Jan Deckers

Obesity, public health, and the consumption of animal products.

Partly in response to rising rates of obesity, many governments have published healthy eating advice. Focusing on health advice related to the consumption of animal products (APs), I argue that the individualistic paradigm that prevails must be replaced by a radically new approach that emphasizes the duty of all human beings to restrict their negative “Global Health Impacts” (GHIs). If they take human rights seriously, many governments from nations with relatively large negative GHIs—including the Australian example provided here—must develop strategies to reduce their citizens’ negative GHIs. As the negative GHIs associated with the consumption of many APs are excessive, it is my view that many governments ought to adopt a qualified ban on the consumption of APs.

Why two arguments from probability fail and one argument from Thomson’s analogy of the violinist succeeds in justifying embryo destruction in some situations

The scope of embryo research in the UK has been expanded by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Research Purposes) Regulations 2001. Two advisory bodies—the Chief Medical Officer’s Expert Group and the House of Lords’ Select Committee—presented various arguments in favour of embryo research. One of these is the view that, just as lottery tickets have relatively little value before the draw because of the low probability of their being the winning ticket, early embryos have relatively little value because of the presumed low probability that they will mature into more developed embryos. This (first) argument from probability is questioned in this paper, as well as the contention that allowing embryo destruction is incompatible with the view that embryos have full moral status. Although I challenge Savulescu’s view that early embryos should be entered into a lottery in which they are subjected to the probability of being destroyed (the second argument from probability), a revised version of Thomson’s analogy of the famous violinist defies the view that the position that the embryo has full moral status is incompatible with qualified support for embryo destruction.

Are those who subscribe to the view that early embryos are persons irrational and inconsistent? A reply to Brock

Dan Brock has asserted that those who claim that the early embryo has full moral status are not consistent, and that the rationality of such a position is dubious when it is adopted from a religious perspective. I argue that both claims are flawed. Starting with the second claim, which is grounded in Brock’s moral abstolutist position, I argue that Brock has provided no argument on why the religious position should be less rational than the secular position. With regard to the first claim, I argue that those who hold the view that the early embryo has full moral status can be consistent even if they do not oppose sexual reproduction, even if they do not grieve as much over the loss of embryos as over the loss of other humans, even if they prefer to save one child instead of 100 embryos in the event of fire, and even if they do not accept racism and sexism.

In Defence of the Vegan Project

The vegan project is defined as the project that strives for radical legal reform to pass laws that would reserve the consumption of animal products to a very narrow range of situations, resulting in vegan diets being the default diets for the majority of human beings. Two objections that have been raised against such a project are described. The first is that such a project would jeopardise the nutritional adequacy of human diets. The second is that it would alienate human beings from nature. It is argued that neither undermines the vegan project.

Animal (De)liberation: Should the Consumption of Animal Products Be Banned?

In this book, Jan Deckers addresses the most crucial question that people must deliberate in relation to how we should treat other animals: whether we should eat animal products. Many people object to the consumption of animal products from the conviction that it inflicts pain, suffering, and death upon animals. This book argues that a convincing ethical theory cannot be based on these important concerns: rather, it must focus on our interest in human health. Tending to this interest demands not only that we extend speciesism—the attribution of special significance to members of our own species merely because they belong to the same species as ourself—towards nonhuman animals, but also that we safeguard the integrity of nature. In this light, projects that aim to engineer the genetic material of animals to reduce their capacities to feel pain and to suffer are morally suspect. The same applies to projects that aim to develop in-vitro flesh, even if the production of such flesh should be welcomed on other grounds. The theory proposed in this book is accompanied by a political goal, the ‘vegan project’, which strives for a qualified ban on the consumption of animal products. Deckers also provides empirical evidence that some support for this goal exists already, and his analysis of the views of others—including those of slaughterhouse workers—reveals that the vegan project stands firm in spite of public opposition. Many charges have been pressed against vegan diets, including: that they alienate human beings from nature; that they increase human food security concerns; and that they are unsustainable. Deckers argues that these charges are legitimate in some cases, but that, in many situations, vegan diets are actually superior. For those who remain doubtful, the book also contains an appendix that considers whether vegan diets might actually be nutritionally adequate.

Could some people be wronged by contracting swine flu? A case discussion on the links between the farm animal sector and human disease

This paper uses the imaginary case of Gemma, presented initially at the International Swine Flu Conference (London, March 2010), to discuss whether a nurse who disagrees with most ways in which animals are farmed would be wronged if she contracted swine flu. It is argued that the farm animal sector has contributed to the emergence of H1N1 flu, and that the sector in general contributes significantly to the burden of human disease. The aim of this paper is to promote debate on the question as to whether a range of systems used by the farm animal sector survive moral scrutiny in light of these concerns.

