James W. Endersby

Multinomial probit and multinomial logit: a comparison of choice models for voting research

Abstract Several recent studies of voter choice in multiparty elections point to the advantages of multinomial probit (MNP) relative to multinomial/conditional logit (MNL). We compare the MNP and MNL models and argue that the simpler logit is often preferable to the more complex probit for the study of voter choice in multi-party elections. Our argument rests on three areas of comparison between MNP and MNL. First, within the limits of typical data—a small sample of revealed voter choices among a few candidates or parties—neither model will clearly appear to have generated the observed data. Second, MNP is susceptible to a number of estimation problems, the most serious of which is that the MNP is often weakly identified in application. Weak identification is difficult to diagnose and may lead to plausible, yet arbitrary or misleading inferences. Finally, the logit model is criticized because it imposes the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property on voter choice. For most applications the IIA property is neither relevant nor particularly restrictive. We illustrate our arguments using data from recent US and French presidential elections.

The impact of legislator attributes on union PAC campaign contributions

Unions are shown to have a sophisticated understanding of the political process, and to allocate their political resources based on this understanding. Two different tests of this hypothesis are presented. First, using a chi-square test, we show union contributions go disproportionately to members of committees with legislative and regulatory jurisdiction over their activities. Second, using logistic regression analysis, we demonstrate that this result is robust with respect to the inclusion of other institutional variables such as seniority, voting record, party, and electoral competitiveness.

Issues, the spatial theory of voting, and British general elections: A comparison of proximity and directional models

Competing spatial models of voter choiceare compared in the context ofparliamentary representatives selectedthrough single-member district, pluralityelections where party platforms areemphasized over individual candidates.Respondents of the 1987, 1992, and 1997British general election surveys ratepolitical parties on a series of issuescales. Ordered logistic regressions ofparty evaluations under proximity,directional, and mixed models reveal thatthe classic spatial model and thedirectional model perform equally well.Differences center on perceptions of thestatus quo, as voters appear to evaluatethe incumbent party (here, theConservatives) slightly differently thanminority parties (Labour and the LiberalDemocrats). The proximity model worksbetter for voter evaluations of governingparties while the directional model workswell for opposition parties.

Campaign Contributions and Legislative Voting in the California Assembly

In this article the authors test for the influence of campaign contributions from economic interest groups on legislative voting in the California Assembly. California does not restrict the size of contributions that special interests may provide to candidates for state office. Consequently, if the purpose of campaign contributions is to secure favorable voting on legislation, this should be evident in an unregulated setting. However, for both business and labor interests, neither the number nor the monetary amount of campaign contributions to incumbents are found to have a major influence on legislative roll call voting.

Strategic Voting in Plurality Elections: A Simulation of Duverger's Law

Experiments designed as an election simulation involve participants in an investigation of strategic voting. Participants assigned political preferences and informed of candidate/party positions on an ideological dimension respond to and learn the results of two public opinion polls before voting. When given two alternatives, the participants vote sincerely. Confronted with three or more alternatives, participants make tactical decisions to narrow the field. Strategic behavior quickly reduces the number of alternatives to two. Consistent with Duvergers law, candidate/party viability encourages strategic voting and the development of a two-party system. The election simulation serves as a useful tool to teach about electoral behavior and to explore topics such as strategic voting.

Tailgate partisanship: Political and social expression through bumper stickers

Abstract One of the more common forms of political participation is the display of decals on automobiles as a means of political expression. Individuals use bumper stickers for purposes such as showing allegiance to an organization, spreading the message of an interest group, and communicating candidate preferences in a campaign. Through a survey of automobiles conducted before the 1992 election, this article provides an examination and empirical classification of bumper sticker messages. Stickers are categorized according to their expressive content, and three questions are addressed: (1) what is the frequency of expression through bumper stickers? (2) how much of this expression is political? and (3) what patterns can be identified in the use of bumper stickers for expressive purposes? The results suggest that car owners apply decals to their vehicles as a form of identification and solidarity with a group sharing common beliefs.

British parties and spatial competition: Dimensions of party evaluation in the 1992 election

Scholars of British politics traditionally characterize the electorate in terms of partisanship and social class. This paper suggests that ideology and issue preferences also enter into voter perceptions of British political parties and leadership. Using data from the 1992 British Election Study, the paper analyzes the factors that contribute to individual voters; perceptions of the Conservative and Labour parties. The 1992 election saw the major parties move toward the ideological center of British voters. Perceptions of political parties are found to be multidimensional and issue-oriented. A spatial model incorporating issue preferences and perceptions of party positions proves both empirically and theoretically richer than simple models of partisanship. The analysis of British voters complements earlier applications of the general spatial model in the context of the United States.

Rules of Method and Rules of Conduct: An Experimental Study on Two Types of Procedure and Committee Behavior

Models of committee decision making predict that equilibria are induced by institutional arrangements. Though rules of procedure undoubtedly affect outcomes in committees, a considerable debate has arisen on the nature of the relevant rules of procedure. Both the decision method and restrictions on communication influence committee decisions. Using a series of five-person experiments, this essay notes that two independent rules of procedure affect outcomes: limitations on the germaneness of motions (rules of method) and levels of communication (rules of conduct). Both types of restrictive rules must be present to induce certain equilibrium outcomes. These results add to the growing empirical evidence on committee decision making and clarify the effects of various rules of procedures.

The Industrial Structure of the California Assembly: Committee Assignments, Economic Interests, and Campaign Contributions

This paper examines the provision of campaign contributions made by economic interests to incumbents seeking reelection in the 1984, 1986, and 1988 California Assembly elections. The study tests whether the distribution of campaign contributions by specific industrial sectors corresponds to legislator possession of the policy property rights associated with membership on relevant Assembly standing committees. A non-parametric statistical model compares the distribution of campaign contributions from groups within a given industrial sector to members of relevant policy committees with the distribution of contributions from all other contributor classes. The empirical analysis confirms that committee assignments significantly affect the allocation of special interest resources in Assembly elections, substantiating the importance of institutional considerations in influencing special interest activity.

Nonpolicy issues and the spatial theory of voting

The traditional spatial model of elections places voters and candidates in an ideological space. Empirical analysis of spatial theory uses voter ratings of candidate and ideal positions on policy issue scales. The spatial model can be enhanced by the incorporation of nonpolicy components as well. These nonpolicy issues can be descriptive (age, ethnicity) or affective (honesty, competence). Using responses for a survey conducted during the 1965 Canadian federal election, an empirical evaluation of these nonpolicy issues is made. Voters are not unanimous in perceptions of parties (or candidates) on nonpolicy dimensions. The traditional spatial model can be extended to include individual voter ideal points and perceptions. This enhanced model proves quite successful at predicting vote choice.