Jan Brascamp
Michigan State University
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Featured researches published by Jan Brascamp.
Trends in Cognitive Sciences | 2008
Joel Pearson; Jan Brascamp
In recent years the overlap between visual perception and memory has shed light on our understanding of both. When ambiguous images that normally cause perception to waver unpredictably are presented briefly with intervening blank periods, perception tends to freeze, locking into one interpretation. This indicates that there is a form of memory storage across the blank interval. This memory trace codes low-level characteristics of the stored stimulus. Although a trace is evident after a single perceptual instance, the trace builds over many separate stimulus presentations, indicating a flexible, variable-length time-course. This memory shares important characteristics with priming by non-ambiguous stimuli. Computational models now provide a framework to interpret many empirical observations.
PLOS ONE | 2008
Jan Brascamp; Tomas Knapen; Ryota Kanai; André J. Noest; Raymond van Ee
When visual input is inconclusive, does previous experience aid the visual system in attaining an accurate perceptual interpretation? Prolonged viewing of a visually ambiguous stimulus causes perception to alternate between conflicting interpretations. When viewed intermittently, however, ambiguous stimuli tend to evoke the same percept on many consecutive presentations. This perceptual stabilization has been suggested to reflect persistence of the most recent percept throughout the blank that separates two presentations. Here we show that the memory trace that causes stabilization reflects not just the latest percept, but perception during a much longer period. That is, the choice between competing percepts at stimulus reappearance is determined by an elaborate history of prior perception. Specifically, we demonstrate a seconds-long influence of the latest percept, as well as a more persistent influence based on the relative proportion of dominance during a preceding period of at least one minute. In case short-term perceptual history and long-term perceptual history are opposed (because perception has recently switched after prolonged stabilization), the long-term influence recovers after the effect of the latest percept has worn off, indicating independence between time scales. We accommodate these results by adding two positive adaptation terms, one with a short time constant and one with a long time constant, to a standard model of perceptual switching.
Journal of Vision | 2005
Jan Brascamp; Raymond van Ee; Wiebe R. Pestman
Studying the temporal dynamics of bistable perception can be useful for understanding neural mechanisms underlying the phenomenon. We take a closer look at those temporal dynamics, using data from four different ambiguous stimuli. We focus our analyses on two recurrent themes in bistable perception literature. First, we address the question whether percept durations follow a gamma distribution, as is commonly assumed. We conclude that this assumption is not justified by the gamma distributions approximate resemblance to distributions of percept durations. We instead present two straightforward distributions of reciprocal percept durations (i.e., rates) that both easily surpass the classic gamma distribution in terms of resemblance to empirical data. Second, we compare the distributions arising from binocular rivalry with those from other forms of bistable perception. Parallels in temporal dynamics between those classes of stimuli are often mentioned as an indication of a similar neural basis, but have never been studied in detail. Our results demonstrate that the distributions arising from binocular rivalry and other forms of bistable perception are indeed similar up to a high level of detail.
Journal of Vision | 2007
Jan Brascamp; Tomas Knapen; Ryota Kanai; Raymond van Ee
We show that previewing one half image of a binocular rivalry pair can cause it to gain initial dominance when the other half is added, a novel phenomenon we term flash facilitation. This is the converse of a known effect called flash suppression, where the previewed image becomes suppressed upon rivalrous presentation. The exact effect of previewing an image depends on both the duration and the contrast of the prior stimulus. Brief, low-contrast prior stimuli facilitate, whereas long, high-contrast ones suppress. These effects have both an eye-based component and a pattern-based component. Our results suggest that, instead of reflecting two unrelated mechanisms, both facilitation and suppression are manifestations of a single process that occurs progressively during presentation of the prior stimulus. The distinction between the two phenomena would then lie in the extent to which the process has developed during prior stimulation. This view is consistent with a neural model previously proposed to account for perceptual stabilization of ambiguous stimuli, suggesting a relation between perceptual stabilization and the present phenomena.
Frontiers in Psychology | 2014
Eunice Yang; Jan Brascamp; Min Suk Kang; Randolph Blake
The interocular suppression technique termed continuous flash suppression (CFS) has become an immensely popular tool for investigating visual processing outside of awareness. The emerging picture from studies using CFS is that extensive processing of a visual stimulus, including its semantic and affective content, occurs despite suppression from awareness of that stimulus by CFS. However, the current implementation of CFS in many studies examining processing outside of awareness has several drawbacks that may be improved upon for future studies using CFS. In this paper, we address some of those shortcomings, particularly ones that affect the assessment of unawareness during CFS, and ones to do with the use of “visible” conditions that are often included as a comparison to a CFS condition. We also discuss potential biases in stimulus processing as a result of spatial attention and feature-selective suppression. We suggest practical guidelines that minimize the effects of those limitations in using CFS to study visual processing outside of awareness.
