James Routledge

Innate and Discretionary Accruals Quality and Corporate Governance

This paper extends previous research on the association between corporate governance mechanisms and accruals quality. We derive measures of the discretionary and innate components of accruals quality and regress them against corporate governance characteristics. For discretionary accruals, we find use of a Big 4 audit firm and a larger audit committee as the primary governance mechanisms associated with higher accruals quality. For innate accruals quality, we find that higher quality is associated with an independent board of directors, a larger, more independent and more active audit committee, and use of a Big 4 audit firm. Our findings suggest a stronger relation between sound governance mechanisms and innate accruals quality than discretionary accruals quality.

Do Corporate Governance Recommendations Improve the Performance and Accountability of Small Listed Companies

This study examines whether the implementation of the 2003 Australian Securities Exchange Limited governance recommendations influenced the governance choices of small companies and whether compliance improves their accounting and market performance and earnings quality. Our analysis examines small and large companies because we are interested in the different effects of the governance recommendations on the two groups. The analysis shows a significant shift by small and large companies to comply with the recommendations around the time of their introduction. We find that formation of an audit committee surrounding the reform period is significantly associated with improved earnings quality for small and large companies. However, compliance with other governance recommendations is not systematically associated with improved performance or earnings quality.

Insolvency administration as a strategic response to financial distress

This study considers whether the strategic decision to enter voluntary administration (VA) rather than to trade the company’s business for a protracted period of declining performance is systematically related to the effective monitoring of management decision-making. Analysis that tests the association between strategic entry into VA and the likelihood that a company will reorganize in VA is also presented. We find about half of the companies in our sample entered VA as a strategic choice. The likelihood of strategic entry to VA increased with the proportion of independent board directors, the existence of an audit committee and a dual CEO/chair board structure. Subsequent analysis of reorganization outcomes suggests that strategic entry into VA improves prospects for a successful reorganization.

An exploratory study of the company reorganisation decision in voluntary administration

A primary purpose of the voluntary administration legislation is to provide a flexible procedure by which a company can attempt to reorganise its affairs and continue trading. Informed decision‐making regarding which companies should attempt reorganisation is critical to the efficient operation of company rescue legislation. This paper explores decision‐making associated with the voluntary administration process, with a focus on the relevance of financial information to the reorganisation decision. Statistical models are developed to provide some insight into the reorganisation decision and the problem of identifying suitable (successful) reorganisation candidates from a pool of distressed companies. Additionally, insolvency experts’ decisions regarding companies’ prospects in reorganisation are examined. The decision accuracy of insolvency experts was found to be significantly lower than statistical model accuracy, indicating that further development of statistical models may be a useful aid to insolvency experts.

Board Gender Diversity and Going Concern Audit Opinions

This paper examines the relation between gender diversity on the board of directors and the likelihood that a company receives an emphasis of matter going concern audit opinion. Gender diversity on the board and the audit committee is examined. We find that, after controlling for the strength of corporate governance and relevant financial characteristics, boards with at least one female director are less likely to receive an emphasis of matter going concern opinion. We attribute this result to the improved monitoring that the board is able to provide as a result of the qualities brought to bear by female directors. In regard to the audit committee, we find that the presence of a committee is associated with an increased likelihood of an emphasis of matter going concern opinion and that this relation is strengthened by the existence of a female audit committee member. This finding is indicative of the important role of the audit committee in relation to the integrity of financial reporting and that the existence of female members on the committee expectation enhances its operation.