Jamie Bologna

CRISES AND GOVERNMENT: SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

We examine a panel of 70 countries during 1966-2010 and utilize Reinhart and Rogoff crisis dates to estimate the effects of crises on the size and scope of government over both 5-year and 10-year horizons. We also estimate cross section regressions using 40-year (1970-2010) changes in government variables. Banking crises appear to be associated with decreases in the size and scope of government, while sovereign external debt crises are associated with increases. Otherwise, the size and scope of government appears to be persistent to the extent that even crisis episodes fail to leave a significant mark upon them. A notable exception may be that, over 40-year periods, countries that spend more years in crisis are associated with weaker legal systems and property rights.

A spatial analysis of incomes and institutional quality: evidence from US metropolitan areas

We use the Stansel (2013) metropolitan area economic freedom index and 25 conditioning variables to analyze the spatial relationships between institutional quality and economic outcomes across 381 U.S. metropolitan areas. Specifically, we allow for spatial dependence in both the dependent and independent variables and estimate how economic freedom impacts both per-capita income growth and per-capita income levels. We find that while economic freedom and income levels are directly and positively related, increases in economic freedom in one area result in negative indirect effects on income levels in surrounding areas. In addition, we find that economic freedom has an insignificant relationship with economic growth.

A Spatial Analysis of Entrepreneurship and Institutional Quality: Evidence from U.S. Metropolitan Areas

This paper uses the Stansel (2013) economic freedom index for a maximum of 375 U.S. metropolitan areas to estimate the effect of economic freedom on entrepreneurship while controlling for spatial dependence. This paper finds positive and statistically significant evidence that increases in economic freedom in one area result in increases in entrepreneurial activity in neighboring areas. Furthermore, the total (direct plus indirect) effects of an increase in economic freedom on entrepreneurship are positive and statistically significant, indicating that a positive-sum game is present. However, these effects are small in magnitude. In order to explain a cumulative one standard deviation increase in either one of the entrepreneurial measures presented in this paper, there would have to be an increase in the freedom index equivalent to moving from the least free area to the most free area.

CORRUPTION, PRODUCT MARKET COMPETITION, AND INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM THE U.S. STATES: CORRUPTION, COMPETITION, AND INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY

This article argues that the effect of corruption on competition is dependent on the institutional environment. When institutions are relatively efficient, observed corruption is likely to be associated with relatively less competition. Conversely, in areas with low quality institutions (e.g., excessively burdensome regulations), corruption may lead to relatively more competition. I employ unique data on competition, corruption, and institutional quality across U.S. states from 1997 to 2009 and report that a higher level of corruption is associated with relatively more competition in states with low levels of institutional quality. However, as institutional quality improves, the effect of corruption worsens. Thus, institutional quality is a fundamental determinant of the corruption‐competition relationship. Improving institutional quality, while at the same time reducing corruption, will increase competition and likely improve economic outcomes.

Corruption, Product Market Competition, and Institutional Quality: Empirical Evidence from the U.S. States

This article argues that the effect of corruption on competition is dependent on the institutional environment. When institutions are relatively efficient, observed corruption is likely to be associated with relatively less competition. Conversely, in areas with low quality institutions (e.g., excessively burdensome regulations), corruption may lead to relatively more competition. I employ unique data on competition, corruption, and institutional quality across U.S. states from 1997 to 2009 and report that a higher level of corruption is associated with relatively more competition in states with low levels of institutional quality. However, as institutional quality improves, the effect of corruption worsens. Thus, institutional quality is a fundamental determinant of the corruption‐competition relationship. Improving institutional quality, while at the same time reducing corruption, will increase competition and likely improve economic outcomes.

Contagious corruption, informal employment, and income: evidence from Brazilian municipalities

Using data on 434 Brazilian municipalities, this paper estimates the effect of both corruption and the size of the informal sector on economic outcomes, while allowing for the possibility of spatial dependence. Overall, this paper finds that the size of the informal sector has a statistically significant and negative impact on economic outcomes that is much larger in magnitude than what is predicted by least-squares estimates due to its exclusion of spillover effects, while the effect of corruption is insignificant. Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in the size of the informal sector is associated with a 26 percent cumulative decrease in GDP per-capita, compared to the maximum of a 17 percent decline predicted by least-squares.

Political Influence Over the Federal Prosecution of Public Corruption: Evidence from Individual Case Files

In the US, federal prosecutors are appointed by the president, confirmed by the Senate, and have significant discretion over which cases they choose to take to court. Federal prosecutors handling an overwhelming majority of corruption cases invites the possibility of political influence in the monitoring of corruption. Additionally, political disparities across states may result in differences in corrupt behavior. Using individual case level data, I examine the effect political factors have on federal corruption cases, with an emphasis on states that are an important focus in the next presidential election. I find that corruption convictions tend to be higher in politically important states. This effect seems more significant when Democratic administrations are in power. In addition, it seems that these effects are relevant only for corruption crimes labeled as “federal�?.

Is the Internet an Effective Mechanism for Reducing Corruption Experience? Evidence from a Cross-Section of Countries

This article develops an indicator of Internet awareness on corruption as described in Goel et al. (2012) to see how this impacts both corruption perceptions and corruption experience. The results confirm the finding of Goel et al. (2012) that corruption perceptions are highly influenced by Internet awareness. However, the effect Internet awareness has on corruption experience is unclear. This article finds that Internet awareness decreases the frequency of corruption experience of households, while it increases the frequency of corruption experience in firms. Overall, the results suggest that the effect Internet awareness has on corruption is highly sensitive to the corruption measures used and the time the Internet data is constructed.