Journal of Vision | 2009
Jan Brascamp; Joel Pearson; Randolph Blake; A.V. van den Berg
When viewing a stimulus that has multiple plausible real-world interpretations, perception alternates between these interpretations every few seconds. Alternations can be halted by intermittently removing the stimulus from view. The same interpretation dominates over many successive presentations, and perception stabilizes. Here we study perception during long sessions of such intermittent presentation. We demonstrate that, rather than causing truly stable perception, intermittent presentation gives rise to a perceptual alternation cycle with its own characteristics and dependencies, different from those during continuous presentation. Alternations during intermittent viewing typically occur once every few minutes--much less frequently than the seconds-scale alternations during continuous viewing. Strikingly, alternations during intermittent viewing occur at fairly regular intervals, making for a surprisingly periodic alternation cycle. The duration of this cycle becomes longer as the blank duration between presentations is increased, reaching dozens of minutes in some cases. We interpret our findings in terms of a mathematical model that describes a neural network with competition between alternative interpretations. Network sensitivities depend on prior dominance, thus providing a memory for past perception. Slow changes in sensitivity produce both perceptual stabilization and the regular but infrequent alternations, meaning that the same memory traces are responsible for both. This model provides a good description of psychophysical findings, and offers several indications regarding their neural basis.
Current Biology | 2010
P. Christiaan Klink; Jan Brascamp; Randolph Blake; Richard J. A. van Wezel
Experience-driven neuronal plasticity allows the brain to adapt its functional connectivity to recent sensory input. Here we use binocular rivalry, an experimental paradigm in which conflicting images are presented to the individual eyes, to demonstrate plasticity in the neuronal mechanisms that convert visual information from two separated retinas into single perceptual experiences. Perception during binocular rivalry tended to initially consist of alternations between exclusive representations of monocularly defined images, but upon prolonged exposure, mixture percepts became more prevalent. The completeness of suppression, reflected in the incidence of mixture percepts, plausibly reflects the strength of inhibition that likely plays a role in binocular rivalry. Recovery of exclusivity was possible but required highly specific binocular stimulation. Documenting the prerequisites for these observed changes in perceptual exclusivity, our experiments suggest experience-driven plasticity at interocular inhibitory synapses, driven by the correlated activity (and also the lack thereof) of neurons representing the conflicting stimuli. This form of plasticity is consistent with a previously proposed but largely untested anti-Hebbian learning mechanism for inhibitory synapses in vision. Our results implicate experience-driven plasticity as one governing principle in the neuronal organization of binocular vision.
Vision Research | 2015
Jan Brascamp; P.C. Klink; Willem J. M. Levelt
It has been fifty years since Levelts monograph On Binocular Rivalry (1965) was published, but its four propositions that describe the relation between stimulus strength and the phenomenology of binocular rivalry remain a benchmark for theorists and experimentalists even today. In this review, we will revisit the original conception of the four propositions and the scientific landscape in which this happened. We will also provide a brief update concerning distributions of dominance durations, another aspect of Levelts monograph that has maintained a prominent presence in the field. In a critical evaluation of Levelts propositions against current knowledge of binocular rivalry we will then demonstrate that the original propositions are not completely compatible with what is known today, but that they can, in a straightforward way, be modified to encapsulate the progress that has been made over the past fifty years. The resulting modified, propositions are shown to apply to a broad range of bistable perceptual phenomena, not just binocular rivalry, and they allow important inferences about the underlying neural systems. We argue that these inferences reflect canonical neural properties that play a role in visual perception in general, and we discuss ways in which future research can build on the work reviewed here to attain a better understanding of these properties.
Psychological Science | 2012
Jan Brascamp; Randolph Blake
Binocular rivalry refers to the unstable perceptual experience that arises when an observer views a different image with each eye: Each image reaches awareness in turn as the other becomes temporarily invisible. Using a novel experimental paradigm, we provide the first direct, perceptual evidence that binocular rivalry occurs only in the presence of attention. Observers in our experiment withdrew attention from a binocular rivalry stimulus shortly after one of the eyes’ images was forced to visibility. Seconds later, they shifted attention back to the stimulus to report their perception. For all observers, reported perception strongly and significantly deviated from the results that would be expected if binocular rivalry continued during inattention. Strikingly, reports instead exactly matched those obtained when the stimulus was physically removed for seconds rather than left unattended. These results show that disregarding a binocular rivalry stimulus is equivalent to having it removed from view. Thus, inattention abolishes binocular rivalry.
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B | 2014
Randolph Blake; Jan Brascamp; David J. Heeger
This essay critically examines the extent to which binocular rivalry can provide important clues about the neural correlates of conscious visual perception. Our ideas are presented within the framework of four questions about the use of rivalry for this purpose: (i) what constitutes an adequate comparison condition for gauging rivalrys impact on awareness, (ii) how can one distinguish abolished awareness from inattention, (iii) when one obtains unequivocal evidence for a causal link between a fluctuating measure of neural activity and fluctuating perceptual states during rivalry, will it generalize to other stimulus conditions and perceptual phenomena and (iv) does such evidence necessarily indicate that this neural activity constitutes a neural correlate of consciousness? While arriving at sceptical answers to these four questions, the essay nonetheless offers some ideas about how a more nuanced utilization of binocular rivalry may still provide fundamental insights about neural dynamics, and glimpses of at least some of the ingredients comprising neural correlates of consciousness, including those involved in perceptual decision-making.