James Van Cleve

Foundationalism, Epistemic Principles, and the Cartesian Circle

T HE problem of the Cartesian Circle is sometimes treated as though it were merely an exercise for scholars: Descartes fell into it, and theirjob is to get him out of it. But more is at stake than extricating Descartes. In its generalized form, the Cartesian Circle is none other than the Problem of the Criterion, a problem that any epistemology must face. Moreover, to solve the problem of the Circle one must answer questions about epistemic principles that are pivotal in contemporary debates between foundationalists and coherentists. There is reason to hope, therefore, that by examining Descartess problem we can throw light on problems of our own. This paper is divided into two parts. In Part One I examine solutions to the problem of the Circle that are possible within Descartess own framework. In Part Two I show how what we learn in Part One may be used to resolve some contemporary disputes that hinge on the status of epistemic principles.

Mind--Dust or Magic? Panpsychism Versus Emergence

1. Human beings are complex systems composed entirely of matter. (Material Composition, or Anti-Dualism)3 2. Mental properties are not logically implied by any physical properties. (Anti-Reductivism) 3. Human beings do have mental properties. (Anti-Eliminativism) 4. There are no emergent properties. That is to say, all properties of a complex system that are not relations between it and something else derive from the properties of its constituents and their mode of combination. (Anti-Emergence)

Thomas Reid's Geometry of Visibles

covered a non-Euclidean geometry. However, the real basis of Reids geometry of visibles is subtle and easy to misidentify. My main aim in what follows is to make clear what the real basis is, separating it from several fallacious or irrelevant considerations on which Reid may seem to be relying. A secondary aim is to air the worry that Reids case for his geometry can succeed only at the cost of compromising the achievement for which Reid is best known-his direct realist theory of perception.

Right, Left, and the Fourth Dimension

Mollusk shells, narwhal tusks, twining plants, and human hands — all of these may come in pairs that are examples of what Kant called incongruent counterparts The members of such pairs are counterparts in that one is a perfect mirror image of the other, yet incongruent in that one could never be made to occupy the region of space just vacated by the other. In 1768 Kant believed that the existence of such objects furnished proof of a Newtonian or absolutist as against a Leibnizian or relationist view of the reality of space: space is a thing in its own right, not just a construction out of material bodies and the relations among them. (“Absolute space has a reality of its own, independent of the existence of all matter.”)1 Kant’s argument is worth examining both for its own interest and for its connection with other issues, such as the logical status of relations and the possibility of a fourth spatial dimension.

Why a Set Contains its Members Essentially

It is essential to every set that it contain just the members it does and no others. This means that no set could gain or lose any members (or exchange some members for others) and still be the set it was. It. also means that no set could have had members other than the ones it does. In short, the membership of a set can vary neither from time to time nor from one possible world to another. Dissent from this thesis on the part of anyone who accepts the idea of essential characteristics at all is likely to be based on misunderstanding of what the thesis says. Here is another statement of it that should forestall irrelevant objections:

Conditions of Identity: A Study of Identity and Survival

This book sets out a new theory of the unity of objects. The author introduces the reader to the central problems faced by philosophical accounts of identity, problems which can, to a large extent, be solved using the theory developed in the book. In his consideration of the vexed issue of personal identity, the author argues that in our everyday thinking about persons we merge radically different kinds of notions. He suggests that our assessment of sameness of person is not founded on any determinate concept of person. Many central topics in epistemology and metaphysics are addressed in the course of the book and the author provides an original examination of each: the nature of physical objects, the metaphysics of possible worlds, the meaning of continuity in space and time and the nature of philosophical theorizing itself. The book is written in non-technical language and so will be of interest to the non-specialist philosopher.

REID ON SINGLE AND DOUBLE VISION: MECHANICS AND MORALS

When we look at a tree, two images of it are formed, one on each of our retinas. Why, then, asks the child or the philosopher, do we not see two trees?1 Thomas Reid offers an answer to this question in the section of his Inquiry into the Human Mind entitled ‘Of seeing objects single with two eyes’. The principles he invokes in his answer serve at the same time to explain why we do occasionally see objects double. In Part I of this essay, I examine the principles Reid uses to explain single and double vision. This part is mostly an exercise in the history of cognitive science, but it raises questions of interest to philosophers along the way. In Part II, I turn to a hard-core philosophical problem raised by double vision, namely, whether double vision constitutes an objection to the direct realist theory of perception, which was one of Reids main philosophical purposes to promote.

Review Essays: Snails Rolled Up Contrary to All Sense@@@The Philosophy of Right and Left: Incongruent Counterparts and the Nature of Space.

To The Argument Of 1768.- To The Arguments Of 1770 And 1783.- On The First Ground Of The Distinction Of Regions In Space (1768).- Selection From Section 15 Of Dissertation On The Form And Principles Of The Sensible And Intelligible World (1770).- Selection From The Prolegomena To Any Future Metaphysics (1783).- On Higher Space.- The Paradox Of Incongruous Counterparts.- Tractatus 6.36111.- Incongruent Counterparts And Absolute Space.- The Fourth Dimension.- The Ozma Problem And The Fall Of Parity.- The Difference Between Right And Left.- Kant Incongruous Counterparts, And The Nature Of Space And Space-Time.- Hands, Knees, And Absolute Space.- Incongruous Counterparts, Intrinsic Features, And The Substantiviality Of Space.- Incongruent Counterparts.- Showing And Telling: Can The Difference Between Right And Left Be Explained In Words?.- Right, Left, And The Fourth Dimension.- On the Other Hand...: A Reconsideration of Kant, Incongruent Counterparts, and Absolute Space.- Replies To Sklar And Earman.- Kant On Incongruent Counterparts.- The Role of Incongruent Counterparts in Kants Transcendental Idealism.- Incongruent Counterparts And Things In Themselves.- Contemporary Contributors.

Probability and certainty: A reexamination of the Lewis-Reichenbach debate

ConclusionI have shown as promised that Reichenbach did not refute either thesis (I) or thesis (II). I have also shown that an argument of Lewiss may be used to establish a weakened version of (I) that has two interesting consequences: if we are to assign probabilities with any justification at all, we must have either certainties or intrinsic probabilities; and if we are frequentists, we must have certainties.

Objectivity without objects: a Priorian program

The issues I explore in this paper are best introduced by the table with which it begins. The left-hand entry in each row gives expression to a kind objectivity; the right-hand entry affirms the existence of a special kind of object. When philosophers believe in any of the entities on the right, it is typically because they think them necessary to ground the facts on the left. By the same token, when philosophers deny any of the facts on the left, it is often because they cannot bring themselves to believe in the associated kind of object on the right. My project is to explore the extent to which it is possible to have the objectivity without the objects—for example, absolute motion without substantival space, objective predication without universals, objective synonymy without propositions, and objective modality without possible worlds. Each of these combinations would have been congenial to A.N. Prior.