economic events have led to a reconsideration of RE. The protracted sequence of successive recessions suggests longer macroeconomic adjustment lags than is consistent with RE theory. How can RE and neoclassical macroeconomics be criticized? The RE view of the transactor has brought a new dimension to the conception of economic man. RE theorists portray the transactor as an empiricist, perhaps less sophisticated than the scientist, but nonetheless an empiricist. Furthermore, modifications of the pure RE view of the transactor also conform to empiricism. This is where the conceptual unity of neoclassical macroeconomics appears. Neoclassical macroeconomics can be construed as a concatenation of informationally based optimization theories which originates with pure RE and terminates with positive economics.

The Economic Organization of Science, the Firm, and the Marketplace

Among the various institutional structures of an economy like the firm and the marketplace is one that is like no other. Science is unique. This uniqueness raises an important question: why does science exist? From an economic perspective, there are two potentially meaningful approaches to the existence of science. They both encompass institutional pluralism. A substitutes theory of comparative institutions presupposes the primacy of the commercial marketplace over firms—that firms substitute for the market when markets fail. This theory has not been used to explain the existence of science. A complements theory postulates that many simultaneous institutional responses, including science, are necessary for creating an efficient and equitable economy. The economic function of science is to produce fundamental theoretical abstractions about our world. Scientific theories are public goods that would not likely be produced within the governance structures of commercial markets and firms. The aim is to complement but not supplant traditional philosophical answers that science exists to discover truth and knowledge.

Scientific misconduct and research ethics in economics: an introduction

Abstract Since the screening of Inside Job in movie theatres around the world in 2010, research integrity in economics has been questioned by scholars and public intellectuals. Prestigious economists and policy makers are accused of conflicts of interest while prominent economists are charged with plagiarism and self-plagiarism. Some of these economists replied to accusations about themselves while many others have preferred not to respond at all. These days, economists hear the following question more often than before: “what is wrong with economics?”

Scientific misconduct and the responsible conduct of research in science and economics

Abstract Considered here are matters relating to the responsible conduct of research in economics and science in the United States for the last forty years. In science there was a “late 20th century wave” of scientific misconduct and then a “millennial wave”. For economics in the former era, episodes of honest error and replication failure occurred. Recently plagiarism and data manipulation have been reported. Overall few economists seem to fabricate data, but falsification of data, replication failure, and plagiarism occur. Furthermore, replication failure is the one thing that scientific misconduct and honest error have in common. In economics and compared to the sciences, there have been no misconduct hearings, no economist has been charged with a crime, nor has anyone served time in prison for scientific misconduct. Science and economics seem to be sufficiently self-corrective so that systemic science failure does not utterly thwart scientific progress in the long run.

Innovative therapies, suspended trials, and the economics of clinical research facilitated communication and biomedical cases

Most approaches to the philosophy of the natural and social sciences are based on completed scientific investigations. However, there are many important cases in science in which testing is incomplete. These cases are termed suspended trials and are particularly significant in biomedical and allied health fields. Initially, the authors’ interest in suspended trials was piqued by a controversial method for assisting autistic children known as facilitated communication. This article examines facilitated communication and other examples of suspended trials from the perspective of an economics of science and game theory. The model is consistent with recent evolutionary approaches to the philosophy of the natural and social sciences and with recent contributions to an economic understanding of science.

Teaching Economics Students as if they are Geniuses

The economics major is a central part of a college education. But is that economics major doing what it is meant to do? And if not, how should it be changed? This book raises a set of provocative questions that encourage readers to look at the economics major in a different light than it is typically considered and provides a series of recommendations for change.

Ricardian Inference: Charles S. Peirce, Economics, and Scientific Method

Standard histories of economics usually treat the “marginal revolution” of the midnineteenth century as both supplanting the “classical” economics of Smith and Ricardo and as advancing the idea of economics as a mathematical science. The marginalists – especially Jevons and Walras – viewed Cournot’s (1838) book on mathematical economics as a seminal work on which they could build. Surprisingly, the scientist, philosopher, and logician Charles S. Peirce discovered Cournot before the marginalist economists and possessed a deeper appreciation of his mathematical approach. While Peirce’s contributions to economics are limited, the influence of economics on his philosophy is subtle and not well understood. In a number of fragments, Peirce, who, despite Ricardo’s lack of mathematical form, nonetheless regarded him as a paradigmatic mathematical economist, refers to “Ricardian inference,” as a fundamental contribution to scientific method. Two, perhaps complementary, options are explored as to exactly what Peirce meant by Ricardian inference. On the one hand, he associates Ricardo with the “primipostnumeral syllogism,” which is a sort of generalization to uncountably infinite sets of what Peirce calls Fermatian inference (often referred to as mathematical induction). On the other hand, he holds up Ricardo as an exemplar of the “analytical method,” which is Peirce’s name for a hybrid form connecting analogy, abduction, and induction. On either account, economics plays a larger and more fundamental role in Peirce’s philosophy of science than is generally understood.

The Economics of Trade Liberalization: Charles S. Peirce and the Spanish Treaty of 1884

In the 1870s and 1880s, the scientist, logician, and pragmatist philosopher Charles S. Peirce possessed an advanced knowledge of mathematical economics, having mastered and criticized Cournot as early as 1871. In 1884 he engaged in a multi-round debate with the editors of The Nation over the economics of trade liberalization in the case of a proposed trade treaty with Spain concerning import tariffs on Cuban and Puerto Rican sugar. The debate is reconstructed and related carefully both to Peirce’s understanding of mathematical economics and to his philosophy of science.