The new EU directive on the use of animals for research and the value of moral consistency.

Beginning in 2013, the European Union (EU) Directive 2010/63/EU on the protection of animals used for scientific purposes must be implemented by member states (European Parliament and the Council of the European Union 2010). This editorial aims to reveal a moral inconsistency underlying EU legislation on the use of animals and to prepare for further reform in laws that govern the use of animals worldwide. In his recent book on the ethics of animal experimentation, Andrew Knight estimates that at least 126.9 million animals with vertebrates were used in experiments in 2005 (Knight 2011, 16). According to the organisation Animals Deserve Absolute Protect ion Today and Tomorrow (ADAPTT 2012), the number of animals who are killed for human food every year exceeds 150 billion. However, this is considered to be a very conservative estimate based on available data gathered in 2003. For every animal used in experiments, it is therefore likely that at least 1,200 animals are killed to provide food. These statistics are mentioned here not from a desire to show that the number of animals used for research is relatively insignificant compared to the number of animals used for food, but, rather, to point out a glaring inconsistency: Whilst fairly stringent legal codes have been developed to regulate the activities of experimenters who work in a sector that uses relatively few animals, legal codes continue to turn a blind eye to the vast numbers of animals who are being used for food. In most EU legislation, the articles that form the core of the legal text are preceded by a number of recitals that provide reasons underpinning the law. Directive 2010/ 63/EU is a remarkable legal document, particularly because of recitals 10 and 12. Recital 10 states that “this Directive represents an important step towards achieving the final goal of full replacement of procedures on live animals” (European Parliament and the Council of the European Union 2010). Recital 12 posits that “the use of animals for scientific or educational purposes should... only be considered where a non-animal alternative is unavailable” (European Parliament and the Council of the European Union 2010). The reason why these recitals are so interesting is that they would have drastic implications for the use of animals for food, if people were prepared to be consistent. This is clear if we replace a few key words in recital 12: “the use of animals for” food “should... only be considered where a non-animal alternative is unavailable.” Indeed, the “final goal of full replacement” that recital 10 talks about seems to be within the reach of most people who live in the European Union today: Most people have sufficient non-animal alternatives available to feed Bioethical Inquiry (2012) 9:377–379 DOI 10.1007/s11673-012-9400-0

Does the Consumption of Farmed Animal Products Cause Human Hunger

Though the human consumption of farmed animal products (FAPs) is rising at an unprecedented rate, the number of undernourished people exceeds 1 billion. FAPs can provide nutritional benefits, but their human health impacts, particularly how their consumption affects the health of others, have hardly been recognized. In this article the question of whether or not the consumption of FAPs causes human hunger is explored. A survey of the direct and indirect negative human health impacts is provided to shed light on this issue. Because the farm animal sector (FAS) facilitates the emergence and spread of a large number of human diseases and produces a wide range of indirect human health impacts associated with land use and degradation, water use and pollution, and fossil fuel use and atmospheric pollution, the consumption of some FAPs is associated with an increase in stressors that cause human hunger. The United Nations, however, adopts the view that everyone has a right to food. If the existence of this right is accepted, it must be asked whether or not this right is jeopardized unjustifiably by the consumption of FAPs. Rather than adopt a simplistic proposal for equal per capita shares, it is argued that what is needed is a careful, case-by-case consideration of how the consumption of FAPs might fit into a theory of global justice that allocates rights and duties, including the duty to safeguard the right to food of every human being.

Justice, negative GHIs, and the consumption of farmed animal products

In a previous work, I argued that all human beings should possess the right to adequate health protection and that we have good reasons to believe that not all human beings are or will be able to enjoy this right. I introduced the ‘Global Health Impact’ or ‘GHI’ concept as a unit of measurement to evaluate the effects of human actions on the health of human and nonhuman organisms and argued that the negative GHIs produced by our current generation jeopardise the right to adequate health protection of future generations unjustifiably. In this article, this incomplete theory of human justice is applied to the negative GHIs associated with the consumption of farmed animal products. Since the negative GHIs of such products generally exceed those associated with other diets, I argue that those who exceed their fair share of negative GHIs might curtail their consumption and that the costs of reducing negative GHIs in this domain might be lower than the costs associated with other things that could be done to reduce negative GHIs.

Why “Animal (De)liberation” survives early criticism and is pivotal to public health

Summary In 2016, the book Animal (De)liberation: Should the Consumption of Animal Products Be Banned? was published. This article aims to engage with the critique that this book has received and to clarify and reinforce its importance for human health. It is argued that the ideas developed in the book withstand critical scrutiny. As qualified moral veganism avoids the pitfalls of other moral positions on human diets, public health policies must be altered accordingly, subject to adequate political support for its associated vegan project.